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Essays On the Informational Role of Credit Default Swaps
Chapter 1: Credit Default Swaps Pricing Errors and Related Stock Returns
This article investigates the impacts of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) pricing errors on re-
lated stock returns. Using a parsimonious CDS valuation model, which produces an above
average adjusted R2 of 90%, I find that its pricing errors significantly predict cross section
stock returns. Further investigation reveals that the cross-market return predictability chan-
nels via Merton (1974)’s structural prediction and primary dealers’ capital risk. This paper
provides a novel view on the complex interactions of capital markets and offers insights on
the relative market efficiencies.
Chapter 2: CDS Markets Informativeness and Related Hard-to-Value Stock Returns
This research investigates the conundrum whether the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) market
is informed relative to the equity market. To do this, we examine the impact of CDS price
changes on stock returns calculated by transaction prices in various trading intervals within
daily close-to-close. We find that stock returns overreact to credit news during trading
hours and partially reverse after the market closes. The predictive effect of CDS news con-
centrates on “hard-to-value stocks” with high credit spreads. The reversal happens mainly
because overconfident investors over-bet on credit news. Limit-to-arbitrage such as stock
illiquidity and short-sale constraint cannot fully explain the predictive results. Overall, our
empirical evidence suggests that CDS informed traders step into hard-to-value stocks with
high credit spread levels.
Chapter 3: The Effect of CDS on Earnings Quality: The Role of CDS Information
This paper investigates whether the initiation of trading in credit default swaps (CDSs)
on a borrowing firm’s outstanding debt is associated with the decline in that firm’s earnings
quality. Using a differences-in-differences approach, we find that after CDS trade initia-
tion, there is a significant reduction in intentional earnings manipulation of the underlying
borrowing firms. The reduction of earnings management activities is channeled through
trade credit exposures and corporate cash holdings. Further, we show that CDS prices
convey distress risk information of firms with poor earnings quality and help to improve
their risk fundamentals through conservative liquidity management strategy such as holding
more cash, enhancing future operating cash flow, and increasing net working capital. Over-
all, our evidence suggests that an external monitoring role provided by CDS markets can
reduce earnings management activities and mitigate the information asymmetry between
corporate insiders and outsiders.
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CHAPTER 1
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS PRICING ERRORS AND RELATED STOCK
RETURNS
1.1 Introduction
Capital markets underlying firms proliferate over time, not only for their sizes but also for
their types. At the same time, they are segmented (Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977),
Errunza and Losq (1985), Merton (1987))1. The co-existence of various segmented fi-
nancial markets leads to complexities and various channels to digest their fundamental
linkages.
This article asks a closely related question: How do pricing errors of securities in one
financial market affect prices of related securities in another financial market? Understand-
ing this question adds value to numerous theoretical works (e.g., Easley, O’Hara, and Srini-
vas (1998), Goldstein, Li, and Yang (2013), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Kondor
and Vayanos (2014), Duffie and Zhu (2017), and Greenwood, Hanson, and Liao (2018),
and many others) that attempt to understand the relative market efficiencies in the context
of market segmentation. This is the first empirical study to look at firm-level pricing errors
spillover among various capital markets.
Specifically, I dive into studying pricing errors spillover from CDS to stock markets.
The focus on stock/CDS is motivated by Merton (1974)’s structure framework implying
that a negative contemporaneous relation between stock and CDS prices holds2. I look at
1This implies that some frictions are making asset per unit of risks unequalized across different related
financial claims.
2Specifically, changes in stock price and credit spread must be negatively related to preventing arbitrage.
The link is built by the insight that changes of equity price are increasing respect to fundamental value of firm
as it mimics the call options payoff, whereas changes of CDS prices are decreasing respect to fundamental
value of firm as it mimics the put options payoffs, the sensitivities between CDS price changes and stock
price changes should expected to be negative.
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CDS rather than corporate bond because CDS is more liquid and may contain rich informa-
tion of active, informed trading among institutional investors such as hedge funds, mutual
funds, and investment banks (Acharya and Johnson (2007)) 3.
I start with estimating CDS markets are pricing errors using cross-sectional regression
following Kapadia and Pu (2012); Galil et al. (2014); Bai and Wu (2016), and many
other studies. The estimation is done at a daily frequency. I find that stock volatility,
market leverage, credit rating, M/B ratio, ROA, Corporate liquidity, Cash holding, market
capitalization, and level, a slope of CDS term-structure jointly produce over 90% adjusted
R2 for 887 U.S. firms from 2001 to 2015. Such high adjusted R2 suggests that the proposed
CDS valuation model can sufficiently explain the cross-sectional variations in CDS spreads,
thus mitigates the concern of omitted variable bias. I compute cross-sectional residuals
from the pricing model each day and denote the residuals as CDS pricing errors (CPE,
henceforth).
I find that CPEs positively predict cross-sectional stock returns. Using a portfolio sort-
ing, I show that buying stocks with the past largest CPEs and shorting stocks with the
smallest past CPEs generates daily returns of 0.025% with a t-statistic of 2.1 (0.027% with
a t-statistic of 2.9 adjusted for risks). Using a Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression, I doc-
ument that the return predictability of CPE lasts for 20 days, which is not explained by a
list of well-known cross-section stock return predictors4.
Next, I interpret the source of stock return predictability by relying on the structure link
between stock and CDS prices (Merton (1974)). The idea is as follows: high (low) CPEs
predict low (high) future CDS returns5 and stock returns negatively comove with CDS re-
3Although CDS is less liquid than stock, CDS is the most liquid and popular credit derivatives. Jiang
and Zhu (2015) showed that, because of liquidity incentive, mutual fund investors shift from bond to CDS
markets by replacing long position in bond to short position in CDS (e.g., protection seller). Furthermore,
informed institutional investors dominate the U.S. corporate bonds market. The structure changes from bond
to CDS documented by Jiang and Zhu (2015) suggesting that the intensity of informed trading becomes larger
in CDS markets.
4Additional analysis shows that the predictive power of CPE on stock markets remains significant when
stock market pricing errors are controlled. It suggests that the CPEs contain additional information to stock
markets when stock market pricing errors are controlled.
5This claim suggests CDS markets inefficiency. Specifically, CDSs, which are seemingly priced wrongly
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turns predicted by CPE following Merton (1974)’s prediction. That is, a positive predictive
relation between CPEs and stock returns is expected to intermediate via future CDS move-
ments, which are linked via lagged CPE. I prove this argument by showing that (1) CPEs
negatively predict future CDS returns; (2) The (negative) comovements of stock/CDS pairs
at t+1 are much stronger for firms when CDSs are mispriced at t. I abbreviate the mecha-
nism as CPE spillover. Guided by the structure prediction, I use CDS return as an instru-
ment to isolate the stock/CDS pair, which is triggered by lagged CPE from the stock/CDS
pair, which is less likely to be triggered by lagged CPE via double-sort. Additionally, I
construct a spread portfolio6 to capture the CPE spillover effect.
Lastly, I show that capital risk of financial intermediary bridges the gap of CPE spillover.
Recent theoretical literature (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Frazzini and Pedersen
(2014), Kondor and Vayanos (2014), Goldstein, Li, and Yang (2014), Greenwood, Hanson,
and Liao (2017)) suggested that shocks on cross-market investors’ funding capital can af-
fect the cross-sectional asset prices when these investors provide liquidity for various mar-
kets. I proxy the shocks using aggregate financial intermediaries or primary dealers capital
constraint followed by He, Kelly, and Manela (2016). Firstly, I find that CPE spillover
arises when a correlation between CPE spillover and shocks in financial intermediaries’
capital constraint rises. This is consistent with He, Kelly, and Manela (2016)s’ point that
higher assets’ covariances with primary dealers’ capital risk are associated with a lower
marginal value of wealth, therefore, higher the expected equilibrium returns. Secondly, I
show that the adverse selection cost plays a vital role in determining CPE spillover when
at t, will sluggishly adjust back to their fair value in future via arbitrage. Empirical asset pricing studies
find that the abnormal stock returns emerge when one short (buy) the overpriced (underpriced) stocks in the
short (long) leg of anomaly portfolios (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan 2012, Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan 2015, and
Stambaugh and Yuan 2016).
6In particular, a spread portfolio is constructed as follows: Firstly, I conduct a stock portfolio, which
is triggered by future CDS returns that are negatively correlated with past CPE by buying stocks in high
lagged CPE, low CDS returns quartile and shorting stocks in low lagged CPE, high CDS returns quartile.
Secondly, I construct a stock portfolio, which is less likely to be induced by future CDS returns that are
negatively correlated with past CPE by buying stocks in low lagged CPE, low CDS returns quartile and
shorting stocks in high lagged CPE, high CDS returns quartile. Thirdly, I take a long-short portfolio between
the two portfolios and use it as a proxy for CPE spillover effect portfolio. For more discussion, please refer
to section 1.4.2.
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financial intermediaries face a tighter capital constraint. In particular, the empirical results
reveal that cross-market liquidity providers tend to participate in transparent firms to mini-
mize information adverse selection cost. However, tightening funding capital restricts their
abilities to provide liquidities, thus inducing CDS spillover for these firms. It tells that
which firms cross-market investors would like to participate.
The paper relates to three strands of literature. Firstly, recent papers uncover that,
within a capital market, pricing errors can predict future cross-sectional returns. Using a
statistical approach (e.g., both linear and non-linear models) to come up with fair values,
they found that the distance between implied fair values and the market values indicates
mispricing. A convergence trade that goes longing the negative pricing errors asset and
shorting the positive pricing errors asset generated a statistically significant alpha. As for
stock markets, Bartram and Grinblatt (2018a) constructed a mispricing measure using 28
the most common accounting characteristics for U.S. stocks and found that buying the
stocks with negative pricing errors and shorting stocks with the positive mispricing errors
generate risk-adjusted returns of up to 10% per year. Bartram and Grinblatt (2018b) extend
their study to an international sample consisting of 25,000 stocks from 36 countries, and
they found that the convergence trade strategy proposed in Bartram and Grinblatt (2018a)
continuously performs well. Lyandres, Matveyev, and Zhdanov (2017) developed pricing
errors based on a real options model and found that a long-short strategy that buys under-
valued stocks and shorts overvalued stocks generates annualized alphas between 10% and
17%. He, Huang, and Zhou (2018) conducted the pricing errors of a universal U.S. public
listed stocks using standard asset pricing factors. They found that the convergence trade
(buying the negative pricing errors and shorting the positive pricing errors stocks) generate
a monthly average return from 0.67% to 0.8%. As for CDS markets, Jarrow et al. (2018)
conducted statistical arbitrages based on a reduced-form pricing model along CDSs term
structure and showed that a large amount of profit could be generated: annualized returns
of around 71.5% with annualized Sharpe Ratio 7.8 given a good fit of the model. This
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article builds on these recent study by showing that pricing errors of one capital market
can spillover to another related market. This has implication on relative market efficiency
under market segmentation.
Secondly, the paper contributes to the recent literature on asset prices interaction among
partially segmented markets. Greenwood, Hanson, and Liao (2017) showed that large sup-
ply shocks disconnect the fundamental linkage of related securities in the presence of slow-
moving capital, resulting in a capital that moves quickly within an asset class but slowly
across asset classes. In a similar vein, studies by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009),
Kondor and Vayanos (2014), Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) suggested that cross-market
investors (or representative arbitrageur) funding liquidity risk plays an important role in
shaping the relative price efficiencies among related security markets. Goldstein, Li, and
Yang (2014) suggested that different opinions7 generate various directions of trades (e.g.,
hedgers and speculators are likely to place opposite orders given the same information),
thus reducing the overall price informativeness and inducing excess volatilities. On the
empirical side, Yu (2005) suggested that capital structure arbitrageurs are the main forces
to integrate credit and equity markets. Kapadia and Pu (2012) found that potential funding
constraints and other liquidity reasons are the factors that deploy the speed of convergence
trade. This paper brings the asset mispricing into segmented markets. The CPE spillover
suggests that there are certain degrees of inefficiencies that cannot be mitigated in the short
run but vanish in long-run via cross-market trading activities. Additionally, the results con-
nect the recent financial intermediaries studies (Recently, He and Krishnamurthy (2012,
2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), He, Kelly, and Manela (2016)) to the broader
set of literature who study relative market efficiency on segmented markets (e.g., the shock
to intermediaries capital structure is a good proxy for the supply shock in Greenwood,
Hanson, and Liao (2017)). It implies that financial intermediaries are one type of important
cross-market investors who are able to influence asset prices of related securities.
7w.r.t. different traders treat the same firm-specific information differently among different capital mar-
kets.
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Lastly, this study provides evidence of predicting cross-sectional stock returns using
CDS information. Friewald, Wagner, and Zechner (2014) found that estimated risk pos-
itively drives equity excess returns. Lee, Naranjo, and Sirmans (2016) found that stock
market momentum works better when past stock returns agree with past CDS returns. Han,
Subrahmanyam, and Zhou (2017) showed that credit slope negatively predicts next-month
cross-section stock returns.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the sample.
Section 3 presents the measurement procedure of CDS pricing errors. Section 4 provides
evidence that CDS pricing errors predict cross-sectional stock returns as well as investi-
gates the economic mechanism of the source of return predictability. Section 5 provides
additional analysis on (1) jointly investigating pricing errors of stock and CDS markets and
(2) showing that CPE spillover destabilizes stock markets. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Variable construction
I detail the data used in this study that combines CDS spreads, equity prices, and relevant
accounting information.
Credit default swaps I obtain daily CDS spreads for 887 USD denominated contracts
of U.S. based reference entities from Markit for the period between January 2001 and De-
cember 2015. I choose CDS term structure with tenors of 1/2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 15,
20, and 30 years. The CDS data consists of modified-restructuring (MR) clause before
the “Big Bang protocol in April 2009 and no-restructuring (XR) clause afterward follow-
ing Friewald, Wagner, and Zechner (2014), Lee, Naranjo, and Sirmans (2016), and Lee,
Naranjo, and Velioglu (2017). I apply a filter to remove stale prices when I observe the
same prices on at least five consecutive days following Friewald, Wagner, and Zechner
(2014). In such case, I only consider the first of these observations and classify subsequent
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observations as not available. The CDS returns are computed by percentage changes in
CDS spreads following Kapadia and Pu (2012) and Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson (2015).
As noted by Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson (2015), CDS returns should equal to percentage
changes in quoted CDS spreads adjusted by an annuity ratio. However, in practice, the
annuity ratio is closed to 1. Therefore, the CDS spread changes are a great proxy for CDS
returns.
Equities The share splits and dividends adjusted closing share prices, numbers of shares
outstanding, and daily returns including dividends are obtained from the Center for Re-
search in Security Prices (CRSP). To obtain daily equity volatilities for each stock, I esti-
mate each firms ex-ante volatility σi,t at each point in time using an exponentially weighted
moving average (EWMA) model following Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009). The spec-
ification is σ2i,t = r
2
i,t−1(1− λ) + σ2i,t−1λ, where λ is fixed at 0.94 following by JP Morgan
RiskMetrics. I combine the equity and CDS dataset primarily using first 6-digit CUSIP.
Then, I conduct a manual match across two databases using long-legal names for the rest
of the firms. It results in 1,819,443 firm-day observations for 887 firms from January 2001
to December 2015.
Accounting information I consider seven credit informative firm characteristics from
the COMPUSTAT database and merge them to Stock, CDS dataset based on earnings an-
nouncement date (RDQ). The missing values between any of two consecutive quarters are
filled using observations from the first quarter. The accounting variables include the mar-
ket leverage ratio, credit rating, M/B ratio, ROA, Corporate liquidity, Cash, and market
capitalization. Appendix 1.5 provides detail descriptions on variables construction.
Other data VIX and TED are from the Federal Reserve Bank of ST.Louis (FRED).
Fama-French 5 factors are from Professor French’s website. Primary dealers’ market eq-
uities and book debts are from DataStream. The aggregate intermediary capital ratio is
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computed as the aggregate value of market equity divided by aggregate market equity plus
aggregate book debt of primary dealers active in day t following He, Kelly, and Manela
(2016). I denote it as η.
1.2.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the data used in this study from January 2001 to
December 2015.
[Table 1 about here]
The mean (AVG), standard deviation (STDV), first 25 percentile (P25), median (P50),
and last 25 percentile (P75) are constructed cross-sectionally by each date, and the time-
series averages of these cross-sectional statistics are reported in Table 1. One key observa-
tion of Table 1 is that the sample consists of considerable size, strong financial firms with a
slightly positive ROA, moderate market leverage, and reasonable corporate liquidity. The
average credit rating is about BBB.
1.3 CDS Pricing Errors
1.3.1 Measuring framework
In this section, I generate empirical valuation on 5-year CDS spreads using cross-sectional
linear regression and obtain CDS pricing errors as residuals of the model8. Specifically, I
first estimate cross-sectional regressions separately at the end of each day t
CDSi,t = αt + Xi,t × λt + i,t (1.1)
8I adopt the parsimonious approach introduced by Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) to do the CDS valuation
rather than reduced-form approach. It has two advantage: (1) The Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001)s’ approach is
easier to implement compared with the reduced-form approach used by, for instance, Jarrow et al. (2018); (2)
the default probability embedded in CDS spreads can be explicitly identified. The use of 5-year CDS spread
as the dependent variable is because this is the most liquid tenor.
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where Xi,t isNt by K matrix that consists of set of explanatory variables on evaluating CDS
spreads and λt is K by 1 vector that consists of estimated slope coefficients, Nt indicates
number of firms at each day t. Eq. (2.1) is similar to the estimation conducted in Kapa-
dia and Pu (2012) and Bai and Wu (2016), with the exception that I estimate the model
in daily frequency. I then collect residuals i,t from Eq. (1.1) at each t. The firm-specific
variable Xi,t used in the Eq. (1.1) including stock volatility, market leverage, credit rating,
M/B ratio, ROA, Corporate liquidity, Cash, market capitalization, and level, a slope of CDS
term-structure. Stock volatility and market leverage serve as key inputs of Merton (1974)’s
structure models and are extensively used by existing literature to price CDS spread (See,
for example, Campbell and Taksler (2003); Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009)). Includ-
ing additional accounting covariates is motivated by a long list of literature suggesting that
stock volatility and market leverage cannot fully explain CDS spreads (see, Cremers et
al. (2004); Tang and Yan (2010); Galil et al. (2014); Bai and Wu (2016) among many
other studies). Lastly, I consider two novel factors - (cross-sectional) level and slope of
(firm level) CDS term structure to explain CDS spreads. The inclusion of the two factors
is motivated by the spanning hypothesis of the term structure of interest rate studies (e.g.,
Litterman and Scheinkman (1991), Bauer and Hamilton (2017) among many others) sug-
gesting that the level and slope of bond yield curves are sufficient to estimate bond risk
premia. I borrow the idea to study cross-sectional CDS spread determinants. The level fac-
tor is computed by the simple average of CDS spread along the entire CDS term-structure
for each firm at each day. The slope factor is computed by the difference between 30-year
CDS spread and 6-month CDS spread for each firm at each day. Both level and slope are
lagged by 30 days to mitigate the concern of overfitting. Thus, the sample of later analysis
is starting from February 2001.
To ensure that estimated pricing errors are not just echo levels of CDS spread, I stan-
9
Figure 1.1: This figure shows that the time series of adjusted R2 estimate from cross-
sectional regressions using Eq. (2.1) from 2001 to 2015.
dardize those by CDS spreads level at each t
CPEi,t =
i,t
CDS Spreadi,t
(1.2)
I denote CDS pricing error as CPE, which considers how much realized CDS spread de-
viates from the model generated spread. Overvalue (undervalue) is defined as CPEi,t > 0
(<0).
1.3.2 Results on CDS pricing errors
Adjusted R2 As displayed in Figure 1, while estimated adjusted R2s are lower around
2001 and 2008-09 financial crisis, the adjusted R2s stay around 90% for the entire sample
period (more precisely, the unconditional mean of adjusted R2 is 91.34%). Such high
adjusted R2 suggests that the proposed CDS valuation model can sufficiently explain the
cross-sectional variations in CDS spreads. It reduces the concern of omitted pricing factors.
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Slope coefficients of key factors Figure 2 plots slope coefficients of input factors of
cross-sectional regression model (Eq. (1.1)) over the entire sample period. From panel
A, we see that the level of term-structure positively explain the 5-year CDS spreads of all
times. From Panel B, the term-structure slope is, on average, negatively explaining the
5-year CDS spread. Panel C and D show that the 5-year CDS spread is overall positively
related to market leverage and volatility that is consistent with Merton (1974)’s prediction.
The results on the estimated slope coefficients of other determinants are reported in Panel
E to Panel J of Figure 2.
Summary statistics of CPE Table 2 reports the summary statistics of CPE given 5-year
CDS spread quartile9. The sample averages of CPE across Q1 (quartile with that smallest
CDS spread) to Q4 (quartile with the largest CDS spread) are -0.027, -0.074, -0.05, and
0.002 respectively. As expected, they are not monotonically increasing in CDS spreads
since the residuals of Eq. (1.1) are scaled by the 5-year CDS spread level. The sample
deviations (reported in brackets below the sample mean) are decreasing from 0.67 of Q1 to
0.25 of Q4.
[Table 2 about here]
1.4 Do CDS pricing errors predict stock returns?
I investigate whether CPE can predict cross-sectional stock market returns. Intuitively, the
spillovers from CPE to future stock returns should channel through the negative contem-
poraneous future price changes between two markets as suggested by Merton (1974),10
9At each day t, I sort CPE by four equal-weighted quartile portfolios using CDS spread at day t. The
portfolios are rebalanced every day.
10Changes in stock price and credit spread must be negatively related to prevent arbitrage. The link is
built by the insight that changes of equity price are increasing respect to a fundamental value of a firm as it
mimics the call options payoff, whereas changes of CDS prices are decreasing respect to a fundamental value
of the firm as it mimics the put options payoffs. The sensitivities between CDS price changes and stock price
changes should be expected to be negative.
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if stock markets ride on CDS market pricing errors. More precisely, it means that cross-
market capital structure arbitrageurs exploit arbitrage opportunities in stock markets at t+1
by relying on the contemporaneous CDS price changes induced by CPE at t. Studies such
as Yu (2005) and Kapadia and Pu (2012) confirm that arbitrageurs’ convergence trades
drive contemporaneous price movements between two markets. Therefore, I expected that
CPE positively predicts next period cross-section stock returns.
1.4.1 Predictive results
Portfolio sort I examine the prediction using the portfolio sorting approach. I build
value-weighted quartile portfolios at a daily frequency. In particular, I sort stock returns
into quartiles based on lagged CPE for each day, form a value-weighted portfolio in each
quartile, and hold that portfolio for 1-day. There are different ways of choosing portfolio
weights, but the results are robust across various weighting schemes. Here, I use value-
weight to highlight the role of blue-chip firms as they have better market depths and are
supposed to be more attractive to investors. I denote them as CPE-stock-sorted portfolios.
[Table 3 about here]
Panel A of Table 3 reports daily value-weighted returns of CPE-stock-sorted portfolios
and returns on a strategy that longs stocks in the highest CPE quartile (Q4) and short the
stocks in the smallest CPE quartile (Q1). In column (1), the average daily returns of stock
portfolios exhibit an increasing pattern from Q1 to Q4. In particular, it shows raw returns
of 0.011%, 0.028%, 0.041%, and 0.034% ranging for Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4. Going long in
Q4 and shorting in Q1 generate daily returns of 0.025% with a t-statistic of 2.1. Columns
(2) to (8) report the risk-adjusted returns based on the Fama-French 5-factor model and
their factor loadings. The result holds even after adjusting for risks. In column (2), we see
that a FF5 α of spread portfolio yields average return of 0.027% with a t-statistic of 2.9.
Additionally, inspection of a negative loading on market factor of -0.205 with a t-statistic
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of -9.8 in column (3) reveals that the long-short stock portfolio between high CPE and low
CPE provides an excellent hedge for market risk. As shown in the last column, the adjusted
R2 of the spread portfolio is 22.4%.
I also examine the predictability at the industry level. By (value-weighted) aggregating
individual firms into industry level, I compute industries returns at t with the lowest CPE
values at t-1 and industries returns at t with the highest CPE values at t-1 respectively. Long
the high CPE industries and short the low CPE industries (“H-L” in Panel B of Table 3) is
the difference in returns between the two groups. I consider Fama and French ten industries
and Fama and French 17 industries. For Fama and French ten industries, I define the lowest
CPE group as the bottom three industries with the lowest CPE value at t-1 and the highest
CPE group as the top three industries with highest CPE value accordingly. For Fama and
French 17 industries, I define the lowest CPE groups as the bottom 5 and the highest groups
as the top five at t-1. The industry level results in Panel B are consistent with firm-level
results in Panel A. Columns (1) and (2) report the results of a FF17 industry. Buy high CPE
industry (0.037% with t-value=2.3) and sell low CPE industries (0.002 with t-value=0.1)
produces 0.035% with t-value=2.1 per day. This holds after adjusting for the Fama and
French 5 factor model. Columns (3) and (4) report the results of a FF10 industry. The
results are quantitatively similar to the case of FF17.
Time-series dynamic Figure 3 plots the time-series dynamics of the cumulative stock
returns of spread portfolio between the highest CPE and the lowest CPE quartile and an
aggregate capital ratio of a primary dealer from 2001 to 2015. Firstly, I show that the cu-
mulative returns are in general increase over the entire sample. However, it appears that
returns during the pre-financial crisis are higher than the post-crisis period (GFC, hence-
forth). More importantly, the strategy experienced a crash during the second half of 2007 to
2008 global financial crisis. Secondly, I find that the evolution of the CPE spread portfolio
appears to coincide with the primary dealers’ capital ratio. For instance, I highlight three
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significant increases in cumulative returns: (1) Dot-com bubble period; (2) first half of GFC
period; and (3) Euro crisis of 2011. Interestingly, it shows that the increase in returns is
associated with a decrease of primary dealers’ capital ratio during three episodes. Addi-
tionally, the crash during the second half of GFC seems to correlate with a big improvement
of primary dealers’ capital ratio. It appears to be consistent with the poor performance of
capital structure arbitrage strategy during the period (e.g., one of capital structure arbitrage
group of Deutsche Bank was shut down in the latter 2008.). Overall, it suggests that pri-
mary dealers play an essential role in the cross-market predictability. I investigate this in
more detail in section 1.4.2.
Fama-MacBeth regression In order to control for other known predictors of cross-section
stock returns and explore the return predictability in long-run, I test the hypothesis using
the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression. For each day, I run the following cross-sectional
regression
Ri,t+j,t+k = β0,t + β1,tCPEi,t + Xi,tγt + t+j,t+k (1.3)
where Ri,t+j,t+k is future t + j to t + k cumulative return. X is a Nt11 × 7 matrix in-
cluding past stock return (R), idiosyncratic volatility, past CDS return, past CDS volatil-
ity, past (log) market size, past log M/B ratio, and past ROA. The idiosyncratic volatility
(benchmarked based on Fama-French 5 factors) and CDS volatility are measured in daily
frequency using EWMA model based on past 1-month data. γt is 7× 1 vector consisting of
slope coefficients on the list of control variables. The key variable of interest is time-series
average of β1,1, which is expected to be positive.
[Table 4 about here]
Table 4 reports time-series averages of coefficients of the independent variables. Columns
(1) to (2) consider the return predictability on next 1-day cross-section stock returns where
11Nt represents number of firms at day t.
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j=k=1. Columns (3) to (8) report the return predictabilities based on different investment
horizons within 1-month. In column (1), CPE positively predicts next 1-day cross-section
stock market return at 5% significance level. The average of β1 is 0.02% (t-stat = 2.1),
which implies a daily return spread 0.025% between two extreme CPE quartiles in Table 3.
In column (2), I find that including a list of control variables does not affect β1. Columns
(3) to (8) examine the return predictability in longer horizons. In particular, columns (3)
to (4) examine the next 10-day cumulative returns and columns (5)-(6) examine the next
10 to 20 days cumulative stock returns. The slope coefficients of CPE are all significantly
positive indicating that the predictability of CPE can last for 20 days. Interestingly, a signif-
icant negative point estimate (-0.14%, t-stat=-2.1) in column (7) suggests that stock market
overreacts to CPE in short-run and exhibits a small reversal in 21 to 30 days. However, the
overreaction is subsumed by the list of control variables as shown in column (8).
1.4.2 Economic mechanism
A structure interpretation
In this section, I formally examine the source of return predictability. In Figure 4, I present
an interpretation by relying on the structure link between stock and CDS. The upper panel
of Figure 4 offers a hypothetical example of a structure prediction of comovement between
two assets without CPE spillover given an increase of firm value at t=0 (as discussed in
footnote 2 of introduction). The lower panel of Figure 4 presents a hypothetical example
of the prediction of comovement between two assets given an overvaluation (The case of
undervalued CDS can easily work out.) at t=0. In order to observe a positive relation
between lagged CPE and stock returns, two observations in the lower panel of Figure 4
need to be proved.
• Firstly, the spread of overvalued (CPE>0) CDS will drift downwards from t=0 to
t=1.
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• Secondly, these mispriced CDS should negatively comove with stock returns from
t=0 to t=1 due to a structure prediction of stock/CDS comovement highlighted in the
upper panel of Figure 4.
CPEs and expected CDS returns To empirically test the structure prediction, I first
examine a condition whether the spread of overvalued or CPE>0 (undervalued or CPE<0)
CDS will drift downwards (upwards) from t=0 to t=1. Mainly, I test an empirical prediction
using single-sort.
[Table 5 about here]
Table 5 reports daily value-weighted returns of CPE portfolios as well as returns on a
strategy that longs the smallest CPE quartile (Q1) and short the highest CPE quartile (Q4).
Column (1) shows that average returns are decreasing in the CPE quartile. CDSs in the Q1
quartile are undervalued and thus tend to be priced higher in the future. In contrast, CDSs
in Q4 tends to be priced lower in the future when current CPE is high. The economics
magnitude is enormous. The long-short strategy or spread portfolio has an average daily
return of 0.28% per day with a t-statistic of 6.7. The result holds after adjusting for risks in
columns (2) to (10). 12
Additional analysis by looking at the cumulative CDS return reactions regarding the
CDS pricing errors at downgrades provides further evidence that CDS with high pricing er-
rors tends to drift downwards, whereas CDS with low pricing errors tends to drift upwards
(see Appendix). When I shift to the long-run predictive test, I find that the predictability
12Column (2) to (10) report the risk-adjusted returns as well as factor loadings relative to a seven-factor
model, which consists of Fama-French 5 factors, CDS market factor (CMKT), and CDS liquidity factor
(CLIQ). The CDS market factor is constructed by taking a value-weighted CDS market returns across all
firms for each day t. The inclusion of the CLIQ is motivated by recent studies showing that liquidity premium
also plays a vital role in driving CDS prices (e.g., Tang and Yan (2007), Bongaerts, de Jong, and Driessen
(2011), Chen, Fabozzi, and Sverdlove (2010)). In Appendix 1.5, I detail the construction of the CLIQ factor.
The factor loading results in column (3) to (9) show that only HML and CMA produce marginal significance,
while the rest of loadings are statistically insignificant. Overall, it suggests that the risk model barely explains
spread portfolio returns.
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persists for up to 24 months and it decreases when arbitrage risk falls. This indicates that
CDSs, which are seemingly priced wrongly at t, will sluggishly adjust back to their fair
value in future via arbitrage. Lastly, I conduct a list of robustness tests by considering dif-
ferent versions of CDS valuation models and sub-samples (see Appendix). The empirical
results of a CDS liquidity factor are in (Appendix 1.5).
Overall, I uncover that cross-section CPEs negatively predict future CDS price changes
by showing that overvalue (classified as positive CPE) CDS will generate lower future CDS
returns vice versa. This is consistent with the structure prediction.
A return decomposition In this section, I examine to what extent stock/CDS future
movements are related to the pricing errors of CDS markets using a return decomposition
(to support the second bullet point in section 1.4.2). The idea underlying the decomposi-
tion is to isolate the the stock/CDS pair triggered by lagged CPE from the stock/CDS pair,
which is less likely to be caused by lagged CPE. Based on the structure predict, stock and
CDS should follow
Rt = β ×∆CDSt + t (1.4)
where β < 0 summarizes a negative correlation between stock and CDS returns. t repre-
sents the i.i.d idiosyncratic stock price moves. Rt is stock return.
Next, I decompose the CDS price changes to CPE-related components and CPE-unrelated
components
∆CDSt = γ × CPEt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
CPE related CDS returns
+ vt︸︷︷︸
CPE unrelated CDS returns
(1.5)
where γ < 0, given a strong predictive relation between CPE and future CDS price changes
discovered in previews section.
Moreover, I decompose stock returns into CPE related and CPE-unrelated parts. Sub-
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stitute Eq. (1.5) into Eq. (1.4) yields the decomposition
Rt = β × γ × CPEt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
CPE spillover
+ β × vt︸ ︷︷ ︸
CPE Unrelated Comovement
+t (1.6)
where β × γ > 0. The β × γ in the first term suggests the stock/CDS comovements from
CPE. The β in the second term suggests a negative stock/CDS comovement, which does not
relate to CPE spillover (It indicates a pure structure prediction on stock/CDS movements
suggested by the upper panel of Figure 3.).
Guided by the proposed hypothetical decomposition, the empirical strategy is to use
CDS return as an instrument to ex-post distinguish which (lagged) CPE triggers stock-CDS
pair’s return comovement via double-sort. Explicitly, I purge the CPE-stock-sorted quartile
portfolios to the contemporaneously CDS returns by double sorting stocks independently
at period t first into CPE quartile portfolios using lagged (at t-1) CPE and then, within each
quartile, compute four value-weighted stock portfolios sorted by CDS returns at t. It results
in 4 × 4 lagged CPE and CDS sorted stock portfolios. The CPE spillover is constructed
by buying stocks in high lagged CPE, low CDS returns quartile and shorting stocks in
low lagged CPE, high CDS returns quartile. I denote it as CPE spillover portfolio (CSP,
henceforth). The CPE separate part is constructed by buying stocks in low lagged CPE, low
CDS returns quartile and shorting stocks in high lagged CPE, high CDS returns quartile.
The reason to do so is to stress the stock/CDS return comovement that does not induced by
CDS returns predicted by CPE. I denote it as CPE unrelated portfolio (CSNP, henceforth).
Overall, the average return of CSP suggests the magnitude for CPE spillover effect via βγ.
The average return of CSNP suggests the magnitude of pure stock/CDS comovement via β
(upper panel of Figure 4).
[Table 6 about here]
Table 6 reports the results. Panel A is the sample average of 4 × 4 double-sort stock
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portfolios based on lagged CPE and CDS returns. It shows that a negative stock/CDS
return comovement is convincing (suggested by an upper panel of Figure 4). In particular,
the average returns of spread portfolio of stock returns between high CDS returns and low
CDS returns (“Q4-Q1” in Row 12 of Panel A, Table 6) are all negatively and statistically
significant. The CSP is constructed by the spread portfolio of stock returns (highlighted
in red) between high CPE, low CDS (0.131% with a t-statistic of 7.0) and low CPE, high
CDS (-0.068% with a t-statistic of -2.8) along the off-diagonal position of Panel A. The
CSP is constructed by the spread portfolio of stocks (highlighted in blue) between low
CPE, low CDS (0.064% with a t-statistic of 2.7) and high CPE, high CDS (-0.043% with
a t-statistic of -2.2) along the diagonal position. In Panel B, I find that sample average of
CSP is 0.199% (t-statistic of 11.3), which is significantly larger than of CSNP of 0.107%
(t-statistic of 6.4)13. The net spillover (NCSP) or a difference between CSP and CSNP is
0.092% (t-statistic of 3.5, statistically significant at 1% level) implying that there is more
reaction in stock/CDS comovement channeled through CPE than a comovement solely
triggered by a change of a value of a firm. The time-series correlation between NCSP and
the spread portfolio “Q4-Q1” reported in Panel A of Table 3 is 0.821, confirming that a
large amount of variation in the “Q4-Q1” of Panel A of Table 3 is indeed channeled via the
proposed structure interpretation.
The role of intermediate capital risk
Recent studies suggest the funding risk will limit market participants’ ability to correct mis-
pricing. For instance, arbitrageurs face funding constraints when attempting to arbitrage
away mispricing between the prices of two identical risky assets traded in segmented mar-
kets (Gromb and Vayanos (2002)). Longstaff (2004) showed that optimal trading strategies
in markets with margin constraints could allow asset mispricing to persist. Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009) developed a model in which highlights the role of investors’ fund-
13The t-statistic is inflated regarding the return predictive analysis because I use ex-post CDS returns to do
the decomposition.
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ing constraint given losses that can deviate prices away from fundamentals. Frazzini and
Pedersen (2014) argued that investors’ funding constraint leads to a beta anomaly. As a
result, risks of arbitrageurs funding ability can be one of the reasons for CPE spillover.
However, the identification on those arbitrageurs funding constraint is challenging because
the information of their trading books is confidential. Nevertheless, recent studies by He
and Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), and He, Kelly, and
Manela (2016) suggested that investigation of capital constraint faced by primary dealers
may contribute to the identification issue. Moreover, it makes economic sense to posit that
trading activities of primary dealer affect various capital markets. For instance, Siriwar-
dane (2015) showed that in 2011, about 50% of total net CDS protection in the U.S. was
sold by the top five dealers. Therefore, I predict CDS pricing error spillover is exposed
to primary dealers capital risks.
Next, I examine the cross-section variation in firm characteristic. I focus on the costs of
adverse selection when the cross-market investors serve as liquidity providers. Specifically,
these liquidity providers should participate in firms with less information asymmetry risk
to minimize the adverse selection costs. However, I expect that CPE spillover should be
more prone to transparent firms when cross-market investors face a tighter funding con-
straint. Therefore, I predict CDS pricing error spillover is stronger for less information
asymmetric firms given tighter funding constraint on primary dealers.
The role of primary dealers’ capital risk I first examine whether CDS pricing error
spillover is exposed to primary dealers capital risks. In order to test this hypothesis, I
examine the mean and covariance structure (w.r.t. CPE spillover) of shock in primary
dealers aggregate capital ratio ∆ηt, where primary dealers aggregate capital ratio ηt is
defined following He, Kelly, and Manela (2016) who match the New York Feds primary
dealer list with CRSP/Compustat and Datastream data on their publicly traded holding
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companies
ηt =
∑
i Market Equityi,t∑
i(Market Equityi,t + Book Debti,t)
(1.7)
where firm i is an NY Fed primary dealer during day t14. I compute the shock of η as
∆ηt = ηt − ηt−115. The list of primary dealer designees is from Table A.1 of He, Kelly,
and Manela (2016). I use the NCSP constructed in section 1.4.2 as a proxy for (net) CPE
spillover. It highlights the asymmetric stock/CDS comovements reaction to CPE-related
news and CPE-unrelated news.
Firstly, I investigate whether ∆η contains information in NCSP by considering a reduced-
form framework using vector-autoregression (VAR) with one lag. I include ∆VIX and
∆TED16 to control for volatility risk and credit risk in the general economy. I am inter-
ested in whether an increase of NCSP compensates for risk of insufficient intermediate
capital supply implied by a negative ∆η.
[Table 7 about here]
Table 7 reports the results of VAR regression. In column (1), I find that none of the
variables can significantly predict NCSP even though a negative b1,2 is consistent with my
prior. Column (2) shows that lagged NCSP and volatility risks are important determinants
of ∆η.
Next, I examine whether the future evolution of NCSP is invoked by the correlation
risk between NCSP and ∆η. My investigation consists of two stages. In the first stage, I
measure the dynamic conditional correlations from the residual respect to the conditional
mean using diagonal BEKK model developed by Engle and Kroner (1995). In the second
stage, I examine whether the dynamic correlation between the residuals of NCSP and ∆η
14The accounting data is in quarterly frequency, but the equity price is in daily frequency. Therefore, the
primary dealers aggregate capital ratio ∆ηt is daily frequency.
15It is different from He, Kelly, and Manela (2016) who used AR(1) model. I prefer to take the first-order
difference because it is model free. I also confirm that using AR(1) model producing a quantitatively similar
result in the dynamic correlation analysis.
16These are percentage changes in VIX and TED spread.
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can characterize the forward movements in NCSP.
Next, I examine the following predictive regression
NSCPt = β0 + β1Corr(eNCSP, e∆η)t−1 + X ∗ θ + t (1.8)
where X is a T by K matrix that consists of list of control variables. θ is a K by 1 vector.
The key variable of interest is β1. I predict that β1 > 0, following the prediction by He,
Kelly, and Manela (2016). The authors show that higher asset’s covariance with ∆η is
associated with lower marginal value of wealth, resulting in higher expected equilibrium
asset returns.
[Table 8 about here]
Table 8 reports the results. In column (1), an univariate predictive regression shows
that the lagged Corr(eNSCP, e∆η) positively predicts the future returns of NCSP and Figure
5 shows that a clear leading pattern of Corr(eNSCP, e∆η) in NCSP. This is consistent with
the prediction by He, Kelly, and Manela (2016). Columns (2) and (4) show that alternative
correlation risk of TED and VIX do not predict the NCSP returns. After controlling for
Fama-French 5 factors in column (5) and recession indicator in column (6), I find that
Corr(eNSCP, e∆η) remains statistically significant. Thus, the empirical evidence suggests
that Corr(eNSCP, e∆η) contains essential information to understand the CPE spillover.
The role of Information asymmetry Whether CPE spillover should channel through
less information asymmetric firms when primary dealers’ funding capitals decrease? To
test this, I split the NCSP portfolio by different levels of information asymmetry. Then, I
partition these split portfolios into two sub-samples to real capital shocks (good news to a
primary dealer) and adverse capital shocks (bad news to a primary dealer). I attempt to see
whether CPE spillover portfolios of transparent firms carry more premiums for the sample
with adverse capital shocks.
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Next, I detail my approach to split the NCSP portfolio by information asymmetry
groups. Particularly, for each t, I rank firms by five groups based on the information asym-
metry proxy. Within each group, I construct CSP and CSNP respectively. Within each
information asymmetry quintile, the CPE spillover portfolio is constructed as the long-
short portfolio between CSP and CSNP. I proxy information asymmetry using firm size
(Bushee and Miller (2012)) and realized spreads17 (Glosten and Harris (1988)). The lower
the realized spread or, the higher the firm size indicate less information asymmetry risk,
and vice versa. I define bad news to primary dealer as ∆η < 0 and good news to primary
dealer as ∆η > 0. The intuition behind ∆η < 0 is the reduction in funding capital of
primary dealers.
[Table 9 about here]
Table 9 reports the estimation results. Columns (1) to (3) consider realized spread of
individual stock as a proxy for information asymmetry and columns (4) to (6) consider firm
size as a proxy. Sample means or CPE spillover premiums for each spillover portfolio are
reported in percentage terms and Newey and West (1987) t-statistics are reported in brack-
ets. As for realized spread, column (1) shows that the CPE spillover premiums are weakly
decreasing as the realized spread gets wide. The realized spread of quintile 1 with the
least information asymmetric risk produces the highest premium (0.09% with a t-statistic
of 2.2). When decomposing the sample respect to ∆η > 0 and ∆η < 0, the CPE premiums
are concentrated in ∆η < 0 sample with greater funding liquidity risks. Moreover, CPE
spillover premiums are strongly decreasing as the realized spread getting wider, and the
long-short portfolio between Q5 and Q1 is -0.19 with a t-statistic of -2.2. In column (3), I
find CPE premiums are weakly increasing with firm size. However, the spread between Q5
and Q1 is statistically insignificant. By partitioning the sample into positive and negative
∆η, a monotonically increasing pattern of spillover premium for market size appears in
17The realized spreads are constructed from monthly TAQ. Since my subscription of TAQ is only up to
2013, thus I restrict the sample from 2001 to 2013 for the results of realized spreads.
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column (5). The long-short portfolio between Q5 and Q1 is 0.28%, statistically significant
at 1% level. Overall, Table 9 shows that the CPE spillover is strong for a firm with less
information asymmetric when primary dealers’ funding capital decreases.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I document that there is a strong connection between pricing errors of one
market and asset prices of another. Using 15 years daily data with 887 individual firms, I
uncover a significant degree of predictability evidence that CDS pricing errors positively
predict next-period cross-sectional stock returns. I pin down the economic mechanism by
the structure prediction of Merton (1974) and propose a return decomposition to quan-
tify the economic impact of CDS pricing errors spillover. Furthermore, the pricing errors
spillover is closely related to intermediaries’ capital risk, which implies that the financial
soundness of intermediaries is essential for understanding relative market efficiencies. I
also show that the spillover effect is more pronounced for large firms with less information
asymmetry when funding constraint is tighter. It sheds light on which firms cross-market
arbitrages like to trade.
The paper suggests that funding liquidity frictions of cross-market arbitrageurs are an
essential source to understand pricing errors spillover. It connects to a vast set of literature
who intend to understand the price reactions across different capital markets given seg-
mentation (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), Kondor and
Vayanos (2014), Goldstein, Li, and Yang (2014), Greenwood, Hanson, and Liao (2017)).
The empirical finding reveals that cross-market arbitrageurs could be margin investors who
drive the relative market efficiencies. By zooming into a particular type of margin investors
primary dealers who are supposed to belong to a group of cross-market arbitrageurs, I find
that the funding liquidity constraint they faced can be a clear indicator on the observed
price anomalies of cross-market assets. Although this is still not the cleanest identifica-
tion strategy, it sheds new light on the field of cross-market prices behavior. In a broader
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scope, it is potentially interesting to jointly study pricing errors including other financial
assets such as bonds, options, and futures. Additionally, study whether and how price er-
rors spillover from various capital markets influence the real economy or not may connect
market segmentation to the real economic activity. I leave them to the future research.
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Appendix
Definition of accounting information To be clear, DLTTQ, DLCQ, PSTKQ, LTQ, CHEQ,
TXDITCQ, IBQ, WCAPQ are labels used in COMPUSTAT quarterly database. PRC and
SHROUT are labels used in CRSP dataset.
• Stock Volatility: Time series of equity volatility is computed for each firm using an
exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA, henceforth) model on daily returns
obtained from CRSP following Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009). In particular,
for each firm, volatility σi,t is generated according to σ2i,t = r
2
i,t−1(1 − λ) + σ2i,t−1λ,
where λ is fixed at 0.94 following RiskMetrics produced by JP Morgan.
• The market leverage ratio: Followed by Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009), the
leverage ratio is computed as
Lev =
Book Value of Debt+Book Value of Preferred Equity
Market Value of Equity+Book Value of Debt+Book Value of Preferred Equity
The Market value of equity is computed as number of shares outstanding (SHROUT)
multiply by stock prices (PRC) from CRSP. The data of book value of debt and the
book value of preferred equity is obtained from COMPUSTAT. Book value of debt is
the sum of debt in current liability (DLCQ) and long-term debt (DLTTQ). Preferred
stocks are labeled as PSTKQ in COMPUSTAT.
• Cash: This is defined as cash and cash equivalent over market value of total assets
at quarterly frequency. Cash is cash and short-term investment used as CHEQ. The
market value of total asset is computed as the sum of total liabilities and market val-
ues of equity (LTQ+PRC*SHROUT/1000). This is in terms of daily frequency and is
obtained from COMPUSTAT/CRSP. Total liability is labeled as LTQ in COMPUS-
TAT. Stock price and number of shares outstanding are labeled as PRC and SHROUT
in CRSP.
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• M/B ratio: The M/B or market to book ratio is computed as the ratio of market value
of equity and book value of equity: MB=(PRC*SHROUT/1000)/(CEQQ+TXDITCQ-
PSTKQ). This is in terms of daily frequency and is obtained from COMPUSTAT/CRSP.
TXDITCQ is deferred taxes and investment tax credit. PSTKQ is preferred stocks.
• ROA: The ROA or returns on total asset. This is computed as the ratio of EBIT and
total asset: ROA=IBQ/(LTQ+PRC*SHROUT/1000). IBQ is EBIT in COMPUSTAT.
• Corporate Liquidity: The corporate liquidity is computes as ratio of working capital
(WCAPQ, in balance sheet) and total asset.
• Market Size: the market value of the equity of the firm (PRC × SHROUT).
• Credit rating: Credit rating is taken from Markit. I transform the credit rating to
numeric number following AAA=1, AA=2, A=3, BBB=4, BB=5, CCC=6.
Post-downgrading announcement drifts I examine whether CPE is informative about
mispricing using event study. In particular, I investigate whether high (low) CPE firms ex-
perience negative (positive) drifts after downgrading. I choose downgrades as information
event because price fluctuations in CDS may contain market sentiment or disagreement
among different investors. Thus, looking at CDS, spreads may not serve as objective as
downgrades. 524 downgrade events are obtained from Capital IQ from 2001 to 2015.
I measure cumulative CDS reactions following Lee, Naranjo, and Velioglu (2017),
namely, the daily indices of 5-year CDS spread changes for each rating class are sub-
tracted from daily CDS spread changes, which are used to calculate the cumulative CDS
response to downgrades. At days of downgrading, The overvalue CDS is top 25 percentile
CPE and undervalue CDS is bottom 25 percentile CPE. Next, I value-weight CDS reactions
within the two groups respectively, and then look at 15-day cumulative CDS reactions after
downgrades.
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Figure A1 plots post-downgrading announcement drifts for high CPE group (orange
line) and low CPE group (blue line). After downgrading, high (low) CPE group experiences
negative (positive) CDS spread reactions after following 15 days. For comparison, I also
report the two pseudo cumulative CDS reactions18 that do not exhibit the difference pattern.
Overall, the evidence is consistent with the view that CPE captures mispricing information.
How long does CPE persist? In this section, I examine how long the CDS returns pre-
dictability of CPE can persist. My prior is that the profits represent some forms of market
frictions. As such, investors do not quickly enough earn the documented returns. Thus, I
also investigate the relation between (long-run) return predictability and the arbitrage risks.
The empirical results indicate that predictive power can last up to 24 months. Additionally,
it is inversely related to a reduction in arbitrage risks.
[Table A1 about here]
In Panel A of Table A1, I aggregate the daily panel into a monthly panel for each
company and rank k-month ahead CDS returns on CPE observed at a current month or
t = 0, where k = {1, 3, 6, 12, 18, 24, 36, 60}. I focus on an average return of a long-short
strategy between Low CPE quartile and High CPE quartile. Along horizons, I find that
the predictive power of CPE is the most significant at 1-month at 2.5% (monthly) with
a t-statistic of 5.3, sharply decreasing to 0.57 % (a t-statistic of 2.4) at 24 months, and
vanishing up to 36 months. It suggests an improvement of CDS market efficiency along
two years.
Panel B of Table A1 explores the source of long-term returns predictability. I first
look at the relation between absolute pricing errors and changes of arbitrage risks using
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) as a proxy. Since the increase of both positive and negative
pricing errors should amplify arbitrage risks (Kapadia and Pu, 2012), I use absolute values
of CPE to gauge the overall impact of a CDS pricing error. Panel B shows that IVOL
18I repeat the event study by sampling 500 times not downgrading random dates.
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experiences a decrease in the following 36 months. Moreover, a cumulative change of
IVOL is decreasing in the predictive power of CPE (shown in Figure A2), suggesting an
improvement of CDS market efficiency is positively associated with a reduction in arbitrage
risks.
Robustness of the CDS valuation framework In Table A2, I conduct sub-sample tests
on the predictability of CPE on CDS returns based on proposed CDS valuation frameworks.
In order to reduce the concern that results may be driven by one particular specification of
CDS valuation model, I employ three alternative specifications to measure pricing errors
of credit spreads. Firstly, I consider stock volatility and market leverage as a two-factor
cross-sectional pricing model. Secondly, I include six fundamentals into the first model.
Thirdly, I consider a model with level and slope of CDS term-structure only. The sub-
sample includes three rating groups (A, and above, BBB, and BB, and below), financial and
banking industry only, excluding finance and banking industry, three sub-periods (2001 to
2006, 2007 to 2008, and 2009 to 2015). Panel A of Table A2 reports the time-series average
R2 of different models. The results reveal that a two-factor model with level and slope of
CDS curve (Model 4) performs almost as good as a kitchen-sink model (Model 1). In
Panel B, I compute the risk-adjusted returns by longing the small CPE CDSs and shorting
the large CPE CDSs. It shows that long-short portfolios are all positive and statistically
significant for the sub-samples and all the alternative specification.
[Table A2 about here]
Construction of a CDS liquidity factor I report the construction of a CDS liquidity
factor that used to price CPE-CDS-sorted portfolios in Table 5. CDS contracts are more
liquid than bonds. Longstaff et al. (2005), Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) consider
CDS spreads as a pure measure of default risk without affected by liquidity. Recent em-
pirical evidence, however, shows that CDS spreads are not the pure default premium (Tang
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and Yan (2007), Bongaerts, de Jong, and Driessen (2011), Chen, Fabozzi, and Sverdlove
(2010), Buhler and Trapp (2010)). It suggests an overvalued default spread if CDS spreads
carry a liquidity premium. I thus conjecture that CDS illiquidity is an important factor
influencing cross-sectional CDS returns. In order to find the CDS liquidity factor, I rank
CDS returns into quartiles based on 1-day lagged CDS market depth, which is based on
the number of contributors that provide quotes to Markit on any given date. The higher the
number of contributors, the better should be the CDS liquidity. Gala, Qiu, and Yu (2010)
and Kapadia and Pu (2012) use this as a measurement of CDS liquidity.
[Table A3 about here]
Table A3 reports the result of a single sort of CDS quartile portfolios based on lagged
CDS depth. Q1 is associated with the smallest CDS depth, which indicates the most illiquid
CDS, whereas Q4 is associated with the most substantial CDS depth, which indicates the
most liquid CDS. As we can see, the average daily returns (%) are decreasing from the
most illiquid quartile to the most liquid quartile. The long-short portfolio between Q1 and
Q4 are 0.17% with a t-statistic of 2.42. It suggests that the CDS market carry a liquidity
premium. Thus, I use the spread portfolio as a proxy for CDS liquidity. I denote it as
CLIQ.
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Figure 1.2: This figure shows that the time series of slope coefficients on input factors
estimated from cross-sectional regressions using Eq.(2.1) from 2001 to 2015.
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Figure 1.3: This figure shows that cumulative stock returns of the largest CPE quartile and
the lowest CPE quartile (blue line) and time-series dynamic of primary dealers’ aggregate
capital ratio (orange line) over 2001 to 2015.
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Figure 1.4: This figure shows an interpretation to CPE spillover relying on the structure
link between stock and CDS. The upper panel offers a hypothetical example of a structure
prediction of comovement between two assets without CPE spillover given increase of firm
value at t=0. The lower panel presents a hypothetical example of prediction of comovement
between two assets given an over-valuation at t=0.
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Figure 1.5: This figure shows time-series dynamic of Corr(eNSCP, e∆η) and NSCP.
Figure A1: This figure shows that the 15-days post-downgrade announcement drifts for
cumulative CDS returns of high CPE (orange line) and cumulative CDS returns of low
CPE (blue line) are reported. The two pseudo cumulative CDS reactions constructed by
simulated 500 times of 100 random downgrades are also reported.
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Figure A2: This figure shows that the decay pattern of the long-run predictive power of
CPE and its relation respect to a cumulative change of arbitrage risks proxied by idiosyn-
cratic volatility. The red bar indicates the long-short strategy that buys CDS with low CPE
and sells CDS with high CPE respect to different investment horizons. The blue bar indi-
cates the cumulative change of idiosyncratic volatilities respect to the absolute CDS pricing
errors.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
This Table reports the summary statistics of market variables and firm characteristics for 887 U.S. firms
from January 2001 to December 2015, a total of 1,819,443 firm-day observations for all variables. CDS
spread (bps) is for 5-year CDS contract obtained from Markit. A level is the value of equal-weight daily
CDS term-structure for each firm each day. A slope is the CDS spread difference between 30-year CDS and
6-month CDS contract. Equity volatility is computed using the EWMA model at a daily frequency in a
look-ahead bias-free manner. The market leverage ratio is computed following Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo
(2009). Credit rating is taken from Markit. I transform the credit rating to numeric number following
AAA=1, AA=2, A=3, BBB=4, BB=5, CCC=6, CC=7. Log M/B ratio is market equity to book equity ratio
by taking a log. ROA is a return on a total asset in percentage. Corporate liquidity is defined as a ratio of
working capital (WCAPQ, in the balance sheet) and total asset of a firm. Cash is cash and cash equivalent
over a value of total assets of a firm. Log Market cap (in a million) is the logarithm of the market value of
the equity of the firm, which is defined as closing pricing times number of shares outstanding. CDS returns
are percentage change of 5-year CDS spreads. Stock returns are holding period returns adjusting for
dividends and share spit from CRSP. VIX is a measure of the stock market’s expectation of volatility
implied by S&P 500 index options by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). TED spread is the
difference between the 3-month interest rates on interbank loans and 3-month U.S. T-bills. This is a measure
of funding liquidity of the market. η is a primary dealers’ aggregate capital ratio computed following He,
Kelly, and Manela (2016). MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA are the five factors from Fama-French
2015. CLIQ is a liquidity factor from CDS markets (Detail construction can be found in Table A3). CMKT
is the value-weighted returns of all CDS. Sample average (AVG), standard deviation (STDV), 25 percentile
(P25), 50 percentile (P50), and 75 percentile (P75) are reported from column (1) to column (5).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AVG STDV P25 P50 P75
CDS spread(bps) 163.27 226.91 52.36 88.74 177.83
Level(bps) 162.17 213.14 56.54 93.19 178.74
Slope(bps) 143.69 210.45 61.65 106.22 187.81
Equity Volatility 0.018 0.010 0.012 0.016 0.022
Market Leverage 0.373 0.307 0.101 0.292 0.597
Rating 4.044 1.101 3.000 4.000 4.759
Log M/B ratio 0.625 2.041 -0.494 0.596 1.825
ROA(%) 0.462 2.511 0.011 0.356 1.038
Corporate Liquidity 0.081 0.245 0.002 0.033 0.104
Cash 0.073 0.101 0.009 0.038 0.098
Log Market Size 22.59 1.61 21.71 22.69 23.64
CDS returns 0.000 0.037 -0.008 0.000 0.007
Stock Returns 0.000 0.019 -0.009 0.000 0.009
VIX 20.471 9.104 14.070 18.020 23.953
TED 0.430 0.456 0.200 0.260 0.440
η 0.274 0.122 0.181 0.254 0.347
MKT 0.000 0.013 -0.005 0.001 0.006
SMB 0.000 0.006 -0.003 0.000 0.004
HML 0.000 0.006 -0.003 0.000 0.003
RMW 0.000 0.005 -0.002 0.000 0.003
CMA 0.000 0.004 -0.002 0.000 0.002
CLIQ 0.002 0.050 -0.011 0.001 0.013
CMKT 0.000 0.011 -0.005 -0.001 0.004
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Table 2: Summary statistics of CPE
This table reports sample mean (AVG) and standard deviation (STDV) of CDS pricing errors or CPE
estimated by Eq. (2.1) respect to CDS quartile. Q1 is the first quartile with smallest 5-year CDS spreads, Q2
is the second quartile with the second smallest CDS spreads and so on so forth. The sample period is from
February 2001 to December 2015.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Q1(Smallest) Q2 Q3 Q4(Largest)
AVG -2.7% -7.4% -5.0% 0.2%
STDV 0.67 0.41 0.31 0.25
Table 3: CPE-stock-sorted portfolios
This table reports the performance of the CPE-stock-sorted portfolios. Panel A reports the firm-level results
and Panel B reports the industry-level results. In Panel A, raw returns are in Column (1). Risk-adjusted
returns are in Column (2). In order to control for risks in stock markets, I regress CPE-stock-sorted
portfolios on the Fama-French 5 factor model. The risk loadings and adjusted R-squares are reported from
Column (3) to Column (8). “Q4-Q1” indicates the sample average of stock returns of spread portfolios
between the largest CPE quartile and the smallest CPE quartile. In Panel B, columns (1) and (2) report the
raw returns and Fama-French 5 factor alpha for Fama and French 17 industries and columns (3) and (4)
report the results for Fama and French ten industries. Newey-west t-statistics (adjusted for 12 lags) are
reported in the brackets. *, ** and *** indicate a significant level of a two-tail test at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively. The sample period is from February 2001 to December 2015.
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Returns Alpha MKT SMB HML RMW CMA AdjR2
Quartile 1 (small) 0.011 -0.016 1.105 -0.095 0.159 0.089 -0.126 90.8
(0.5) -(2.5) (77.7) -(4.7) (2.3) (2.7) -(1.9)
Quartile 2 0.028 0.001 1.061 -0.109 0.153 0.100 -0.005 93.2
(1.4) (0.2) (81.7) -(6.5) (4.8) (4.0) -(0.1)
Quartile 3 0.041 0.013 1.030 -0.085 0.144 0.139 0.090 93.8
(2.2) (2.4) (99.8) -(6.2) (6.6) (6.4) (3.6)
Quartile 4 (large) 0.034 0.010 0.900 -0.156 0.026 0.196 0.116 92.4
(2.2) (2.1) (92.2) -(10.3) (0.8) (7.7) (3.1)
Q4-Q1 0.025** 0.027*** -0.205 -0.060 -0.129 0.112 0.239 22.4
(2.1) (2.9) -(9.8) -(1.9) -(1.3) (2.1) (2.6)
Panel B FF17 FF10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Returns Alpha Returns Alpha
Low CPE Industries 0.002 -0.027 0.008 -0.017
(0.1) -(2.0) (0.4) -(2.4)
High CPE Industries 0.037 0.011 0.038 0.011
(2.3) (1.7) (2.3) (1.8)
H-L 0.035** 0.038** 0.030** 0.029***
(2.1) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6)
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Table 4: Predict stock returns using Fama and MacBeth regression
The table reports the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of cumulative returns from day
t+j to t+k on the CPE observed in day t. The control variables include stock return (R), idiosyncratic
volatility, CDS return, CDS volatility, Log market size, log M/B ratio, and profitability. The idiosyncratic
volatility (benchmarked based on Fama-French 5 factors) and CDS volatility are measured in daily
frequency using EWMA model based on past 1-month data. Columns (1) to (2) report the Fama and
MacBeth (1973) regression results for the 1-day ahead stock returns (j=k=1). Columns (3) to (4) report the
regression results for 2 to 10 days cumulative return (j=2,k=10), so on so forth. Newey-west t-statistics
(adjusted for 12 lags) are reported in the brackets. *, ** and *** indicate a significant level of a two-tail test
at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The sample period is from February 2001 to December 2015.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
R(1) R(1) R(2,10) R(2,10) R(11,20) R(11,20) R(21,30) R(21,30)
Intercept 0.05*** 0.36*** 0.45*** 2.77*** 0.49*** 2.03*** 0.50*** 0.45
(2.7) (6.2) (2.8) (6.0) (2.8) (3.8) (2.9) (0.8)
CPE 0.02** 0.02** 0.13** 0.19*** 0.15** 0.15** -0.14** -0.03
(2.1) (2.4) (2.1) (3.1) (2.0) (2.2) -(2.1) -(0.4)
R -1.68*** -4.27*** -1.05 -0.26
-(6.2) -(5.9) -(1.3) -(0.4)
Idiosyncratic Volatility -1.51 -12.74 -0.51 26.23***
-(1.3) -(1.3) (0.0) (2.6)
CDS Return -0.72*** 0.04 0.44 0.48
-(6.4) (0.1) (0.9) (1.2)
CDS Volatility -0.32*** -3.91*** -5.75*** -5.51***
-(3.0) -(4.4) -(6.0) -(6.0)
Log Market Size -0.01*** -0.09*** -0.06** -0.01
-(5.1) -(4.8) -(2.8) -(0.4)
Log M/B ratio 0.00* 0.02* 0.02 0.01
(1.8) (1.9) (1.3) (1.1)
Profitability 0.10 0.95 1.40* 1.76**
(1.0) (1.3) (1.7) (2.1)
Avg adjusted R2 0.33% 6.10% 0.40% 7.5% 0.40% 7.40% 0.40% 7.20%
N 1758398 1758398 1755131 1755131 1751430 1751430 1747709 1747709
44
Table 5: CPE-CDS-sorted portfolios
This table reports the performance of the CPE-CDS-sorted portfolios. Raw returns are in Column (1).
Risk-adjusted returns are in Column (2). In order to control for risks in CDS returns, I regress
CPE-CDS-sorted portfolios on a seven-factor model (A combination of two CDS market risks factor (CDS
market factor and CDS liquidity factor), and Fama-French 5-factor model of stock markets.). The risk
loadings and adjusted R-squares for the seven-factor model are reported from Column (3) to Column (10).
“Q1-Q4” indicates the sample average of CDS returns of spread portfolios between the smallest CPE
quartile and the largest CPE quartile. Newey-west t-statistics (adjusted for 12 lags) are reported in the
brackets. *, ** and *** indicate a significant level of a two-tail test at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The
sample period is from February 2001 to December 2015.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Returns Alphas CLIQ CMKT MKT SMB HML RMW CMA AdjR2
Quartile 1 (small) 0.18 0.20 0.02 0.96 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.14 53.9
(3.5) (7.5) (2.0) (27.4) (0.3) -(0.8) -(1.5) -(1.3) -(1.6)
Quartile 2 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.86 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.11 0.04 63.0
-(1.2) -(2.3) -(0.4) (23.6) -(1.4) -(1.4) (0.1) (2.0) (0.6)
Quartile 3 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.89 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 -0.15 61.6
-(1.0) -(1.7) (1.8) (26.2) -(2.9) -(1.1) -(0.9) -(0.2) -(1.7)
Quartile 4 (large) -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 1.05 -0.02 0.06 0.08 -0.01 0.18 66.5
-(2.0) -(3.8) -(1.2) (35.3) -(0.9) (1.7) (2.0) -(0.1) (2.2)
Q1-Q4 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.04 -0.08 0.03 -0.10 -0.16 -0.08 -0.32 1.6
(6.7) (6.7) (1.6) -(1.5) (0.7) -(1.4) -(2.2) -(0.6) -(2.3)
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Table 6: A return decomposition
This table reports the performance of the CPE-CDS-sorted portfolios. This table reports the results on the
return decomposition on CPE-stock-sorted portfolios. In Panel A, I purge the CPE-stock-sorted quartile
portfolios to the contemporaneously CDS returns by double sorting stocks independently at period t first into
CPE quartile portfolios using lagged (at t-1) CPE and then, within each quartile, compute value-weighted
stock portfolios sorted by CDS returns at t. It results in 4 × 4 lagged CPE and CDS sorted stock portfolios.
In Panel B, the stock CPE-related CDS movement is proxied by a stock-CPE-CDS portfolio or CSP, which
longs stocks in high lagged CPE (Q4), low CDS returns quartile (Q1) and short stocks in low lagged CPE
(Q1), high CDS returns quartile (Q4). The stock CPE-non-related comovement is proxied by a
stock-non-CPE-CDS portfolio, or CSNP, which longs stocks in low lagged CPE (Q1), low CDS returns (Q1)
quartile and short stocks in high lagged CPE (Q4), high CDS returns (Q4) quartile. Newey-west t-statistics
(adjusted for 12 lags) are reported in the brackets. *, ** and *** indicate a significant level of a two-tail test
at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The sample period is from February 2001 to December 2015.
Panel A: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CPE at t-1→ Q1(Low) Q2 Q3 Q4(High) Q4-Q1
CDS returns at t ↓ Stock Returns Stock Returns Stock Returns Stock Returns Stock Returns
Q1(Low) blue0.064 0.127 0.134 red0.131 0.066
(2.7) (5.6) (6.2) (7.0) (3.6)
Q2 0.028 0.044 0.063 0.061 0.033
(1.3) (2.2) (3.5) (4.0) (2.0)
Q3 0.024 0.028 0.046 0.027 0.003
(1.2) (1.4) (2.3) (1.8) (0.2)
Q4(High) red-0.068 -0.086 -0.069 blue-0.043 0.025
-(2.8) -(3.8) -(3.2) -(2.2) (1.6)
Q4-Q1 -0.133 -0.212 -0.203 -0.174 -0.041
-(7.4) -(13.2) -(13.0) -(11.3) -(1.8)
Panel B:
CSP 0.199
(11.3)
CNSP 0.107
(6.4)
NCSP 0.092***
(3.5)
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Table 7: VAR Analysis
This table reports Vector-auto-regressive results with 1-lag. The input variables include net CPE spillover
effect or NCSP, shocks to intermediary capital ratio or ∆η, shocks to TED spread or ∆TED, and shocks to
VIX index or ∆VIX. The estimation is based on MLE. Normal t-statistics are reported in the brackets. *, **
and *** indicate a significant level of a two-tail test at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The sample period is
from February 2001 to December 2015.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NCSP ∆η ∆TED ∆VIX
Intercept 0.08*** 0.00 0.46*** 0.24**
(3.2) (0.0) (2.9) (2.1)
Lagged NCSP 2.07 -6.68*** -0.52 -0.92
(0.5) -(2.7) (0.0) -(0.1)
Lagged ∆η -3.09 4.10 2.33 14.47
-(0.9) (1.2) (0.2) (1.6)
Lagged ∆TED 0.57 -0.01 -15.34*** 0.73
(1.1) (0.0) -(3.3) (0.6)
Lagged ∆VIX 0.69 -5.77*** 0.21 -7.46***
(1.5) -(15.4) (0.1) -(2.9)
N 3738 3738 3738 3738
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Table 8: Dynamic Correlation Analysis
Table 8 reports the results of a predictive regression
NSCPt = β0 + β1Corr(eNSCP, e∆η)t−1 + X ∗ θ + t
where X is T by K matrix that consists of list of control variables. θ is K by 1 vector. The
Corr(eNCSP, e∆η)t−1 is conditional correlation between NSCP and e∆η measured at time t-1 using the
BEKK(1,1) model. Newey-west t-statistics (adjusted for 12 lags) are reported in the brackets. *, ** and ***
indicate significant level of two-tail test at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The sample period is from
February 2001 to December 2015.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NCSP NCSP NCSP NCSP NCSP NCSP
Lagged Corr[NCSP,∆η] 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.009***
(4.20) (3.80) (3.71) (2.71)
Lagged Corr[NCSP,∆TED] 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004**
(0.32) (0.56) (0.67) (2.17)
Lagged Corr[NCSP,∆VIX] -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001
(-1.35) (0.35) (0.49) (0.70)
MKT -0.299*** -0.297***
(-7.43) (-7.34)
SMB -0.219*** -0.222***
(-3.09) (-3.18)
HML -0.243 -0.243
(-1.01) (-1.02)
RMW 0.060 0.053
(0.49) (0.44)
CMA 0.423* 0.416*
(1.83) (1.84)
REC 0.002*
(1.82)
REC*Lagged Corr[NCSP,∆η] 0.012
(0.95)
REC*Lagged Corr[NCSP,∆TED] -0.011**
(-2.12)
REC*Lagged Corr[NCSP,∆VIX] 0.003
(0.29)
Intercept 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(5.08) (3.28) (3.68) (5.13) (4.93) (3.53)
N 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738
Adj R2 0.008 -0.000 0.001 0.008 0.107 0.109
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Table 9: The role of information asymmetry
This table reports the results to testable hypothesis 2. For each t, I rank firms by five quintile groups based
on the information asymmetry proxy. Within each group, I construct SCP and CSNP respectively. Within
each information asymmetry quintile, the CPE spillover portfolio is constructed as the long-short portfolio
between SCP and CSNP. I proxy information asymmetry using firm size (Bushee and Miller,2012) and
realized spreads (Glosten and Harris,1988). The lower the realized spread or, the higher the firm size
indicate less information asymmetry risk, vice versa. I define bad news to primary dealer as ∆η < 0 and
good news to primary dealer as ∆η > 0. Newey-west t-statistics (adjusted for 12 lags) are reported in the
brackets. *, ** and *** indicate a significant level of a two-tail test at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The
sample period is from February 2001 to December 2013 for columns (1) to (3) and February 2001 to
December 2015 for columns (4) to (6).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sort on realized spreads Sort on market sizes
All ∆η ∆η < 0 ∆η > 0 All ∆η ∆η < 0 ∆η > 0
Quintile1 0.09** 0.20*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 0.06
(2.2) (3.2) -(0.4) -(0.2) -(1.3) (1.1)
Quintile2 0.06 0.25*** -0.15*** 0.02 0.07* -0.03
(1.4) (4.7) -(2.5) (0.7) (1.7) -(0.6)
Quintile3 0.04 0.18*** -0.10 0.03 0.13*** -0.07
(1.0) (3.5) -(1.4) (1.2) (3.3) -(1.5)
Quintile4 -0.02 0.18*** -0.21*** 0.06** 0.17*** -0.05
-(0.4) (2.8) -(3.2) (2.2) (3.4) -(0.9)
Quintile5 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.05* 0.20*** -0.11**
-(0.1) (0.2) -(0.3) (1.7) (5.0) -(2.2)
Q5-Q1 -0.09* red -0.19** 0.00 0.06 red 0.28*** -0.18***
-(1.7) -(2.2) (0.0) (1.1) (3.7) -(2.6)
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Table A1: How long does CPE persist?
This table reports the long-term predictability results of CPE relying on monthly data panel. To construct a
monthly panel for a particular firm, I equal-weight all the daily observations for a given month. Panel A
reports the long-run return predictive test by ranking k-month ahead CDS returns into quartile based upon
CPE observed at month t, where k ={1, 3, 6, 12, 18, 24, 36, 60} months. The long-short portfolio is reported
in the Column “Diff. (L-H)”. Panel B reports the predictive relation between CDS pricing errors and
arbitrage risk. Since both positive and negative CPE should amplify with arbitrage risks (Kapadia and Pu
(2012)), I use absolute values of CPE to gauge the overall pricing errors. The arbitrage risk is proxied by
idiosyncratic volatility constructed following Ang et al., (2006). Newey-west t-statistics (adjusted for 12
lags) are reported in the brackets for both panels. The sample period is from February 2001 to December
2015.
Panel A: CDS Returns
Low CPE 2 3 High CPE Diff.(L-H)
t=1 1.56 0.10 -0.57 -0.94 2.50
(1.6) (0.1) -(0.6) -(1.1) (5.3)
t=3 0.84 -0.09 -0.10 -0.07 0.90
(0.9) -(0.1) -(0.1) -(0.1) (2.4)
t=6 0.73 0.16 -0.05 0.08 0.65
(0.9) (0.2) (0.0) (0.1) (2.1)
t=12 0.45 -0.09 -0.39 0.05 0.40
(0.5) -(0.1) -(0.4) (0.0) (1.6)
t=18 0.13 -0.13 -0.20 -0.28 0.41
(0.1) -(0.1) -(0.2) -(0.3) (2.0)
t=24 0.36 -0.01 -0.10 -0.22 0.57
(0.4) (0.0) -(0.1) -(0.2) (2.4)
t=36 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.52 -0.07
(0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) -(0.2)
t=60 1.03 0.94 0.39 0.68 0.34
(0.8) (0.8) (0.3) (0.5) (0.9)
Panel B: IVOL
Low abs.CPE 2 3 High abs.CPE Diff.(H-L)
t=1 0.004 -0.009 -0.023 0.006 0.002
(0.2) -(0.3) -(1.0) (0.2) (0.2)
t=3 0.005 0.004 -0.016 -0.033 -0.037
(0.1) (0.1) -(0.3) -(0.6) -(2.7)
t=6 0.011 0.006 0.006 -0.040 -0.051
(0.1) (0.0) (0.1) -(0.4) -(3.1)
t=12 -0.020 -0.011 -0.016 -0.055 -0.035
-(0.1) -(0.1) -(0.1) -(0.3) -(1.5)
t=18 -0.053 -0.044 -0.050 -0.085 -0.032
-(0.2) -(0.2) -(0.2) -(0.4) -(1.2)
t=24 -0.091 -0.091 -0.101 -0.140 -0.048
-(0.3) -(0.3) -(0.4) -(0.6) -(1.8)
t=36 -0.145 -0.140 -0.139 -0.160 -0.016
-(0.5) -(0.5) -(0.5) -(0.6) -(0.6)
t=60 -0.125 -0.104 -0.112 -0.118 0.007
-(0.3) -(0.3) -(0.3) -(0.3) (0.2)
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Table A2: Different specifications on CPE
Table A2 reports the robustness checks on CDS valuation models. In order to reduce the concern that results
may be driven by one particular specification of CDS valuation model, I employ three alternative
specifications to measure pricing errors of credit spreads. Firstly, I consider stock volatility and market
leverage as a two-factor cross-sectional pricing model (Model 2). Secondly, I include six fundamentals into
the first model (Model 3). Thirdly, I consider a model with level and slope of CDS term-structure only
(Model 4). Model 1 is the kitchen-sink model used in my main analysis. Panel A reports the average
adjusted R2 for four models. Panel B, I compute the risk-adjusted returns by longing the small CPE CDSs
and shorting the large CPE CDSs. The sub-sample consists of three rating groups (A, and above, BBB, and
BB, and below), financial and banking industry only, excludes finance and banking industry, three
sub-periods (2001 to 2006, 2007 to 2008, and 2009 to 2015). Newey-west t-statistics (adjusted for 12 lags)
are reported in the brackets.
Panel A: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
AVG Adj R2 (%) 91.34 27.11 40.25 90.50
Panel B: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
CPE CPE Alt1 CPE Alt2 CPE Alt3
Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha
A, and Above 0.33 0.45 0.23 0.44
(6.1) (8.8) (5.0) (7.3)
BBB 0.19 0.30 0.33 0.13
(4.9) (8.6) (8.4) (2.7)
BB, and below 0.18 0.25 0.28 0.11
(5.1) (8.2) (8.8) (2.8)
Excluding Finance Industry 0.29 0.31 0.22 0.29
(7.6) (9.5) (7.7) (6.8)
Finance Industry 0.28 0.26 0.20 0.25
(6.2) (6.7) (5.6) (5.2)
2001-2006 0.53 0.32 0.34 0.42
(6.0) (4.5) (5.2) (4.6)
2007-2008 0.29 0.31 0.22 0.29
(7.6) (9.5) (7.7) (6.8)
2009-2015 0.15 0.22 0.14 0.20
(6.0) (8.0) (7.0) (5.5)
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Table A3: CDS liquidity ranked portfolio
The table reports value-weighted returns for CDS liquidity quartile portfolios. To construct the table, I first
rank CDS returns into quartiles based on 1-day lagged CDS market depth, which is based on the number of
contributors that provide quotes to Markit on any given date. The higher the number of contributors, the
better should be the CDS liquidity. Then I compute the sample average for each of the portfolios. Q1-Q4 is
the difference between the most illiquid quartile (Q1) and the most liquid quartile (Q4). Newey-west
t-statistics (adjusted for 12 lags) are reported in the brackets. *, ** and *** indicate a significant level of a
two-tail test at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The sample period is from January 2001 to December 2015.
Q1(Illiquid) Q2 Q3 Q4(Liquid) Q1-Q4
AVG. 0.13* -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.17**
T-stat (1.79) (-0.18) (-0.44) (-0.63) (2.42)
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Table A4: BEKK estimation result
This table reports the estimation result for diagonal BEKK(1,1) dynamic covariances for the vector
{eNCSP , e∆η, e∆VIX, e∆TED} obtained from the residuals of VAR model in Table 7. Standard errors are
reported in the brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significant level of two-tail test at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively. The sample period is from February 2001 to December 2015.
Coef. Stdr. Sig.
B
λ1 0.9788 (0.000) ***
λ2 0.9933 (0.000) ***
λ3 0.9200 (0.001) ***
λ4 0.9179 (0.002) ***
A
δ1 0.1884 (0.000) ***
δ2 0.1015 (0.000) ***
δ3 0.3920 (0.002) ***
δ4 0.2690 (0.003) ***
C
c1 0.0011 (0.000) ***
c2 -0.0001 (0.000) ***
c3 -0.0005 (0.000) ***
c4 0.0036 (0.000) ***
c5 0.0007 (0.000) ***
c6 -0.0002 (0.000) ***
c7 -0.0128 (0.000) ***
c8 0.0101 (0.000) ***
c9 0.0008 (0.000) ***
c10 0.0146 (0.000) ***
Loglikelihood 10.3754
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CHAPTER 2
CDS MARKET INFORMATIVENESS AND RELATED HARD-TO-VALUE
STOCK RETURNS
2.1 Introduction
The positive role of Credit default swap (CDS) remains ambivalent to financial economists,
policymakers, and market participants1. On one hand, CDS allows trading of default risk
separately from other market risks and significantly improves the overall credit market
liquidity2. On the other hand, there is a widespread concern that the CDS market gives
rise to insider trading, market manipulations, and credit speculation. Acharya and John-
son (2007) used equity prices as proxies for public information and examined potential
insider trading in the CDS market relying on relative price discovery between equity and
CDS market3. Acharya and Johnson (2007), Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2007), Ni and Pan
(2011), Qiu and Yu (2012), Kryzanowski, Perrakis, and Zhong (2017), and Lee, Naranjo,
and Velioglu (2017) found that increasing CDS spreads lead to corresponding negative
stock returns conditional on credit events. However, Norden and Weber (2009), Hilscher,
Pollet, and Wilson (2015), and Marsh and Wagner (2016) showed that increasing stock re-
turns strongly and unconditionally predict opposite changes in CDS spreads. They found
1The CDS market is a derivatives market, which specializes in managing credit risk. The protection buyer
or credit risk seller pays a periodic fee to the protection seller or credit risk buyer for a contingent payment
associated with a reference entity’s credit events.
2The CDS market has grown tremendously over the last two decades and is increasingly a critical market
side by side the stock market.
3Price discovery is the process by which trading incorporates new information and market participants’
expectations into asset prices. The early price discovery in one capital market followed by price impact in a
related capital market is evidence of informed trading. We focus on single-name CDS market rather than the
corporate bond market as the related capital market to the stock market because theoretical work by Oehmke
and Zawadowski (2015) indicates that single-name CDS is more efficient than underlying corporate bonds
due to higher liquidity and scalable transactions. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that CDS dominates
underlying corporate bonds because of higher informational efficiency of CDS markets. See Blanco, Brennan,
and Marsh (2005). Furthermore, institutional investors such as mutual funds substitute corporate bonds by
investing in CDS markets due to the latter’s liquidity advantage (Jiang and Zhu, 2016).
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informational causality not to be the other way around. There are thus mixed results in the
literature regarding whether the credit default swap market could lead the stock market with
new information flows. An alternative perspective is whether the CDS market is informed
relative to the equity market.
In this research work, we examine if existing studies might have used coarser measures
of stock returns that could not pick up new information signals from the CDS market. We
refine the return measures by separating daily stock return into 3 components after the CDS
market closes for a day t − 1. The first component is before market-open for a day t from
00:00 hours to 09:30 hours. This period is generally quiet and does not feature strongly
in economic terms. The second component is market hour return for a day t taking the
logarithm of price differences at 16:00 hours from 0930 hours (Eastern Time). This is
the most interesting and critical period where most trading activities take place. The third
component on a day t is market-close hours from 16:00 hours to 24:00 hours. This is also
an important period where any news on possible events on the next day t+1 may be leaked,
and informed traders could use this period to revise their trading positions. Our primary
focus on the short-term aspect of stock price reactions is motivated by Chordia, Roll, and
Subrahmanyam (2005) who found that stock price adjustments to new information occurred
within a day, suggesting that examining the subject of close-to-close stock returns may not
be optimal to study the information content of the CDS market.
In our methods, we examine the responses of stock returns during different market
hours to CDS spreads using (1) a Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression approach, (2) port-
folio sorting approach, and (3) panel regression. In (2), portfolios are constructed using
single sort via CDS spreads and returns, double sorts using CDS spreads and then returns,
triple sorts using CDS spreads followed by idiosyncratic volatility proxying for valuation
uncertainty, and then CDS returns, and more layered sorts involving trading volumes and
turnovers, and so on. The portfolio sorting and daily rebalancing, is followed by invest-
ment strategy over different daily, weekly, and monthly horizons. Robustness checks on
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different specifications of the sort criterion are also performed and results are shown as
supplementary tables in the Appendix. Other results are indicated but not shown due to
space constraint. The empirical results show that both CDS spread level and CDS return
strongly and negatively predict subsequent period’s stock returns during market hours, but
positively predict subsequent period’s stock returns after the following day market closing.
These results can persist up to monthly horizons and are robust to value weighting. The
results are consistent with stock market over-reaction during market hours and partial re-
versal after market hours. We find a weaker CDS predictive power on close-to-close daily
stock returns as in many existing studies. Although changes of CDS spread can negatively
predict close-to-close stock returns at a daily level, it fails to predict in more extended
weekly and monthly investment horizons. We also find weak and insignificant results on
before market-open returns. Overall, there is strong empirical evidence that stock prices do
react to lagged CDS price information.
We use CDS spread level as a key conditioning variable in the portfolio sort and invest-
ment or trading profitability tests because high CDS spread identifies its associated stocks
as those more keenly watched due to those firms facing higher credit and default risks.
Any news impacting those firms would be revealed more readily through CDS percentage
price change or return as well as through related stocks when informed traders arbitrage on
the new information. CDS spread has also been studied by Acharya and Johnson (2007)
and Lee, Naranjo, and Velioglu (2017) who found that CDS prices infuse into CDS price
changes information about adverse credit news faster than related stock prices.
We explore the potential mechanism of the unequivocal information flow from CDS
market news to stock markets. The central thesis we are focusing on is an informed-trading
hypothesis suggesting that informed investors in CDS markets focus or concentrate on trad-
ing in opaque stocks with high valuation uncertainty, associated with high idiosyncratic
volatility, by using their new information extracted from just lagged CDS prices. Because
of the high information asymmetry risk premium where the price impact of privately in-
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formed trades cannot be ex-ante fully diversified, and the relatively low execution costs in
stocks, informed traders would trade across to the stock market. These informed traders
are akin to those described in Goldstein, Li, and Yang (2014), including cross-market ar-
bitrageurs who have better access to both the CDS market and the stock market. The
idea of focus on opaque stocks relates to the strand of literature suggesting that trading
incentives of informed investors should be more significant for opaque firms. See Sey-
hun(1986), Aboody, Hughes, and Liu (2005), Kumar (2009), Ben-David, Glushkov, and
Moussawi (2010), Wu (2018), and Chen, Kelly, and Wu (2018). For example, high val-
uation uncertainty can amplify uninformed investors’ behavioral biases (Kumar (2009)),
and thus relatively better-informed investors conditional on CDS prices attempt to exploit
those biases. Motivated by studies that showed that high idiosyncratic volatility is associ-
ated with poor information environment of firms (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) and
Chen, Huang, and Jha (2012)), we use idiosyncratic volatility, based on Fama and French
(2015) five-factor model, to proxy firm’s valuation uncertainty. By partitioning the high
CDS spread group into both high and low idiosyncratic volatility sub-groups, we find that
the CDS predictability is only significant on stocks with the high valuation uncertainty.
We investigate the source of stock price overreaction to CDS news, after market-close
the next day, in more depth. If all informed traders know precisely what the credit pri-
vate signal is, the stock price will not overshoot. Based on this insight, we test stock price
changes by examining periods with both low and high short-run imminent credit event pre-
diction error. We expect to find no stock returns reversal after market-close whether the
imminent credit event prediction error is small or large if the traders are fully informed.
We employ days on t + 1 where downgrade actually occurred as indicators of low immi-
nent credit event prediction error at t. However, if traders are not fully informed but are
overconfident that positive CDS return indicates an imminent credit event, then we would
see stock returns fall and not reverse after market hours when an actual imminent credit
event occurs afterward, but stock price reversals when no imminent credit event actually
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occurs. For negative CDS returns, if traders are also overconfident that no imminent credit
event or adverse credit news will follow, they would over-buy stocks so that there would
also be reversals when no credit events occur. Because incidences of negative CDS returns
followed by a credit downgrade is very rare, these occurrences of subsequent stock price
fall averagely do not affect the overall after-market hours insignificant results in this case.
Lastly, we also consider if limit-to-arbitrage hypothesis may be able to explain our re-
sults. Limit-to-arbitrage could be due to stock trading illiquidity or short-sale constraint,
and causes non-integration between CDS and stock markets, thus possibly explaining the
time gap before stock returns catch up to CDS news. See Amihud (2002), Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003), and Achary and Pedersen (2005). However, we find that the predictive
results are significant for both high as well as low liquidity stock groups, suggesting that
the stock illiquidity channel is unlikely to explain our findings fully. Kapadia and Pu (2012)
considered idiosyncratic volatility as a measure of limit-to-arbitrage that causes stock and
CDS market disintegration. A possible concern is that idiosyncratic volatility may reflect
stock illiquidity. However, we find that trading activities for firms with high idiosyncratic
volatility are two times higher than those for firms with low idiosyncratic volatility. More-
over, we partition the stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility into sub-groups with high as
well as low trading activities, and find that the return predictability is based on stocks with
high trading activities. Besides illiquidity, another plausible reason for CDS predictability
may be driven by the arbitrage asymmetry in the presence of stock short-sale constraint.
Extracting short-sale volume data from “Reg SHO” from 2005 to 2007, we find that the
average short volume of high valuation uncertainty group is much higher than that of low
valuation uncertainty group. Further, using residual institutional ownership as in Nagel
(2005) to proxy for short-sale constraint, we find that the predictive results appear in both
high and low residual institutional ownership. Thus the presence of short-sale constraint
does not appear to limit the predictability of CDS price changes on stock returns. Over-
all, these results suggest that our findings cannot be fully explained by limit-to-arbitrage
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arguments.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are multifold. This paper relates to the re-
cent debate on CDS market informativeness. As discussed earlier, the research literature
showed that CDS returns can predict stock returns on a daily basis only under circum-
stances when credit events take place. We contribute to this literature by using a novel set-
ting, which decomposes daily stock returns into different sets of trading hours to provide
new evidence that stock markets overreact to CDS changes regardless if there is any credit
event. We find an interesting price reversal pattern excepts in days when a credit event is
imminent. The stock return reversal after overreaction adds another context to the literature
of short-term return reversals by Lehmann (1990), Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Jegadeesh
(1990), Bremer and Sweeney (1991), and others. This reversal happens across the related
securities of CDS and stocks in a very short period of time within a trading day. Moreover,
we show that CDS predictability occurs because of a high valuation uncertainty especially
with high credit spreads and high stock liquidity. This characterization of the CDS news
impact on stocks is consistent with the recent theoretical paper by Collin-Dufresne and Fos
(2016) where informed trading is very much present. We believe therefore that our strong
results indicating CDS price change impact on stock returns are due to informed trad-
ing activities related to high valuation uncertainty and presence of information asymmetry
across the markets. The line of analyses follow theoretical works and empirical studies by
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Verrecchia (1982), Diamond (1985), Frankel and Li (2004),
Aboody et al. (2005), Kumar (2009), Chen, Kelly, and Wu (2018), and Wu (2018).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and variables
used in our analyses. Section 3 studies the impact of CDS markets on stock markets during
different market trading hours. Some baseline empirical results are reported. Peripheral
results to check for robustness are reported as supplementary tables in the Appendix or
are mentioned but not shown due to space economy4 Section 4 investigates the sources of
4These are obviously obtainable from the authors if requested.
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predictability by developing three hypotheses and then testing them. Section 5 provides
conclusions.
2.2 Data and Variables Construction
We start by describing the data sample. We focus on U.S. firms with both stock return and
CDS spread data between January 2001 and December 2013 inclusive. The stock return
data are obtained from monthly Trade and Quote (TAQ) and the CDS price information is
from Markit Group. We also employ close-to-open, open-to-close, and close-to-close daily
stock returns from CRSP to replicate and check some results for robustness and compar-
isons with past studies. We compute all returns based on transaction prices with associated
trading volumes. The transaction stock prices include dividends and are adjusted for share
splits before computing returns. We do not use quote prices. For this reason, intraday CDS
data are not utilized as they do not contain transaction prices. By using stock transaction
prices instead of quoted bid and ask prices, we can determine actual economic trading ben-
efits as an outcome of informed trading. We notice that using for example close-to-open
stock returns (overnight) computed from CRSP sometimes generates large differences com-
pared to using TAQ’s transaction price-based returns due to close-to-open price jumps due
to quotes and sentimental retail order flow (without actual transactions) outside of the reg-
ular working hours.
Stock Returns. We obtain stock return data from TAQ. We focus on common stocks.
Opening and closing prices are associated with the Stock Exchanges’ trading hours. First
and last trades on a day t are respectively defined as first trade after midnight of a day t− 1
on a day t, and last trade as that before midnight on day t. The opening price on a day t
is the first valid actual transaction price at or immediately after 09:30. The closing price
on a day t is the last valid transaction price on day t when the Stock Exchanges close at
16:00. The first trade price is the first transaction price, before 9:30 but no earlier than
0:00, if there is a non-zero transaction volume attached to the price. Otherwise, we code
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the first price before market-open as missing. The last trade price after market-close is
defined as the last transaction price with a non-zero trading volume after 16:00, but no
later than 24:00. Otherwise, we code it as missing. We compute daily close-to-close log
stock (transaction) price change as a proxy for daily stock return for a firm i on day t as
Ri,t = ln(Pi,16:00,t) − ln(Pi,16:00,t−1)5 where Pi,c,t is the stock i’s price on day t at clock
time h:m, where h is hour and m is minute. Further, we look at three different parts of daily
stock returns.
• We compute stock returns before market opens, RBMi,t , as the log difference between
opening market price at 09:30 on a day t and earlier first trade price during 00:00
to 09:30 on a day t, if both first transaction price before the market opens and the
transaction price at the market open are available. Otherwise the RBMi,t is coded as
missing.
• We compute stock returns during market hours RMHi,t as the log difference between a
closing market price at 16:00 on a day t and the market-open price at 09:30 on a day
t, if both transaction prices are available. Otherwise the RMHi,t is coded as missing.
• We compute stock returns after market hours RAMi,t as the log difference between last
trade at or prior to 24:00 and the earlier market-close price at 16:00 on a day t, if
both transaction prices are available. Otherwise, the RAMi,t is coded as missing
6.
5We notice that markets close earlier on holidays, when market closing time is adjusted from 16:00 to
13:00, 13:15, or 13:30. We identify and adjust for these situations by replacing market closing time from
16:00 to 13:00, 13:15, or 13:30 accordingly, all else remaining the same.
6We describe some institutional background on what happens after conventional trading hours. In the
U.S., most of the trades in stock markets happen in NYSE and Nasdaq from 09:30 to 16:00 Eastern Time.
However, investors can still trade after market hours. This is done by ECN (Instinet was the first ECN
created in 1969), which is an alternative SEC-permitted trading system or network that allows trading outside
traditional exchange after trading hours. Stocks and currencies are the most widely traded products in ECN.
Before the 1990s, after-market hours trading were primarily dominated by institutional investors. After 1990s,
ECNs attracted a much wider group including retail investors by giving clients full access and transparency
in the order books as well as imposing a much smaller transaction cost. In particular, most of the trades
in the after-hours session happen between 16:00 and 18:30 Eastern Time. To place an order on an ECN,
individual investors must either have an account with a broker who can directly access ECN or they need to
be a subscriber. An execution occurs when the price of a buy order and the price of a sell order intersect on
the ECN. Nowadays, almost any investor can trade through an ECN, including retail investors, institutional
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Our decomposition of daily stock returns ensures that there is no overlapping informa-
tion when we conduct the price discovery test between equity and CDS markets. Daily
CDS spreads are from Markit daily single-name CDS indicative transactions prices as of
15:30 Eastern Time, which is 30 minutes earlier than the stock market closing time, 16:00
Eastern Time. But we shall ignore the small time difference in our analyses of more impor-
tant pieces of interactive market features.
CDS Spreads and Returns. We obtain daily CDS spread data for five-year CDSs
on senior, unsecured debt. We follow Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson (2015) to restrict the
CDS sample by selecting those with modified restructuring default clause before the April
2009 CDS “big bang”, because this is the restructuring convention commonly used for U.S.
firms. We require no restructuring clause afterward, following Lee, Naranjo, and Velioglu
(2017). We compute the 5-year CDS return or credit protection return by the percentage
change in credit spread at a daily frequency. Positive credit return reflects the loss of the
credit protection seller. As noted by Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson (2015), credit returns
should equal to the percentage change in the quoted CDS spread adjusted by the ratio of
two annuity factors. However, in practice, the percentage change of spread is an accurate
proxy for CDS protection return because the annuity ratio will always be close to 1. Thus,
we use the percentage change of CDS protection or CDS return in our empirical analyses.
We apply a filter to remove stale price observations, where prices are defined as stale when
we observe the same price on at least five consecutive days. In case of a stale price, we only
consider the first of these observations and classify subsequent observations as unavailable.
Papers using percentage change in credit spreads as a proxy for credit returns include Ka-
padia and Pu (2012), Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson (2015), and Lee, Naranjo, and Velioglu
(2017).
investors, market makers, and broker-dealers. Using month TAQ database, we find that the aggregate after-
market (from 16:00 at t to 24:00 at t for all t) trading volume increases from January 1993 to December 2013
based on the universe of all firms in the TAQ database. In particular, the aggregate (after-market hours) trading
volume was about $5 trillion (approximately $3 million per day per stock) in 1993. It increased to $119
trillion (approximately $62 million per day per stock) in 2009 and decreased to $96 trillion (approximately
$52 million per day per stock) in 2013.
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Merge Stock/CDS Sample. Our strategy of merging the stock and CDS datasets fol-
lows three steps. First, we link TAQ data to CRSP using TAQ-CRSP Link Table (tclink)
provided by WRDS. Second, we attach PERMNO (unique identifier) obtained from CRSP
to each reference entity with CDS using the first six digit CUSIP that is both available at
CRSP tapes and the “RED” reference entity file provided by Markit. Third, for those firms
that cannot be matched in the second step, we manually match across the two databases by
using long-legal names. As a result, there are 1186 unique firms with both stock returns
and CDS spreads.
Firm Characteristics. The firm characteristics include total daily trading volume, daily
trading volume turnover, stock market capitalization, idiosyncratic volatility, daily short
volume turnover, residual institutional ownership, and downgrade events. We provide de-
tailed descriptions of these variables in the Appendix.
2.2.1 Summary Statistics
The total number of unique firms in our sample from 2001 to 2013 is 1186. There is, on
average, 721 unique firms per year. Table 1A reports the summary statistics of the variables
used in our analyses.
[Tables 1A and 1B about here]
We focus on stocks with trading activity. We remove stock return observations with
zero trading volume. Consequently, our sample yields 724,051 firm-day observations for
RBM , 2,050,282 firm-day observations for RMH , and 1,966,518 firm-day observations for
RAM . The sample average of after-market hours returns RAM is about 0.009% return on
a daily basis, where before market hours returns (RBM ) and during market hours returns
(RMH) are negative at about -0.028% and -0.01% respectively on a daily basis. In terms
of volatility, (RBM ) and (RMH) are more volatile than RAM . Average daily trading volume
during market hours by aggregating across all stocks is about 15 times larger than the aver-
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age daily trading volume after the market closes from 16:00 till 24:00 and 119 times larger
than average daily trading volume before market opens during 00:00 to 09:30. The average
5-year CDS spread is about 181 bps. The CDS returns have higher volatility compared
with stock returns. All stock and CDS returns are positively skewed, except for RAM .
Table 1B reports the correlation between same day stock returns computed using differ-
ent market hours by TAQ and CRSP datasets respectively. We calculate the various daily
return correlations by averaging out individual stock return cross-sectional correlations.
In Table 1B, we confirm that the TAQ-based market hour stock returns we constructed
are closely related to CRSP-based open-to-close stock return with a correlation of 99.9%.
The correlations among CRSP-based overnight returns, RCTO,CRSP and the TAQ-based
overnight returns are quite low since they are measured using different time-stamps. The
correlation between RCTO,CRSP and RBM is 32.3%. This is significantly higher than the
correlation between RCTO,CRSP and RAM at only 1.7%. It suggests that RBM may repre-
sent a larger portion of variations in CRSP-based overnight returns. Interestingly, the aver-
age unconditional correlations between RMH and both RBM and RAM are both negative,
but small at -3.6% and -7.9% respectively. This suggests news impact on returns typically
spent their force during market hours and does not necessarily carry over momentum into
after-market hours and past midnight to before market-open the following day.
2.3 Baseline Empirical Results
Credit default swap (CDS) spreads or prices inform market participants through revealing
market expectations about stock default risk. Even without triggering credit or else de-
fault events, CDS spreads still disclose useful information on long-term credit risk for the
reference entity. Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson (2015) showed that stock returns strongly
negatively predict CDS returns, and not the other way around, suggesting the one-way in-
formation transmission from stock markets to CDS markets. The suggested reason is that
the relatively low transaction costs of stocks facilitate informed investors to make gains
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from their private information first in the stock market. This is consistent with the separat-
ing equilibrium hypothesis proposed by Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998). We replicate
the empirical results of Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson (2015) using daily close-to-close CRSP
stocks returns and CDS returns - this is reported as a supplementary Table A1 in our Ap-
pendix. We show that information indeed unconditionally flows from stock returns to CDS
returns and not vice versa using our sample.
We focus on the information flow from CDS to stock markets, unlike the implication of
unilateral information flow from stock to CDS market that is well recognized in the litera-
ture currently due to Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson (2015). As at this juncture, whether there
exists on information flow from CDS to stock markets or not, unconditional on any credit
event, remains unclear. Uncovering and understanding such information flow is essential
because it would place rightful attention on news of distress risk that would naturally be
revealed first via CDS price signals. We show strong evidence that both levels and changes
of CDS spread can predict subsequent period’s stock returns when market hours and after-
market hours stock returns are examined separately with respect to the CDS price signals.
We present the empirical evidence using a regression approach and portfolio sorting ap-
proach, as well as panel regressions.
2.3.1 Regression Results
We first employ regression of one-period (period defined earlier as before market-open
hours, market hours, and after-market hours) ahead stock returns on CDS prices and also
CDS returns based on Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression method. In
addition, we include control variables for well-known determinants of stock returns, such
as idiosyncratic volatility, log of market capitalization, one-period lagged returns, and cu-
mulative past 12-month returns (excluding the most recent month). Most of the empirical
studies focused on stock returns based on close-to-close, and there are few studies work-
ing on the effect of prediction on more refined shorter period returns on, before, or after
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market hours. We add the same set of control variables to regressions using dependent
variables of during, before-, and after-market hours stock returns for consistency. Stud-
ies that investigated asset price behavior using overnight stock returns include Berkman,
Koch, Tuttle, and Zhang (2012) and Aboody, Even-Tov, and Lehavy (2018) who suggested
that overnight stock returns can serve as a measure of firm-specific investor sentiment.
Bollerslev, Li, and Todorov (2016) found that market betas associated with intraday dis-
continuous and overnight returns contained significant risk premiums. In longer investment
horizons, we cumulate daily stock returns with respect to different market hours to weekly
(Wednesday to Wednesday) and monthly returns for investigation. For example, we ag-
gregate the daily December market-hour stock returns into December monthly return by
RMHi,Dec = R
MH
i,Dec1st + R
MH
i,Dec2nd + ... + R
MH
i,Dec31th. We average the daily values within each
week or month for each firm i on equal weights.
[Tables 2A and 2B about here]
Table 2A reports the results using lagged 5-year CDS spread as predictor. The 4 panels
indicate the different regressions with the different dependent variables. Columns (2) and
(3) present the key results. 5-year CDS spread cross-sectionally strongly predicts the next-
periods’ stock returns during market hours and after market hours with different signs,
while the predictability is weak for the next-periods’ stock returns before market opens
and for close-to-close. For example, in Panel A of Table 2A, SCDSt−1 negatively predicts
RMHt . It indicates that a one unit increase of S
CDS
t−1 is on average associated with a decrease
inRMHt of -1.2% (t-stat = -5.9) on a daily basis, -5.69% (t-stat=-5.4) on a weekly basis,
and -22.45% (t-stat=-5.1) on a monthly basis. These return changes are not adjusted to a
common annual basis, but if so, it would appear the effects are closely similar with stronger
daily, then weekly, and then monthly effects. By contrast, as shown in Panel B, SCDSt−1
positively predicts RAMt . A one unit increase of S
CDS
t−1 is on average associated with an
increase in RAMt of 0.24% (t-stat=3.7) on a daily basis, 1.10% (t-stat=3.7) on a weekly
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basis, and 4.67% (t-stat=3.5) on a monthly basis. SCDSt−1 shows little predictive power on
RBMt in Panel C and R
CTC,TAQ
t in Panel D.
Table 2B reports the results using lagged 5-year CDS return as predictor. All else are
similar to those in Table 2A. We see that the results for using lagged 5-year CDS return
are consistent with those in Table 2A, with higher CDS return or positive change in CDS
spread decreasing market hours related stock returns the next day while increasing to a
lesser extent returns after market closes. However, the magnitudes of average coefficients
in Panels A and B of Table 2B are smaller than those in Table 2A. Note that although RCDSt−1
negatively predicts the RCTCt at daily horizon (Panel D), the predictability is insignificant
for longer horizons, suggesting that the predictability over time is transient. Overall, the
analyses suggest that the stock market returns overreact to the CDS markets information
during regular market hours and reverse after the market closes.
There is basically no CDS signal effect for returns during before market-open during
midnight hours 00:00 till 09:30. The control variables basically have intuitively correct
coefficient signs on average. For example, momentum increases next period market hours
stock returns, but lagged rating level, leverage, effective spread, and size cross-sectionally
decreases stock returns.
2.3.2 Portfolio Tests
We conduct further tests using portfolio sorts. At the start of every trading day, all stocks
are sorted in ascending order on both the level of CDS spread level (SCDS) and the CDS
return (RCDS) on the previous trading day. The ranked stocks are then assigned to one of 5
quintile portfolios. The portfolio stocks are rebalanced every day based on updated CDS
signals. Besides the 5 quintile portfolios under CDS spread sort and the 5 quintile portfolios
separately under CDS return sort, we also compute the H/L spread portfolios for each of
the above sorts. The H/L portfolio is constructed by going short the largest quintile stocks
with high CDS prices or else high CDS returns, and long the smallest quintile stocks with
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low CDS prices or else low CDS returns. The portfolios are constructed based on either
equal-weighted stocks or value-weighted stocks. Table 3 shows these portfolio test results
of daily profits. These sorted portfolio results are, of course, nonlinear models instead
of the linear regression models in Tables 2A, 2B, in showing how investors could profit
from nonlinear expectations of stock returns conditioned on lagged information of control
variables as well as the latest CDS price signals.
[Table 3 about here]
In Table 3, we observe a clearly monotonically negative relationship between CDS
spreads and subsequent day’s market hours stock returns RMHt . This is also observed for
CDS return although the negative relation is not as strong. We also observe a generally
positive relationship between CDS spread as well as CDS return with the subsequent day’s
after-market hours stock returns RAMt using the portfolio approach. In the column (3), the
H/L portfolio, which goes short quintile 5 stocks with high SCDSt−1 and long quintile 1 stocks
with low SCDSt−1 , generates an average return of 0.131% (t-stat=5.5) with high statistical sig-
nificance. In column (4), although the pattern in the RAMt is not monotonically increasing
with respect to SCDSt−1 , sorting on these variables generate a negatively and statistically sig-
nificant H/L portfolio return of -0.024% (t-stat=-7.7). Obviously if we short H/L we obtain
positive return of 0.024%.
In Panel B of Table 3, we consider RCDSt−1 as a sorting variable. We replicate the portfolio
investment strategy in Panel A and find similar though weaker results. The H/L portfolio
in column (3) produces smaller but significant 0.036% (t-stat=5.2) return. Similar H/L in
column (4) produces a return of -0.008% (t-stat=-3.9). All the other H/L portfolios in other
columns are insignificant except for that in column (1) of Panel B. Later in Table 4, we
see that the latter does not persist when the horizon is longer. The results in Panels A and
B show in a significant way how prior CDS price signals whether spread levels or spread
changes could be very informative as they led to predictable changes in subsequent stock
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returns. The predictability is subtle as it appears in market hours returns negatively and
in after-market hours returns positively. We will explore these observations in more tests.
Suffice for now, it is seen that there appears to be on average a clear price reversal when
stocks react one way or the other during market hours. When both market hours returns
and after-market hours returns are aggregated into daily returns, the impact of prior CDS
price signal is apparently much weaker, and this could be a reason why existing research
does not expose the intricacies of CDS market informativeness.
[Table 4 about here]
At the start of the previous week or month, all stocks are sorted in two ways, on ascend-
ing order of the level of CDS spread (SCDS) as well as ascending order of the CDS return
(RCDS). The ranked stocks are assigned to one of 5 quintile portfolios. The portfolios are
rebalanced every week or month, whichever is the case. H/L (SCDS) portfolio return is the
raw return of a zero-cost portfolio of going short high CDS spread stocks and long low
CDS spread stocks. H/L (RCDS) portfolio return is the raw return of a zero-cost portfo-
lio of going short high CDS return stocks and long low CDS return stocks. In this table,
we focus on the H/L portfolios at weekly and monthly investment horizons. Both equal
weighting and value weighting are used to show the robustness of results. Table 4 shows
that the equal-weighted and value-weighted H/L portfolios produce similar results though
the former portfolios’ returns are larger. It is shown that the predictability of SCDSt−1 and
RCDSt−1 towards both R
MH
t and R
AM
t can persist over longer periods of weekly and monthly
horizons. Overall, the results are consistent with those reported in Table 3 suggesting that
stocks overreact to CDS price signals and on average reverses after the stock market closes.
2.3.3 Predictability of Credit Returns given High/Low CDS Levels
The empirical results from Tables 2 through 4 show that the predictive power of CDS return
is weaker than that of CDS spread. Secondly, after-market stock returns are not monoton-
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ically increasing respect to lagged CDS prices. Also, after-market hours stock returns are
not monotonically increasing when CDS returns increase. It is possible that the effect of
CDS returns could be more definite when they are considered under different categories of
spread levels. There are existing literature that differentiate the behavior of firms’ returns
when their credit risks become too high. For instance, Avramov et al., (2007) showed that
firms with higher credit risks are associated with fewer analyst coverages, higher forecast
dispersions, and subject to higher revisions compared with those of firms with lower credit
risks. Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Lee, Naranjo, and Velioglu (2017) found that CDS
prices infuse information about adverse credit news faster than news permeate via related
stock prices. On the latter, it could also be that stocks with high credit spreads tend to be
less frequently traded, thus leading to a sluggish stock price adjustment relative to associ-
ated credit derivatives (Kwan (1996)). Motivated by the existing literature, we expect that
a stronger CDS return or CDS price change signal could have higher predictive power if
we condition the changes on the CDS spread level. It allows us to use changes of CDS
spread as a proxy for credit news arrival that is consistent with existing studies on relative
efficiencies between stock and CDS markets that may be differentiated by the firms’ level
of credit spread or risk.
Specifically, we conduct a double sorting strategy such that at the start of every trading
day (or week or month), we independently split all stocks into high CDS spread group and
low CDS spread group based on the cross-sectional median7 of CDS spread levels observed
7We use the cross-sectional median as a cutoff to ensure that there are enough stocks contained in each of
the portfolios. In particular, in an unreported table of an average number of firms of each of quintile portfolios
in Table 5, there are approximately 65 firms contained in each of the CDS return quintile for close-to-close
stock return portfolio and market hours return portfolio with respect to the high CDS spreads and the low
CDS spreads respectively. The average number of firms contained in each quintile portfolio is smaller for
before-market hours and after-market hours cases. For instance, there are around 53 firms in the CDS return
quintile for high CDS spreads and low CDS spreads. The average number of firms reduces dramatically
for the before-market hour return portfolio. There are only about 21 firms contained in each of the quintile
portfolio given the level of CDS spreads. In Table A2 of the appendix, we conduct robustness tests by showing
results of a similar double sorting portfolio test. In particular, we consider a top 80 percentile and a bottom 20
percentile sort of cross-sectional lagged CDS spreads and portfolio tests are replicated as in Table 5. Table A2
confirms that our results are robust for using different split points of stocks based on cross-sectional lagged
CDS spreads.
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on the previous trading day (or week or month). Within each CDS spread group, we rank
firms by five groups based on their CDS returns to form 5 portfolios.
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 shows the average returns of daily equal-weighted portfolios. At the start of
each trading day, all stocks are split into high CDS spread group and low CDS spread group
based on the cross-sectional median of the observed CDS spread levels on the previous
trading day. Using a double sort, within each spread group, the stocks are further divided
into five quintiles according to CDS return. The top 20% belong to the high CDS return
group while the bottom 20% belong to the low CDS return group. Panel A shows the
average returns over sampling period January 2001 through December 2013 of market
hour returns of the long position in all the stocks (solid line), in the low credit spread group
(dashed line), and in the high credit spread group (dotted line). The x-axis indicates the 5
CDS return quintiles where Q5 has the highest CDS returns. The y-axis shows the equal-
weighted portfolio return in %. Panel B shows the average of corresponding after-market
hours returns. After conditioning on high CDS spread, we indeed see a more significant
predictive result on the stock returns. In particular, the market hours stock returns are
monotonically reducing and after-market hours stock returns are monotonically increasing
with respect to increasing CDS returns in the high CDS spread group. In contrast, we do
not see a clear pattern when CDS spread is low.
Further, we examine the H/L portfolio at different investment horizons. In Table 5 we
examine stock portfolio returns based on portfolios sorted by CDS Returns but conditioned
separately on high and low CDS Spread Levels. Under a double sort, at the start of an
investment period, whether daily, weekly or monthly, we split all stocks into high CDS
spread level and low CDS spread level based on their cross-sectional (across all firms on
that day) median. Within each CDS spread group, we rank firms by quintiles based on their
CDS returns and form 5 portfolios. The portfolios are rebalanced every day, week, and
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month accordingly. H/L is the raw return of a zero-cost portfolio of going short stocks of
the highest quintile CDS return and going long stocks of the lowest CDS return quintile.
Equal-weighted returns are reported in Panel A, and value-weighted returns are reported
in Panel B for the different horizons of day, week, and month. These average returns are
expressed as %.
[Table 5 about here]
In Column (5) of Panel A as well as Panel B, we find that RCDSt−1 negatively and signif-
icantly predicts the next period’s stock returns during market hours given a high level of
CDS spread the previous period. The means of equal-weighted H/L portfolio are 0.058%
(t-stat = 5.6), 0.241% (t-stat=1.8), and 2.199% (t-stat=2.8), are significant at 1%, 10%, 1%
level respectively at the daily, weekly, and monthly horizons. In sharp contrast, column (6)
shows that the means of equal-weighted H/L portfolios given a low level of CDS spread
are not significantly different from zeros at all the horizons. Similar results are observed in
the value-weighted portfolios.
Similarly, RCDSt−1 positively predicts the next period’s after-market closing returns R
AM
t .
The means of equal-weighted H/L portfolio are -0.013% (t-stat =-3.4), -0.125% (t-stat=-
2.5), and -0.768% (t-stat=-3.4) with respect to daily, weekly, and monthly horizons given
high CDS spread level (Column 7) but does exhibit any predictive power given low CDS
spread level (Column 8). The results are similar for value-weighted portfolios. Consistent
with our prior findings, RCDSt−1 does not provide much useful information to predict next day’s
close-to-close and before-market open stock returns regardless of levels of CDS spread, as
shown in columns (1) to (4) for the equal-weighted cases. The results for value-weighted
portfolios, as shown in Panel B, are similar to the equal-weighted cases reported in Panel
A, excepting the monthly close-to-close cases.
The robustness of the results in Table 5 is checked using two other sets of results re-
ported in supplementary Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix. In Table A2 we replicate
72
our empirical investigation as per Table 5 but instead of splitting all stocks into high CDS
spread level and low CDS spread level based on their cross-sectional median, we check
for robustness of results by splitting all stocks into high CDS spread level and low CDS
spread level based on their cross-sectional top 80% and bottom 20% respectively as ob-
served on that day. Similar results as in Table 5 are seen in Table A2. Stocks with high
CDS spread react negatively in a significant way during market hours to increased CDS
return the previous day, but show price reversals after market hours.
Table A3 also replicates the test in Table 5 but uses CRSP data to examine close-to-open
returns and open-to-close returns. The latter is approximately our TAQ market hours returns
and the former is the sum of our after-market returns and before market-open returns. The
results in Table A3 unsurprisingly yield similarly significant H/L portfolio returns for high
credit spread stocks during open-to-close or approximately during market hours in our TAQ
data results. However, other cases are largely insignificant. Overall, the empirical evidence
suggests that CDS returns, as a proxy for CDS news, can deliver useful information in
predicting subsequent day’s stock returns overreaction given a group of firms with high
levels of CDS spread.
2.4 Information Mechanism and Empirical Tests
The findings in the last section allows us to construct a validated framework for under-
standing how CDS market works in relation to the stock market since many stocks in U.S.
markets are entities to associated CDS contracts traded through Markit platform that is the
major platform for CDS trades. At 15:30 Eastern time, Markit end-of-day daily CDS price
or spread relative to the previous trading day’s spread provides credit news that could be
short-run imminent credit downgrade or default, or else a long-run distress risk signal. The
percentage change in CDS price or CDS return as a source of news could indicate bad news
on stocks if CDS return is positive or good news if CDS return is negative. Institutional
traders, including banks, on CDS who also arrange lending/borrowing deals with firms
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would harbor profitable information on how material the CDS news are, as some CDS re-
turns could be due merely to liquidity trades or hedgers reloading or unloading positions.
Materials news are concentrated in stocks with high credit spreads (lower credit ratings)
and that are hard to value, as characterized earlier. Stock markets close a very short while
after at 16:00. Between 16:00 and 24:00 afterward, termed after-market hours in our study,
where there is no continuing affirmation of actual imminent credit event, stock prices typ-
ically reverse on average due to overconfident traders that are only partially informed and
not perfectly informed. The last part of the statement would be supported in this section of
the study. Past midnight into 09:30 the next morning, the period termed as before-market
hours, stock prices do not move much on average when most traders are asleep or not keen
to take decisive positions. It could also be a time to soak in the day’s news. After 17 1/2
hours, by the time the market opens the next day, informed traders start to aggressively
build up positions on the stocks given the CDS return signals particularly on high credit
spread and hard-to-value stocks. By the end of the trading hours at 16:00, the stock returns
would have reflected the impact as found in our earlier empirical results. There would be
overreaction followed by reversals in stock price except in cases when actual imminent
credit downgrades or default would happen. Uninformed investors and traders in the stock
market could not read any revealed information in the stock prices between 16:00 and 09:30
the next day as they could not be certain if a credit event is imminent and that price reversal
may not happen. If there were no price reversals seen during 16:00 to 24:00, the stocks in
after-market hours would already be at a low price so the uninformed cannot learn about
likely impending credit event and sell more stocks since there would be no demand for
them.
This section explores plausible information mechanisms of the overreaction findings
we documented in Section 2.3. In particular, we ask (1) what is the source of the CDS
predictability? Also, (2) Why does the stock market overreact to CDS price/news?
To address the first question, we focus on an informed-trading hypothesis, suggesting
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that informed investors in CDS markets trade in opaque stocks with high valuation uncer-
tainty by using their private information extracted from lagged CDS prices. As such, the
CDS returns are more likely to lead stock returns for opaque firms. To address the second
question, we posit that CDS prices carry two pieces of distress risk information that are
usually hard to tell apart: (1) long-run high distress risk that leads to short-run stock net
profit falls but no imminent credit event, and (2) short-run imminent danger of a credit event
including downgrades and default. Case (2) happens more rarely, but it can be confusing
to informed traders who may not tell (1) and (2) readily apart. Probabilities of long-run
distress and short-run imminent credit event are defined as complementary and sum to 1.
Based on the last CDS spread change or the CDS return, the informed trader makes bet
about imminent credit event happening. If CDS return was positive, the bet was about how
likely a credit event would take place the next few days. If CDS return was negative, the
bet was about how less likely a credit event would take place the next few days given a high
credit spread level. Overreaction to CDS news is led by the informed traders who do not
have perfect information and could over-bet in some situations.
2.4.1 Development of Hypotheses
Informed Trading - Source of the Predictability
The CDS market is sophisticated and sees active participation by a set of primary dealers
that are likely to be large financial institutions including banks. This is because banks have
better access to reference entities’ credit status through established borrow/lending rela-
tionships with the reference entities, and thus have an economic interest and the necessary
experience to deal in CDS. This could be a source of private information embedded in CDS
changes. Kim et al. (2014) also found that informed lenders to entities could trade on bor-
rowers’ private information. Consistent with this view, Acharya and Johnson (2007) found
that CDS prices are more informative for firms with a higher number of bank relations. Lee,
Naranjo, and Velioglu (2017) found that bank-related insider trading information seemed
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to be fully reflected in the CDS spread reactions rather than related stock prices. Addition-
ally, Siriwardane (2018) showed that in 2011 about 50% of total net CDS protection in the
U.S. was sold by the top five dealers.
Informed trading should be more profitable for hard-to-value stocks. This is because
informed traders can benefit more by trading with uninformed traders who would find it
more difficult to infer information given the more challenging information environment.
The signal noises to uninformed investors is a crucial factor of informed investors’ trade
incentives (Seyhun (1986)). Theories of endogenous information acquisition suggest that
the incentives to acquire private information are inversely related to the informativeness of
public information. See Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Verrecchia (1982), and Diamond
(1985), among many other studies. Empirically, Frankel and Li (2004) found that insid-
ers prefer to trade in firms whose financial statements are less value-relevant. Aboody et
al. (2005) found that insider trading activities are more pronounced for firms with poor
earnings quality. Kumar (2009) found that informed trading intensity is higher among
hard-to-value stocks where retail investors are more prone to behavioral biases. Wu (2018)
found that insiders’ trading profits increase sharply after an increase in information asym-
metry. Chen, Kelly, and Wu (2018) found that hedge funds trade more aggressively when
information asymmetry increased.
If stocks have high transparency in terms of easy valuation, more accurate financial
statements, high earnings quality, and thus low information asymmetry, then CDS price
signals would not help in predicting stock return changes since both CDS and stock markets
could have processed any news simultaneously. However, for hard-to-value stocks where
there is information asymmetry, informed traders will be able to trade on stocks based on
CDS price changes which they would know contain information signals. It could also be
that the initial price movements of CDS markets reveal the trading activities of a small set
of informed cross-market arbitrageurs who have better access to both the CDS market and
the larger stock markets, and who could follow up by trading in the stock market, as found
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in Goldstein, Li, and Yang (2014).
Hypothesis 1: CDS returns only lead stock returns when valuation uncertainty is high.
Overconfidence - Stock Market Overreaction to CDS Price Signals
CDS price changes carry two pieces of distress risk information that are complementary
and are events that add up the probabilities to one. One interpretation of a CDS price
change is news about long-run distress risk that does not imply any imminent credit or
default event but which will cause stock profits and hence prices to decrease in the short-
run. The other possibility is that the CDS price change is indicating a short-run imminent
credit downgrade or default event. Based on the last CDS spread change or the CDS return,
the informed trader makes bet about imminent credit event happening. If CDS return was
positive, the bet was about how likely a credit event would take place the next few days. If
CDS return was negative, the bet was about how less likely a credit event would take place
the next few days given a high credit spread level.
If all informed traders know precisely what the credit private signal is, the stock price
will not overshoot. Based on this insight, we test stock price changes by examining periods
with both low and high short-run imminent credit event prediction error. We expect to find
no stock returns reversal after market-close whether the imminent credit event prediction
error is small or large if the traders are fully informed. We employ days on t + 1 where
downgrade actually occurred as indicators of low imminent credit event prediction error at
t. However, if traders are not fully informed but are overconfident that positive CDS return
indicates an imminent credit event, then we would see stock returns fall and not reverse
after market hours when an actual imminent credit event occurs afterward, but stock price
reversals when no imminent credit event actually occurs. For negative CDS returns, if
traders are also overconfident that no imminent credit event or adverse credit news will
follow, they would over-buy stocks so that there would also be reversals when no credit
events occur. Because incidences of negative CDS returns or low CDS spread (below
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120) followed by a credit downgrade is very rare, at 0.01% of the sample points, these
occurrences of subsequent stock price fall averagely do not affect the overall after-market
hours results to produce significant price reversals.
Thus overconfident informed traders over-estimate the probability of short-run credit
downgrade or default and would over-sell more stocks. In other words, they under-estimate
long-run distress risk. When lagged CDS return signal is negative, i.e. less credit risk, they
under-estimate the probability of short-run credit downgrade or default but over-estimate
the complementary long-run distress risk. A testable hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis 2: There is no stock return reversal for days with credit downgrade fol-
lowing the CDS return signals.
Limit-to-Arbitrage
If equity and CDS markets are fully integrated, then (1) contemporaneously price changes
in one market should appear in the other market with consistent signs (2) intertemporally,
price changes in one market should not spillover to future price changes in the other market.
However, as shown by Kapadia and Pu (2012), in the presence of market frictions and
financial constraints, short-horizon intertemporal pricing discrepancies can occur between
the two markets. Thus, limit-to-arbitrage may have a large impact on our results showing
lagged CDS price changes impacting stock returns. To investigate this, we consider two
types of limit-to-arbitrage: trading liquidity in the stock market and short-sales contraints
in stock trading.
• Lack of individual stock liquidity. The stock market reactions to CDS prices could
reflect the lack of liquidity of the related stocks. Theoretically, Grossman and Miller
(1988), Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), Amihud (2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003),
Acharya and Pedersen (2005), and many other studies suggested that an illiquid stock
is supposed to have a steeper demand curve compared with a liquid stock. Further,
Brogaard, Li, and Xia (2017) showed that the CDS spread can proxy for the steeper
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slope of the aggregate demand curve of an individual stock. Thus stocks with adverse
credit are on average less liquid. Suppose credit news arrives that shifts the aggregate
liquidity supply of the stocks the next period. Bad credit news would increase supply
while good news would decrease supply. The less liquid or illiquid stock with a less
elastic or steeper demand curve would see a larger change in stock price than that of
the more liquid stock. If stock demand is perfectly elastic, then there would be no
change in stock price. Furthermore, if supply should rever, then the less liquid stock
will also see a large price reversal compared to the more liquid stock. The above
price reactions are graphically shown in Figure A1 in the Appendix.
Hypothesis 3A: Stock price reactions are stronger for more illiquid stocks and
weaker for liquid stocks.
• Short-sale constraint As shown in Figure 1, the quintile portfolios of high CDS
spread deliver, on average, negative returns during market hours, suggesting that
stock markets are more sensitive to bad credit news when the credit risks of the
underlying debts are high. One possible reason is that institutional investors face
short-sale constraint and thus cannot immediately short the stocks with bad credit
news. This,in turn,delays the flow of information into stock prices (Nagel (2005)).
Therefore, the stock price reactions on lagged CDS price changes may occur because
of short-sale constraint.
Hypothesis 3B: Stock price reactions are stronger for stocks with greater short-
sale constraints and weaker for stocks with lesser short-sale constraints.
2.4.2 Empirical Findings
Test of Hypothesis 1: Informed trading and valuation uncertainty
To test hypothesis 1, we further split the sample by high and low valuation uncertainty
groups using portfolio sorts. We consider idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) as a proxy for the
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degree of valuation uncertainty as existing literature showed that valuation uncertainty was
more (less) pronounced given a high (low) idiosyncratic volatility. For examples, Chen,
Huang, and Jha (2012) found that a high degree of the managerial discretionary earnings
management activity with idiosyncratic volatility has poorer information quality and less
informativeness on stock price; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) found that financial
reporting quality is poorer when idiosyncratic volatility is higher. We construct the id-
iosyncratic volatility for each stock based on Fama and French (2015) five-factor model
using daily returns data in a 1-year rolling window framework.
The portfolio sorting approach is as follows. At the start of every trading day, all stocks
are independently split into groups of high/low CDS spread levels based on the cross-
sectional median of the CDS spread level observed on the previous trading day. Within
each CDS spread group, we further split stocks into high/low valuation uncertainty groups
based on the median of IVOL on the previous trading day. Then within each of the sub-
groups, we sort by CDS returns from the previous trading day into quintiles. Within each
quintile portfolio of stocks, the portfolio returns are computed using equal weights of indi-
vidual stock returns. The H/L portfolio return is computed by shorting stocks in the highest
quintile and buying stocks in the lowest quintile. The daily portfolio rebalancing results
are similarly replicated using weekly and also monthly rebalancing based on weekly and
monthly sorts respectively. Panel A reports average H/L returns of market hours stock
returns at daily, weekly, and monthly frequency. Panel B reports average H/L returns of
after-market hours stock returns at daily, weekly, and monthly frequency. Columns (1)
& (2) report the returns under high IVOL and low IVOL groups for high CDS spreads.
Columns (3) & (4) report the returns under high IVOL and low IVOL group for low CDS
spreads. We report these portfolio results in Table 6. We show portfolio returns of indi-
vidual quintile portffolios in Figure 2. (We also perform portfolio aggregation using value
weights, and find the results to be largely similar. We do not report these to economize on
space.)
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[Figure 2 & Table 6 about here]
In Figure 2, among the stocks with high CDS spreads and high idiosyncratic volatili-
ties, we see that magnitudes of average market hours return in Panel A are monotonically
decreasing in CDS returns. This is reflected in Table 6 Panel A column (1) where the daily
H/L portfolio return is highly significant at 0.07% per day (t-statistic: 6.3). The weekly and
monthly H/L portfolio returns are also strongly significant at 0.242% and 0.800%. How-
ever, the daily returns show the strongest results. This shows that for hard-to-value stocks
(stocks with high IVOL) with high credit spread levels (at higher credit risk), credit news or
CDS return signals allow informed investors to make profit via trading in the stock market.
On the other hand, the magnitudes of average after-market hours returns in Panel B
of Figure 2 are monotonic increasing in CDS returns. This is reflected in Table 6 column
(1) with a H/L portfolio return of -0.016% per day (t-statistic: -3.5). Weekly and monthly
returns are also significantly negative. These after-market hours H/L portfolio negative
returns are smaller in magnitudes compared to the positive H/L portfolio returns during
market hours, so there is evidence of stock price reversals after market closes when CDS
spread and also IVOL or valuation uncertainties are high. This is consistent with hypothesis
1.
In stark contrast, in Figure 2 we do not observe clear patterns for low IVOL group
stock returns given high CDS spread. In Table 6, all H/L portfolios with low CDS spread
or those with high CDS spread but low IVOL have returns not significantly different from
zeros. Overall, our empirical results suggest that informed trading on stocks based on CDS
price change signals is higher when the underlying stocks have higher credit spreads and
are hard-to-value. This certainly serves to lend evidence to Hypothesis 1.
One concern is that IVOL may capture limit-to-arbitrage as suggested by Kapadia and
Pu (2012). In other words, it may be limit-to-arbitrage that is facilitating the predictability
result and not valuation uncertainty. To rule out this possibility and to affirm valuation
uncertainty as in Hypothesis 1 to be a credible reason of the predictability, we further
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consider a latter test on the impact of limit-to-arbitrage. The related hypotheses about
limit-to-arbitrage’s impact on stock price reactions are framed in Hypotheses 3A and 3B.
We also check for economic significance of the portfolio results besides statistical sig-
nificance. In Table 7 we report the economic significance of the stock portfolios formed by
using lagged CDS market news. Panel A reports the daily Sharpe Ratio and Panel B reports
the skewness. Panel A reports the daily Sharpe Ratios and Panel B reports the skewness of
equal-weighted H/L stock portfolios conditioned on high/low CDS spreads and high/low
IVOL. The daily shape ratio is computed by the ratio of the sample of mean over standard
deviation of daily returns. The skewness is the sample skewness. The sample period covers
January 2001 through December 2013.
[Table 7 about here]
We compare the Sharpe ratios and skewness of the H/L portfolios with the equal-
weighted S&P 500 stock index returns (including dividends) as the benchmark. For the
after-market hours, we compute the Sharpe ratio by taking the absolute value of the aver-
age return. The market hours Sharpe ratio is higher than the after-market hours Sharpe ratio
by about 33%. This is consistent with the results in Table 6 regarding the stronger profit
of H/L in market-hours trading. Moreover, the H/L portfolio Sharpe ratios far exceeds in
performance versus the S&P 500 index performance over the sampling period. The H/L
portfolio performance over stocks with low CDS spread or low IVOL, however, appear to
be on par with the S&P 500 index performance. Besides, the H/L portfolio’s skewness
is positive while that of the S&P 500 index is negative over the same sampling period.
The positive skewness together with higher mean and smaller or same standard deviation
clearly indicates H/L portfolios as superior performers and to have contained profitable
information for trading when CDS spread is high and when there is valuation uncertainty.
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Test of Hypothesis 2: Overconfidence
Hypothesis 2 predicts that there is no return reversal during after-market hours when a
credit downgrade is imminent. We postulate overconfident informed traders over-estimating
the probability of short-run credit downgrade or default and would over-sell more stocks.
When lagged CDS return signal is negative indicating less credit risk, they under-estimate
the probability of short-run credit downgrade or default but over-estimate the complemen-
tary long-run distress risk. If all informed traders know precisely how private signal looks
like, the price will never overshoot and there would not be overconfidence implications.
To test Hypothesis 2, we run panel regressions of the stock returns during different trad-
ing hours with stocks sorted by high/low IVOL. The explanatory variables include controls
such as lagged returns. The key explanatory variables include interactive variables com-
bining CDS price information such as spreads or returns with dummy variables indicating
whether a credit downgrade or default event follows the CDS price information the next
day. Specifically, Downgradei,t is a dummy variable that equals to 1 when a downgrade
occurs at day t, and is zero otherwise. NoDowngradei,t is a dummy variable that equals
to 1 when there is no downgrade at day t, and is zero otherwise. At t, we assume that there
is perceived short-run default risk of firm i if Downgradei,t+1 = 1. We assume the down-
grade information following closely the next day could have been somewhat perceived.
Otherwise adverse changes in CDS spread or return is construed as long-run default risk.
Table 8 reports the fixed-firm effect panel regression results for high valuation uncer-
tainty stocks in Panel A and low valuation uncertainty stocks in Panel B. The stocks are
divided into high or low valuation uncertainty group based on the median of IVOL on the
previous day. Portfolios are re-balanced every trading day. The panel regression across
stocks i and time t by days is specified as follows.
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RStocki,t = β0 +β1S
CDS
i,t−1×Downgradei,t+1 +β2SCDSi,t−1×No Downgradei,t+1 +Xi,t−1 +δi+i,t
(2.1)
where Downgradei,t is a dummy variable that equals to 1 for downgrade or default that
occurred and zero otherwise. No Downgradei,t is dummy variables that is equal to 1 when
downgrade or default does not occur imminently afterward. Xi,t−1 are control variables.
We also test the following using CDS returns.
RStocki,t = β0 +β1R
CDS
i,t−1×Downgradei,t+1 +β2RCDSi,t−1×No Downgradei,t+1 +Xi,t−1 +δi+i,t
(2.2)
In the regression, we test whether the overreaction effect disappears when there is im-
minent credit downgrade or default. In particular, we check whether β1 is indifferent from
zero for both market hours returns and also after-market hours returns.
[Table 8 about here]
In Table 8 Panel A, we find that point estimates βˆ1 of both SCDSi,t−1 × Downgradei,t+1 and
RCDSi,t−1 × Downgradei,t+1 are insignificant for RAMt . These are seen in Column (3) and
column (6). This suggests that there is no stock return reversal when a credit downgrade
or default event is imminent. In other words, the signal errors of short-run distress risk is
low. In Panel A columns (2) and (5), estimates βˆ1 of both SCDSi,t−1 × Downgradei,t+1 and
RCDSi,t−1 × Downgradei,t+1 are significantly negative for market hours returns RMHt . Thus
when credit downgrades or defaults occur, informed traders did not overreact or overshoot
by excessive selling based on CDS price signals since there is no stock return reversal.
There are only about 0.01% of sample points where negative CDS return or smaller spread
is followed by a credit downgrade or default, so any reversal in this small portion of cases
would not show up on the β1 estimates for RAMt . The above validates Hypothesis 2.
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On the other hand, when downgrades or defaults did not occur, the Panel A βˆ2 estimates
for RMHt are significantly negative in columns (2) and (5). The magnitudes of the estimates
are smaller than those when downgrades or default occurs, indicating that whether a credit
event is imminent or not, higher CDS returns lead to decrease in stock prices, and vice-
versa. However, when downgrades or defaults did not occur, the Panel A βˆ2 estimates for
RAMt are significantly positive in columns (3) and (6). This is strong evidence of overreac-
tion in normal long-run distress risk when there would be no credit downgrades or defaults.
The overreaction or overshooting is consistent with overconfident traders who overestimate
short-run imminent downgrade or default risk when it would not occur, based on increased
CDS return or increased CDS spread. When credit events actually occur, then the over-
betting by overconfident traders would turn out to be just on target so that there would be
no stock price reversal.
When the CDS price signal is negative CDS return or decrease in CDS spread, the
informed traders would overconfidently overestimate long-run distress risk and under-
estimate short-run imminent credit event. They would over-buy the stocks. Because of
over-confidence, there would still be after-market hours stock price reversals when no im-
minent credit downgrades or defaults occur. If credit events do occur, which form a very
tiny fraction or 0.01% of the cases, βˆ1 for after-market returns would not be significantly
different from zero, so there is on average no stock price reversal.
The βˆ1 and βˆ2 coefficient estimates in Panel B, when IVOL is low, are all insignificant.
This implies no reactions (and therefore no reversals) were present in stocks that have low
valuation uncertainty. Informed traders cannot profit from such stocks.
Test of Hypothesis 3A: Illiquidity in Limit-to-arbitrage
One motivation to test if limit-to-arbitrage could explain the overreaction in stock prices
to CDS news is to ascertain if indeed IVOL is a proxy not just for valuation uncertainty
but also for limit-to-arbitrage, as suggested by Kapadia and Pu (2012). If limit-to-arbitrage
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could not satisfactorily explain the overreaction in stock prices to CDS news, then we could
rule out the role of IVOL as proxy for limit-to-arbitrage since our results so far have shown
strongly that IVOL is key in explaining significant overreaction in stock prices.
First, we examine whether the monotonic patterns of quintile portfolio returns in Figure
1 for both market hours returns and after-market hours returns, only in the case of lagged
high credit spread, is due to a lack of trading activities among those stocks. To do this,
we report equal-weighted total daily trading volumes and daily turnovers of the five stock
quintiles constructed in Figure 1, conditioned on high CDS spread and low CDS spread.
Note that to focus on the trading activities, we consider trading volume-based stock liquid-
ity measures rather than bid-ask spread-based liquidity measures because bid-ask spread
may contain information of valuation uncertainty (see, e.g., Glosten and Harris (1988) and
Huang and Stoll (1989)), which may overlap with the information asymmetry content in
IVOL. The results are shown in Figure 3.
[Figure 3 about here]
In Figure 3 Panel A, we compute equal-weighted average of total daily trading volume
for each of the CDS return quintiles given high and low CDS spread levels. Similarly, we
report the case of daily trading turnovers in Panel B. Two important results emerge from
the analyses. Firstly, both the trading volume and turnover of the high CDS spread group
are higher than those of the low CDS spread group. It indicates that significant amounts
of trading activities occurred for the high CDS spread group. Thus, we cannot accept that
stronger stock market reactions observed in a group of high CDS spreads are because these
stocks are less liquid. Secondly, the average trading volume and turnover exhibit a U-
shaped pattern from the quintile with the most negative CDS returns to quintile Q5 with the
highest CDS returns. This indicates that trading activities are more intense on stocks with
either the highest or the lowest CDS price changes, which is intuitive as material changes
would more likely imply content of news and not just liquidity trading effects in the CDS
86
market.
Second, Kapadia and Pu (2012) showed that limit-to-arbitrage is a key factor to drive
stock and CDS markets non-integration. They considered IVOL as a measure of arbitrage
costs in stock markets. If so, the IVOL we used earlier may just proxy for limit-to-arbitrage,
not valuation uncertainty. At the start of each trading day, all stocks are split into high
CDS spread group and low CDS spread group based on the cross-sectional median of the
observed CDS spread levels on the previous trading day. Within each CDS spread group,
the stocks are further sorted using observed IVOL based on the cross-sectional median
on the previous day. Using a triple sort, within each IVOL group, the stocks are further
divided into five quintiles according to CDS return. We examine the magnitudes of trading
activities of the different quintiles under high/low IVOL and under different high/low credit
spread levels. Figure 4 reports the results.
[Figure 4 about here]
In Figure 4, we show that the trading activities (total daily trading volume in Panel A
and daily turnover in Panel B) are much higher for high IVOL and high CDS spread sub-
group than the other sub-groups. Indeed, trading activities are the highest for high IVOL
groups regardless of CDS spreads. Thus, we reject that stronger stock market reactions
observed in a group of high idiosyncratic volatilities are because these stocks are less liquid
and are subject to limit-to-arbitrage.
Unlike Hypotheses 1 and 2, Hypothesis 3A is set up to allow a refutation of some ex-
isting thinking about impact of liquidity on stock price reactions. In our context, clearly
Hypothesis 3A is rejected. Lack of trading liquidity is not seen as the reason for overreac-
tion in stock prices after CDS market news. We also perform portfolio tests based on our
high/low liquidity metrics. The results are reported in Table 9.
[Table 9 about here]
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At the start of every trading day, all stocks are split into groups of high/low CDS spread
level based on the cross-sectional median of CDS spread level observed on the previous
day. Within each CDS spread group, stocks are further divided high IVOL and low IVOL
sub-groups based a median of IVOL (that proxies for degree of information asymmetry)
observed on the previous day. In each of the 4 sub-groups, stocks are sorted in columns
(1) and (2) into High/Low trading volumes, in columns (4) and (5) into High/Low trading
turnovers, using their cross-sectional medians. After these triple sorts, within each sub-
group, stocks are sorted into high and low CDS return groups using the previous trading
day’s median for CDS returns. Unlike previous sorting into quintiles, as the sub-sorting
levels increase, we use only two groups at this level to retain enough sample points. These
high and low CDS return groups’ daily equal-weighted portfolios are shown in Panel A
for two measures of returns - the market hours returns and the after-market hours returns.
The numbers in the table shows the return of long positions on the various portfolios. This
table shows only the sub-group with high CDS spread level and high IVOL level. (Other
results involving the other 3 sub-groups are not reported here to economize on space; those
results without high CDS spread and high IVOL generally produce weaker and insignificant
results.)
H/L is the raw return of a zero-cost portfolio of going short stocks of the high CDS
returns and long stocks of the low CDS returns. In Panel B, the high and low CDS return
groups are split not using the previous day median but using 30% lower CDS returns and
70% high CDS returns. The average returns are expressed in %. Columns (3) and (6) - Diff
- is the portfolio comprising a long position in High Volume or Turnover, and short Low
Volume or Turnover respectively.
Table 9 shows that the overreactions in stocks with greater trading activities are in fact
stronger than those in stocks with lesser trading activities. For example, in Panel A of Table
9, column (1) for the case of total daily trading volume, the H/L portfolios of both market
hours and after-market hours stock returns are statistically significant with a high total daily
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trading volume. The difference (Diff in Column (3)) is statistically insignificant, suggesting
that stock reactions are not due to a lack of trading activities. The results of daily turnover
(Column (4) to (6)) and results in Panel B are similar. Overall, the results indicate that
stock illiquidity cannot satisfactorily explain our overreaction and reversal results.
Test of Hypothesis 3B: Short-sale constraint
We first examine whether the short-sale activities of stock quintile portfolios given high
CDS spreads are smaller than those of low CDS spreads. We proxy short-sale activities
using short trading turnover, which is constructed by the ratio of the short trading volume
to the number of shares outstanding for the entire stock in a trading day. The short trading
volume is from “Reg SHO”, which spans from 2005 to 2007. Figure 5 reports the result.
[Figure 5 about here]
From Figure 5, we see that average short-sale turnovers along the quintile portfolios
given high CDS spreads in Panel A are about two times larger than those of low CDS
spreads. Moreover, the stock quintiles, based on sorting with CDS returns, evidence larger
and intense shorting activities at the two extremes of large and small CDS returns. By parti-
tioning into high and low IVOL sub-groups, we see that in Panel B, significant amounts of
shorting activities are concentrated on the high IVOL stocks rather than the low IVOL
stocks. Hence high IVOL stocks appear not to be inhibited by short-sale constraints.
In other words, the overreactions of high IVOL stocks especially those with high credit
spreads are not due to short-sales constraints.
We further investigate the role of short-sale constraint in a larger sample employing
Nagel (2005)’s residual institutional ownership (RIO) as a proxy for short-sale constraint.
As noted by Nagel, higher (lower) RIO indicates more (less) short-sale constraint because
when there are less institutional trading, there are less abilities to overcome short-sale re-
strictions. On the contrary, more institutional trading implies abilities to overcome short-
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sale constraints.
We construct another portfolio test based on H/L trading day portfolio returns under a
triple sort. At the start of trading day, we split all stocks into high CDS spread level and low
CDS spread level based on their cross-sectional median. Within each CDS spread group,
we further split stocks by high/low short-sale constraint based on the median of residual
institutional ownership (RIO) on the previous day. Next, within each of the 4 sub-groups,
we again sort the stocks into 5 quintiles based on largest CDS returns in the 5th quintile
and smallest CDS return in the 1st quintile. We form zero-cost H/L portfolio by going short
the 5th quintile stocks and going long the 1st quintile stocks. The H/L portfolio returns are
measured as market hours returns as well as after-market hours returns, and are reported in
Table 10.
[Table 10 about here]
In Table 10, we see that the average returns of H/L portfolios for both market hours and
after-market hours are significant for high CDS spreads for both the high RIO and the low
RIO sub-groups. For the high residual institutional ownership sub-group with high CDS
spreads, i.e. the stocks facing high short-sales constraint, the H/L market hours average
return is 0.056% which is smaller than the 0.082% in the sub-group facing lesser short-
sales constraint with low RIO. If strong stock reactions to CDS return signals are because
of short-sale constraints, we expect that the significant average returns of H/L should only
occur in the high RIO stocks. Similarly, after-market returns are significantly negative,
indicating stock price reversals, and this occurs as well for both high and low RIO sub-
groups. Overall, we conclude that the stock market reactions to CDS price signals cannot
be satisfactorily explained by short-sales constraints and limit-to-arbitrage. We reject both
Hypotheses 3A and 3B.
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2.5 Conclusions
Do CDS prices convey useful information on stock returns? This paper establishes a strong
and previously unexplored link between CDS spread and stock returns during different
hours of the daily trading period. We show that lagged CDS spread changes or CDS
returns negatively impact stock returns during market-open hours. Using cross-sectional
regressions, nonlinear portfolio sorting approaches, and panel regressions, the impact is
shown to be both statistically and economically significant. We also find that after regular
market hours or after stock exchange’s market closing when trades still continue on elec-
tronic trading platforms, there is also a strong and significant positive relationship between
stocks returns and lagged CDS returns, indicating stock return reversals after market hours.
Previous research have mixed or weak results supporting any effect of lagged CDS spreads
or lagged CDS returns on daily stock returns measured on close-to-close basis. This could
be due to the aggregation of both a negative impact during market hours and a reversal after
market hours. Figuratively, by splitting the atom, we see a more interesting and realistic
picture of electrons and nucleus.
To understand the source of return predictability, we explore an informed trading hy-
pothesis, an overconfidence hypothesis, and limit-to-arbitrage hypotheses. We show that
our results are mainly contributing to the informed trading hypothesis and the overcon-
fidence hypothesis. We provide an information mechanism framework that is consistent
with the empirical findings in our paper. Our characterization of the CDS news impact on
stocks is consistent with the theoretical paper by Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016) where
informed trading is very much a centre-piece in understanding empirical results. We show
that CDS predictability occurs because of a high valuation uncertainty especially with high
credit spreads and high stock liquidity. Thus informed traders across CDS and stock mar-
kets concentrate on hard-to-value and low credit rating stocks, and extract information rent
or profit particularly during high trading activities. Short-sale constraint is found not to
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be a satisfactory reason for overreaction of stocks and in fact, more profitability seems to
center around stocks with low residual institutional ownership or stocks highly traded by fi-
nancial institutions including banks. The stock return reversal observations or patterns that
consistently show up illuminates a strong possibility of overconfident information traders
supported by our findings.
We believe that our strong results indicating CDS price change impact on stock returns
are due to informed trading activities related to high valuation uncertainty and the presence
of information asymmetry across the CDS and stock markets. We anticipate more exciting
research ahead to discover more of the intriguing interactions of traders across these two
related markets, particularly when time-stamped data on CDS trades would become avail-
able in the future. The microstructures of trades within fractions of a day are fascinating
and our decomposition of returns into three blocks within a trading day is an important first
step to understanding more deeply the information-based trading behaviours.
92
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Aboody, D., Even-Tov, O., Lehavy, R. and Trueman, B., 2018. Overnight returns and
firm-specific investor sentiment.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,53(2),
pp.485-505.
[2] Aboody, D., Hughes, J. and Liu, J., 2005. Earnings quality, insider trading, and cost of
capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 43(5), pp.651-673.
[3] Amihud, Y. and Mendelson, H., 1986. Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread. Journal of
financial Economics, 17(2), pp.223-249.
[4] Amihud, Y., 2002. Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects.
Journal of financial markets, 5(1), pp.31-56.
[5] Avramov, D., Chordia, T., Jostova, G. and Philipov, A., 2007. Momentum and credit
rating. The Journal of Finance, 62(5), pp.2503-2520.
[6] Avramov, D., Chordia, T., Jostova, G. and Philipov, A., 2009. Credit ratings and the
cross-section of stock returns. Journal of Financial Markets, 12(3), pp.469-499.
[7] Ang, A., Hodrick, R.J., Xing, Y. and Zhang, X., 2006. The cross section of volatility
and expected returns. The Journal of Finance, 61(1), pp.259-299.
[8] Acharya, V.V. and Johnson, T.C., 2007. Insider trading in credit derivatives. Journal of
Financial Economics, 84(1), pp.110-141.
[9] Acharya, V.V. and Pedersen, L.H., 2005. Asset pricing with liquidity risk. Journal of
financial Economics, 77(2), pp.375-410.
[10] Biais, B. and Hillion, P., 1994. Insider and liquidity trading in stock and options
markets. The Review of Financial Studies, 7(4), pp.743-780.
[11] Blanco, R., Brennan, S. and Marsh, I.W., 2005. An empirical analysis of the dy-
namic relation between investmentgrade bonds and credit default swaps. The journal of
Finance, 60(5), pp.2255-2281.
[12] Bollerslev, T., Li, S.Z. and Todorov, V., 2016. Roughing up beta: Continuous versus
discontinuous betas and the cross section of expected stock returns. Journal of Financial
Economics, 120(3), pp.464-490.
[13] Boulatov, A. and George, T.J., 2013. Hidden and displayed liquidity in securities mar-
kets with informed liquidity providers. The Review of Financial Studies, 26(8), pp.2096-
2137.
[14] Berndt, A. and Ostrovnaya, A., 2014. Do Equity Markets Favor Credit Market News
Over Options Market News?. The Quarterly Journal of Finance, 4(02), p.1450006.
[15] Berkman, H., Koch, P.D., Tuttle, L. and Zhang, Y.J., 2012. Paying attention: overnight
returns and the hidden cost of buying at the open. Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis, 47(4), pp.715-741.
[16] Bremer, M. and Sweeney, R.J., 1991. The reversal of large stockprice decreases. The
Journal of Finance, 46(2), pp.747-754.
93
[17] Chen, Yong, Bryan Kelly, and Wei Wu. Sophisticated Investors and Market Effi-
ciency: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. No. w24552. National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 2018.
[18] Collin-Dufresn, P., Goldstein, R.S. and Martin, J.S., 2001. The determinants of credit
spread changes. The Journal of Finance, 56(6), pp.2177-2207.
[19] CollinDufresne, P. and Fos, V., 2015. Do prices reveal the presence of informed trad-
ing?. The Journal of Finance, 70(4), pp.1555-1582.
[20] CollinDufresne, P. and Fos, V., 2016. Insider trading, stochastic liquidity, and equi-
librium prices. Econometrica, 84(4), pp.1441-1475.
[21] Collin-Dufresne, P., Fos, V. and Muravyev, D., 2015. Informed trading and option
prices: evidence from activist trading (No. 15-55). Swiss Finance Institute.
[22] Collin-Dufresne, P. and Fos, V., 2013. Moral hazard, informed trading, and stock
prices (No. w19619). National Bureau of Economic Research.
[23] Chen, C., Huang, A.G. and Jha, R., 2012. Idiosyncratic return volatility and the infor-
mation quality underlying managerial discretion. Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis, 47(4), pp.873-899.
[24] Chordia, T., Roll, R. and Subrahmanyam, A., 2005. Evidence on the speed of conver-
gence to market efficiency. Journal of Financial Economics, 76(2), pp.271-292.
[25] Diamond, D.W., 1985. Optimal release of information by firms. The journal of fi-
nance, 40(4), pp.1071-1094.
[26] Daniel, Kent, David Hirshleifer, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam. ”Investor psychology
and security market under− and overreactions.” the Journal of Finance 53, no. 6 (1998):
1839-1885.
[ff (1992)] Fama, E.F. and French, K.R., 1992. The crosssection of expected stock returns.
the Journal of Finance, 47(2), pp.427-465.
[ff (2015)] Fama, E.F. and French, K.R., 2015. A five-factor asset pricing model. Journal
of Financial Economics, 116(1), pp.1-22.
[ff (1973)] Fama, Eugene F., and James D. MacBeth. ”Risk, return, and equilibrium: Em-
pirical tests.” Journal of political economy 81, no. 3 (1973): 607-636.
[27] Frankel, R. and Li, X., 2004. Characteristics of a firm’s information environment and
the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Journal of Accounting and
Economics, 37(2), pp.229-259.
[28] Fink, J., Fink, K.E. and Weston, J.P., 2006. Competition on the Nasdaq and the growth
of electronic communication networks. Journal of Banking & Finance, 30(9), pp.2537-
2559.
[29] Easley, D., O’hara, M. and Srinivas, P.S., 1998. Option volume and stock prices:
Evidence on where informed traders trade. The Journal of Finance, 53(2), pp.431-465.
[30] Glosten, L.R. and Harris, L.E., 1988. Estimating the components of the bid/ask
spread. Journal of financial Economics, 21(1), pp.123-142.
[31] Grossman, S.J. and Miller, M.H., 1988. Liquidity and market structure. the Journal of
Finance, 43(3), pp.617-633.
94
[32] Goldstein, I., Li, Y. and Yang, L., 2014. Speculation and hedging in segmented mar-
kets. The Review of Financial Studies, 27(3), pp.881-922.
[33] Grossman, S.J. and Stiglitz, J.E., 1980. On the impossibility of informationally effi-
cient markets. The American economic review, 70(3), pp.393-408.
[34] Hilscher, J., Pollet, J.M. and Wilson, M., 2015. Are credit default swaps a sideshow?
Evidence that information flows from equity to CDS markets. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 50(3), pp.543-567.
[35] Hughes, J.S., Liu, J. and Liu, J., 2007. Information asymmetry, diversification, and
cost of capital. The accounting review, 82(3), pp.705-729.
[36] Huang, R.D. and Stoll, H.R., 1997. The components of the bid-ask spread: A general
approach. The Review of Financial Studies, 10(4), pp.995-1034.
[37] Jegadeesh, N., 1990. Evidence of predictable behavior of security returns. The Journal
of finance, 45(3), pp.881-898.
[38] Jegadeesh, N. and Titman, S., 1995. Overreaction, delayed reaction, and contrarian
profits. The Review of Financial Studies, 8(4), pp.973-993.
[39] Jiang, W. and Zhu, Z., 2016. Mutual Fund Holdings of Credit Default Swaps: Liquid-
ity, Yield, and Risk Taking.
[40] Kapadia, N. and Pu, X., 2012. Limited arbitrage between equity and credit markets.
Journal of Financial Economics, 105(3), pp.542-564.
[41] Kim, J.B., P. Shroff, D. Vyas, and R. Wittenberg-Moerman, 2014. Active CDS Trad-
ing and Managers’ Voluntary Disclosure. Working Paper, Singapore Management Uni-
versity, 56 pp.
[42] Kyle, A.S., 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica: Journal of
the Econometric Society, pp.1315-1335.
[43] Kryzanowski, L., Perrakis, S. and Zhong, R., 2017. Price discovery in equity and CDS
markets. Journal of Financial Markets, 35, pp.21-46.
[44] Kwan, S.H., 1996. Firm-specific information and the correlation between individual
stocks and bonds. Journal of financial economics, 40(1), pp.63-80.
[45] Lee, J., Naranjo, A. and Velioglu, G., 2017. When Do CDS Spreads Lead? Rating
Events, Private Entities, and Firm-Specific Information Flows.
[46] Lindset, S., Lund, A.C. and Persson, S.A., 2014. Credit risk and asymmetric informa-
tion: A simplified approach. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 39, pp.98-112.
[47] Lee, C. and Ready, M.J., 1991. Inferring trade direction from intraday data. The Jour-
nal of Finance, 46(2), pp.733-746.
[48] Lo, A.W. and MacKinlay, A.C., 1990. When are contrarian profits due to stock market
overreaction?. The review of financial studies, 3(2), pp.175-205.
[49] Lehmann, B.N., 1990. Fads, martingales, and market efficiency. The Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 105(1), pp.1-28.
[50] Merton, R.C., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest
rates. The Journal of finance, 29(2), pp.449-470.
95
[51] Marsh, I.W. and Wagner, W., 2016. NewsSpecific Price Discovery in Credit Default
Swap Markets. Financial Management, 45(2), pp.315-340.
[52] Nagel, S., 2005. Short sales, institutional investors and the cross-section of stock
returns. Journal of financial economics, 78(2), pp.277-309.
[53] Newey, Whitney K; West, Kenneth D., 1987. ”A Simple, Positive Semi-definite, Het-
eroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix”. Econometrica. 55
(3): 703708.
[54] Norden, L. and Weber, M., 2004. Informational efficiency of credit default swap and
stock markets: The impact of credit rating announcements. Journal of Banking & Fi-
nance, 28(11), pp.2813-2843.
[55] Ni, Sophie Xiaoyan and Pan, Jun, Trading Puts and CDS on Stocks with Short Sale
Ban (July 1, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1572462.
[56] Oehmke, Martin, and Adam Zawadowski. ”Synthetic or real? The equilibrium effects
of credit default swaps on bond markets.” The Review of Financial Studies 28, no. 12
(2015): 3303-3337.
[57] Pstor, L. and Stambaugh, R.F., 2003. Liquidity risk and expected stock returns. Jour-
nal of Political economy, 111(3), pp.642-685.
[58] Qiu, Jiaping and Yu, Fan, Endogenous Liquidity in Credit Derivatives
(March 14, 2011). AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1785750.
[59] Rajgopal, S. and Venkatachalam, M., 2011. Financial reporting quality and idiosyn-
cratic return volatility. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(1-2), pp.1-20.
[60] Seyhun, H.N., 1986. Insiders’ profits, costs of trading, and market efficiency. Journal
of financial Economics, 16(2), pp.189-212.
[61] Siriwardane, Emil, Limited Investment Capital and Credit Spreads (June 1, 2018).
Harvard Business School Finance Working Paper No. 16-007; Journal of Finance, Forth-
coming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2584043.
[62] Wu, Wei, Information Asymmetry and Insider Trading (August 26, 2018). Fama-
Miller Working Paper ; Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 13-67. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2323537.
[63] Verrecchia, R.E., 1982. Information acquisition in a noisy rational expectations econ-
omy. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pp.1415-1430.
96
Table 1A: Summary Statistics: This table reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables used
in this study covering 2001 to 2013. SCDS is 5-year CDS spread. RCDS is percentage change of 5-year CDS
spread. Four different stock returns are reported, comprising (1) stock returns computed based on close-to-
close stock prices RCTCi,t , (2) stock returns before market opens R
BM
i,t , (3) stock returns during market hours
RMHi,t , and (4) stock returns after market hours R
AM
i,t . Short volume is the aggregate daily short volume from
2005 to 2007. TURN is stock trading volume turnover that is volume divided by total number of shares (in
’000’s). IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility computed based on the Fama and French 5-factor model using past
1-year rolling window. RIO is residual institutional ownership. Short volume, trading volumes are reported
in thousands, and stock capitalization (SIZE) are reported in $000’s. Statistics include sample mean (Mean),
sample standard deviation (Stdv), sample skewness (Skew), and sample kurtosis (Kurt).
No. of Obs Mean Stdv Skew Kurt
SCDS 2050282 180.938 339.479 8.29 118
RCDS 2050282 0.002 4.450 0.50 358
RCTC 2050282 0.003 3.090 3.59 1569
RBM 724051 -0.028 2.554 257.28 119046
RMH 2050282 -0.010 2.365 17.13 6169
RAM 1966518 0.009 0.823 -1.43 15574
Trading Volume (AM) 1966518 228010 1637458 247.72 121967
Trading Volume (BM) 724051 30255 981999 444.17 324799
Trading Volume (MH) 2050282 3602645 14122111 42.00 3473
IVOL 2050282 0.017 0.012 3.72 30
SIZE ($’000) 2050282 16282105 33590738 5.59 47
TURN 2050282 10.516 101.37 205.334 57928
RIO 2050282 1.191 1.182 -0.142 7.089
Short Volume 540181 308852.6 550269.8 8.7 265.6
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Table 1B: Correlation Table of Stock Returns Computed using Different Market Hours
using TAQ and CRSP: This table reports the correlations for same day stock returns from 2001 to 2013.
The various stock returns comprise (1) stock returns before market-open RBMi,t , (2) stock returns during
market hours RMHi,t , (3) stock returns after market hours R
AM
i,t , (4) close-to-close stock returns R
CTC,TAQ
t
computed by TAQ, (5) close-to-close stock returns RCTC,CRSPt computed by CRSP, (6) open-to-close stock
returns ROTC,CRSPt computed by CRSP, and (7) close-to-open stock returns R
CTO,CRSP
t computed by
CRSP. RBMi,t , R
MH
i,t , and R
AM
i,t are computed using TAQ dataset. All units are expressed in terms of percentage.
RBM RMH RAM RCTC,TAQ RCTC,CRSP ROTC,CRSP RCTO,CRSP
RBM 100 -3.6 0.5 15.8 16.4 -3.1 32.3
RMH 100 -7.9 73.7 77.1 99.9 -7.2
RAM 100 -4.8 -5.1 -7.3 1.7
RCTC,TAQ 100 99.7 73.8 50.6
RCTC,CRSP 100 77.6 53.3
ROTC,CRSP 100 -7.4
RCTO,CRSP 100
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Table 3: Stock Portfolios Sorted By CDS Information at Daily Frequency: This table reports
equally weighted portfolio trading day raw returns at daily frequency. At the beginning of every trading day,
all stocks are sorted in two ways viz. ascending order on the level of CDS spread (SCDS) and ascending
order on CDS return (RCDS) on the previous trading day. The ranked stocks are assigned to one of 5 quintile
portfolios. The portfolios are rebalanced every day. Equal-weighted stock returns of long positions in the
portfolios constructed by lagged SCDS are reported in Panel A. Equal-weighted stock returns of long positions
in the portfolios constructed by lagged RCDS are reported in Panel B. In panel A, H/L shows the raw return of
a zero-cost portfolio of going short high level CDS spread stocks and going long low level CDS spread stocks.
In panel B, H/L shows the raw return of a zero-cost portfolio of going short high level CDS return stocks and
going long low level CDS return stocks. In panel C, the H/L portfolios’ raw returns of value-weighted stocks
sorted on CDS spread and on CDS return are reported. The average returns in the different sorted portfolios
are reported in %. Column (1) is portfolio based on the close-to-close stock return (RCTCt ). Columns (2), (3),
and (4) are based on before market-open (RBMt ), during market hours (R
MH
t ), and after-market hours stock
(RAMt ) returns respectively. The returns are constructed using transaction prices from TAQ. The sample period
covers January 2001 through December 2013. Newey and West t-statistics adjusted for 12 lags are reported
in the brackets. ***,**, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Sorted by CDS Level, Equal-weight RCTCt RBMt RMHt RAMt
Low SCDSt−1 -0.002 -0.012*** 0.034** 0.004*
(-0.1) (-5.6) (2.4) (1.8)
2 0.006 -0.008** 0.024 0.003
(0.3) (-2.5) (1.5) (1.3)
3 0.000 -0.006** 0.014 0.000
(0.0) (-2.6) (0.8) (0.1)
4 0.007 -0.009*** 0.005 0.004
(0.3) (-3.2) (0.2) (1.5)
High SCDSt−1 -0.010 -0.011** -0.097*** 0.028***
(-0.2) (-2.1) (-2.8) (7.8)
H/L 0.009 -0.001 0.131*** -0.024***
(0.3) (-0.3) (5.5) (-7.7)
Panel B: Sorted by CDS Change, Equal-weight RCTCt RBMt RMHt RAMt
Low RCDSt−1 0.014 -0.011*** 0.011 0.005**
(0.5) (-3.2) (0.5) (2.3)
2 0.011 -0.009*** -0.001 0.008***
(0.5) (-3.3) (-0.1) (3.5)
3 0.014 -0.004 -0.001 0.005*
(0.6) (-1.2) (-0.1) (1.9)
4 0.002 -0.007* -0.004 0.007***
(0.1) (-1.7) (-0.2) (3.0)
High RCDSt−1 -0.022 -0.014*** -0.024 0.013***
(-0.8) (-3.6) (-1.1) (5.2)
H/L 0.037*** 0.003 0.036*** -0.008***
(4.1) (0.8) (5.2) (-3.9)
Panel C: Value weighted: RCTCt RBMt RMHt RAMt
Daily, Value-weight
H/L SCDSt−1 0.034 -0.015 0.095*** -0.015***
(1.3) (-1.5) (4.5) (-3.5)
Daily, Value-weight
H/L RCDSt−1 0.038*** 0.001 0.031*** -0.007**
(3.3) (0.3) (3.6) (-2.3)
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Table 4: Stock Portfolios Sorted By CDS Information at Longer Horizons: This table reports
trading day H/L stock portfolio raw returns at weekly and monthly frequencies. At the close of the previous
week or month, all stocks are sorted in two ways, on ascending order of the level of CDS spread (SCDS) as well
as ascending order of the CDS return (RCDS). The ranked stocks are assigned to one of 5 quintile portfolios.
The portfolios are rebalanced every week or month, whichever is the case, H/L (SCDS) portfolio return is the
raw return of a zero-cost portfolio of going short high CDS spread stocks and long low CDS spread stocks.
H/L (RCDS) portfolio return is the raw return of a zero-cost portfolio of going short high CDS return stocks and
long low CDS return stocks. In this table, we focus on the H/L portfolios at weekly and monthly investment
horizons. Both equal weighting and value weighting are used to show robustness of results. Column (1)
is the close-to-close portfolio stock returns (RCTCt ). Columns (2), (3), and (4) comprise before market-open
(RBMt ), during market hours (R
MH
t ), and after-market hours (R
AM
t ) portfolio stock returns respectively. The
returns are constructed using transaction prices from TAQ. The sample period covers January 2001 through
December 2013. Newey and West t-statistics adjusted for 12 lags are reported in the brackets. ***,**, and *
denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RCTCt R
BM
t R
MH
t R
AM
t
Weekly, Equal-weight
H/L SCDSt−1 0.040 -0.011 0.603*** -0.111***
(0.3) (-0.5) (4.0) (-6.0)
Weekly, Value-weight
H/L SCDSt−1 0.142 -0.078 0.433*** -0.056***
(1.0) (-1.4) (3.6) (-3.2)
Monthly, Equal-weight
H/L SCDSt−1 0.240 -0.042 2.623*** -0.460***
(0.4) (-0.4) (3.3) (-4.0)
Monthly, Value-weight
H/L SCDSt−1 0.604 -0.403* 2.074*** -0.289***
(0.9) (-1.9) (3.2) (-3.4)
Weekly, Equal-weight
H/L RCDSt−1 0.080 -0.090 0.104** -0.032***
(0.5) (-1.4) (2.3) (-3.2)
Weekly, Value-weight
H/L RCDSt−1 -0.274 -0.070 0.052 -0.042
(-1.2) (-0.7) (1.3) (-1.4)
Monthly, Equal-weight
H/L RCDSt−1 0.052 -0.060 0.378** -0.150**
(0.3) (-1.3) (2.0) (-2.6)
Monthly, Value-weight
H/L RCDSt−1 0.060 0.011 0.003 0.028
(0.3) (0.1) (0.0) (0.4)
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Table 5: Stock Portfolios Sorted by CDS Returns Conditioned on High/Low CDS Spread
Levels: This table reports H/L portfolio trading day returns under a double sort. At the start of an investment
period, whether daily, weekly, or monthly, we split all stocks into high CDS spread level and low CDS spread
level based on their cross-sectional (across all firms on that day) median. Within each CDS spread group,
we rank firms by quintiles based on their CDS returns or percent spread change, and form 5 portfolios. The
portfolios are rebalanced every day, week, and month accordingly. H/L is the raw return of a zero-cost
portfolio of going short stocks of the highest quintile CDS return and going long stocks of the lowest CDS
return quintile. Equal-weighted returns are reported in Panel A, and value-weighted returns are reported
in Panel B for the different horizons of day, week, and month. These average returns are expressed as
%. Columns (1) & (2) report the H/L close-to-close stock return (RCTCt ) given High and Low CDS spread
respectively. Columns (3) & (4) report the H/L before market-open stock return (RBMt ) given High and Low
CDS spread respectively. Columns (5) & (6) report the H/L during market hours stock return (RMHt ) given
High and Low CDS spread respectively. Columns (7) & (8) report the H/L after-market hours stock return
(RAMt ) given High and Low CDS spread respectively. The stock returns are constructed by transaction prices
from TAQ. The sample period covers January 2001 through December 2013. Newey and West t-statistics
adjusted for 12 lags are reported in the brackets. ***,**, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High SCDSt−1Low S
CDS
t−1High S
CDS
t−1Low S
CDS
t−1High S
CDS
t−1Low S
CDS
t−1High S
CDS
t−1Low S
CDS
t−1
RCTCt R
CTC
t R
BM
t R
BM
t R
MH
t R
MH
t R
AM
t R
AM
t
Panel A: Equal-weight
Daily
H/L RCDSt−1 0.043** -0.002 0.010 -0.004 0.058*** 0.004 -0.013*** -0.002
(2.1) (-0.2) (1.6) (-1.0) (5.6) (0.7) (-3.4) (-1.2)
Weekly
H/L RCDSt−1 0.007 -0.076* -0.056 -0.006 0.241* -0.032 -0.125** 0.007
(-0.0) (-1.8) (-0.9) (-0.4) (1.8) (-0.9) (-2.5) (0.7)
Monthly
H/L RCDSt−1 0.693 -0.246 -0.611** -0.020 2.199*** 0.001 -0.768*** 0.027
(1.1) (-1.5) (-2.4) (-0.4) (2.8) (-0.0) (-3.4) (0.4)
Panel B: Value-weight
Daily
H/L RCDSt−1 0.032 -0.001 0.019** -0.004 0.042*** 0.003 -0.008* -0.002
(1.6) (-0.1) (2.2) (-0.7) (3.0) (0.5) (-1.7) (-0.8)
Weekly
H/L RCDSt−1 0.099 -0.076* -0.026 -0.002 0.167** -0.024 -0.061*** 0.003
(1.5) (-1.8) (-1.3) (-0.1) (2.5) (-0.8) (-3.2) (0.3)
Monthly
H/L RCDSt−1 0.565** -0.298** -0.143 -0.009 0.794*** -0.072 -0.250** 0.001
(2.2) (-2.0) (-1.5) (-0.2) (3.1) (-0.5) (-2.4) (-0.0)
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Table 6: Stock Portfolios Sorted by CDS Returns Conditioned on High/Low CDS Spread
Level and High/Low IVOL (Valuation Uncertainty): This table reports H/L trading day portfolio
returns under a triple sort. At the start of an investment period, whether daily, weekly, or monthly, we split
all stocks into high CDS spread level and low CDS spread level based on their cross-sectional (across all
firms on that day) median. Within each CDS spread group, we further split stocks into high or low valuation
uncertainty group based on the median of IVOL on the previous day. Next, within each of the 4 groups,
we again sort the stocks into 5 quintiles based on largest CDS returns in the 5th quintile and smallest CDS
return in the 1st quintile. We form zero-cost H/L portfolio by going short the 5th quintile stocks and going
long the 1st quintile stocks. Equal-weighted returns are reported for daily, weekly, and monthly horizons.
The average returns are expressed in %. Panel A reports average H/L returns of market hours stock returns
at daily, weekly, and monthly frequency. Panel B reports average H/L returns of after-market hours stock
returns at daily, weekly, and monthly frequency. Columns (1) & (2) report the returns under high IVOL and
low IVOL groups for high CDS spreads. Columns (3) & (4) report the returns under high IVOL and low
IVOL group for low CDS spreads. The sample period covers January 2001 through December 2013. Newey
and West t-statistics adjusted for 12 lags are reported in the brackets. ***,**, and * denote significance at
1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High CDS Spread Low CDS Spread
High IVOL Low IVOL High IVOL Low IVOL
Panel A: Market Hours
Daily, H/L 0.070*** -0.014 0.005 0.019
(6.3) (-0.4) (0.6) (0.9)
Weekly, H/L 0.242*** 0.169 -0.027 0.002
(2.9) (1.2) (-0.7) (0.0)
Monthly, H/L 0.800** 0.612 -0.162 0.751
(2.4) (0.8) (-0.6) (1.0)
Panel B: After-Market Hours
Daily, H/L -0.016*** 0.005 -0.002 0.003
(-3.5) (0.4) (-0.6) (0.5)
Weekly, H/L -0.070*** -0.006 0.012 -0.012
(-3.0) (-0.2) (1.2) (-0.3)
Monthly, H/L -0.259** -0.149 0.023 -0.104
(-2.1) (-0.7) (0.3) (-1.0)
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Table 7: Economic Significance of Portfolios Returns Sorted by High/Low CDS Spread
Level and High/Low IVOL: This table reports the economic significance of trading day stock portfolios
formed using quintiles of CDS returns conditioned on lagged CDS spread levels. The condition is based
on plitting all stocks into high CDS spread level and low CDS spread level based on their cross-sectional
(across all firms on that day) median. H/L portfolios are constructed by going short the highest CDS return
quintile portfolio and going long the lowest CDS return quintile portfolio. Panel A reports the daily Sharpe
Ratio and Panel B reports the skewness of the portfolios. Equal-weighted daily rebalanced portfolios are used
throughout. The results are related to those reported in columns (5) to (8) of Panel A in Table 5. The stock
portfolio returns are measured in both market hours returns and also after-market hours returns. Next the daily
Sharpe Ratios and skewness of equal-weighted stock portfolios of high and low IVOL groups given high CDS
spread are reported and are related to those reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. The daily Sharpe Ratio
and skewness of the equal weighted S&P 500 benchmark return (including dividends) are also reported for
comparison. The daily Sharpe ratio is computed by the ratio of the sample mean return over sample standard
deviation of returns. The skewness is the sample skewness. The sample period covers January 2001 through
December 2013.
Panel A: Daily Sharpe Ratio
High CDS spread Low CDS Spread
Market Hours, H/L 0.1068 0.0022
After-Market Hours, H/L 0.0633 0.0135
High CDS spread
High Info IVOL Low Info IVOL
Market Hours, H/L 0.1073 0.0237
After-Market Hours, H/L 0.0675 0.0053
Stock Index
S&P 500 Index 0.0144
Equal-Weighted Return-incl. dividends 0.0321
Panel B: Skewness
High CDS spread Low CDS Spread
Market Hours, H/L 0.0838 0.1442
After-Market Hours, H/L 1.1911 -2.3202
High CDS spread
High Info IVOL Low Info IVOL
Market Hours, H/L 0.1207 -0.4333
After-Market Hours, H/L 6.8774 -0.5339
Stock Index
S&P 500 Index -0.0214
Equal-Weighted Return-incl. dividends 0.0140
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Table 10: Residual Institutional Ownership, CDS price, and Stock Markets Reaction: This
table reports H/L trading day portfolio returns under a triple sort. At the start of trading day, we split all
stocks into high CDS spread level and low CDS spread level based on their cross-sectional (across all firms
on that day) median. Within each CDS spread group, we further split stocks by high/low short-sale constraint
based on the median of residual institutional ownership (RIO) on the previous day. Next, within each of the
4 sub-groups, we again sort the stocks into 5 quintiles based on largest CDS returns in the 5th quintile and
smallest CDS return in the 1st quintile. We form zero-cost H/L portfolio by going short the 5th quintile stocks
and going long the 1st quintile stocks. The H/L portfolio returns are measured as market hours returns as well
as after-market hours returns. The sample period covers January 2001 through December 2013. Newey and
West t-statistics adjusted for 12 lags are reported in the brackets. ***,**, and * denote significance at 1%,
5%, and 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High CDS Spread Low CDS Spread
RIO High RIO Low RIO High RIO Low
Market Hours, H/L 0.056*** 0.082*** -0.000 0.002
(2.9) (4.2) (-0.0) (0.1)
RIO High RIO Low RIO High RIO Low
Aftermarket Hours, H/L -0.014** -0.023* -0.008** 0.007*
(-2.1) (-1.9) (-2.3) (1.9)
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Figure 1 shows the average returns of daily equal-weighted portfolios. At the start of each trading day, all
stocks are split into high CDS spread group and low CDS spread group based on the cross-sectional median
of the observed CDS spread levels on the previous trading day. Using a double sort, within each spread
group, the stocks are further divided into five quintiles according to CDS return. The top 20% belong to
the high CDS return group while the bottom 20% belong to the low CDS return group. Panel A shows the
average returns over sampling period January 2001 through December 2013 of market hour returns of long
position in all the stocks (solid line), in the low credit spread group (dashed line), and in the high credit spread
group (dotted line). The x-axis indicates the 5 CDS return quintiles where Q5 has the highest CDS returns.
The y-axis shows the equal-weighted portfolio return in %. Panel B shows the average of corresponding
after-market hours returns.
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Figure 2 shows the average returns of daily equal-weighted portfolios. At the start of each trading day,
all stocks are split into high CDS spread group and low CDS spread group based on the cross-sectional
median of the observed CDS spread levels on the previous trading day. Only results for the high CDS spread
(spd) group are shown. Within this group, the stocks are further sorted using observed IVOL based on the
cross-sectional median on the previous day. Using a triple sort, within each IVOL group, the stocks are
further divided into five quintiles according to CDS return. The top 20% belong to the high CDS return
group while the bottom 20% belong to the low CDS return group. Panel A shows the average returns over
sampling period January 2001 through December 2013 of market hour returns of long position in high IVOL
(solid line) and in low IVOL group (dashed line). The x-axis indicates the 5 CDS return quintiles where Q5
has the highest CDS return. The y-axis shows the equal-weighted portfolio return in %. Panel B shows the
average of corresponding after-market hours returns.
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Figure 3 At the start of each trading day, all stocks are split into high CDS spread group and low CDS
spread group based on the cross-sectional median of the observed CDS spread levels on the previous trading
day. Using a double sort, within each spread group, the stocks are further divided into five quintiles according
to CDS return. The top 20% belong to the high CDS return group while the bottom 20% belong to the low
CDS return group. The average daily trading volumes of the different quintile portfolios are shown in Panel
A and daily turnovers are reported in Panel B.
Figure 4 At the start of each trading day, all stocks are split into high CDS spread group and low CDS
spread group based on the cross-sectional median of the observed CDS spread levels on the previous trading
day. Within each CDS spread group, the stocks are further sorted using observed IVOL based on the cross-
sectional median on the previous day. Using a triple sort, within each IVOL group, the stocks are further
divided into five quintiles according to CDS return. The top 20% belong to the high CDS return group while
the bottom 20% belong to the low CDS return group. Panel A shows the average trading volumes of equal-
weighted quintile portfolio at a daily frequency for (1) high IVOL and high CDS spread, (2) low IVOL and
high CDS spread, (3) high IVOL and low CDS spread, and (4) low IVOL and low CDS spread. Panel B
shows the average daily turnover.
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Figure 5 shows the average short volume turnover of equal-weighted quintile portfolios at a daily frequency
from 2005 to 2007. Panel A shows the average short volume turnover of high/low CDS spread groups. Panel
B shows the average short volume turnover of high/low IVOL groups given high CDS spread.
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Construction of Firm Characteristics
• Trading volume turnover. It is a ratio between total trading volume (during regular
trading hours) and number of shares outstanding.
• Stock market capitalization. The stock market capitalization is the sum over all stocks
of their product of end-of-day share price and number of shares outstanding, obtained
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
• Volatility-based measure. The idiosyncratic volatility is computed on a daily 1-year
rolling window using Fama and French 5 factor model. Specifically, we project daily
excess stock returns on Fama and French (2015) five-factor model and extract the
sample standard deviation of residuals. The stock volatility is the realized volatility
computed by a sample standard deviation of intra-day (log) transaction price changes.
• Short volume. The number of shares with short contracts outstanding for the entire
sample of stocks in a day. The sample is from “RHO” file from 2005 to 2007.
• Residual Institutional Ownership. The residual of institutional ownership is con-
structed by running the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression: logit(INSTi,t) =
c + β1Log(Size)i,t + β2Log(Size)
2
i,t + ei,t, where logit(INSTi,t) = log
INSTi,t
1−INSTi,t . We
run the regression at the beginning of each quarter and apply the fit to the rest of the
days in the following quarter in order to derive the residuals. The idea is to isolate
the IO effect from the size effect suggested by Nagel (2005). The INST is from 13F
filings.
• Downgrade events. The rating events data are obtained from S&P Capital IQ. There
were 1068 downgrade events from 2001 to 2013.
• Percentage Effective Spread. The percentage effective spread (ES) for day t is com-
puted by ESi,t = 1Ni,t
∑Ni,t
j=1
2Di,j(Pi,j−Mi,j)
Mi,j
, where i indicates firm, j indicates second,
andN is the total number of trades of stock i on day t. Given day t, Pi,j is transaction
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price for firm i at second j. Mi,j is the bid-ask mid price between bidding quote and
asking quote for each second. Di,j is buy or sell indicator. In particular, Di,j = 1
if there is a buy, Di,j = −1 if there is a sell. The buy/sell indicator and merging
between quote and trade database is using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm.
• Market leverage. Following Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009), the market lever-
age ratio (Lev) is computed as Lev = Book Value of Debt+Book Value of Preferred EquityMarket Value of Equity+Book Value of Debt+Book Value of Preferred Equity
where the market value of equity is computed as shares outstanding (SHROUT) mul-
tiplied by stock prices (PRC) from CRSP. The book value of debt and the book
value of preferred equity are obtained from COMPUSTAT. The book value of debt is
the sum of debt in current liability (DLCQ) and long-term debt (DLTTQ). Preferred
stocks are labeled as PSTKQ in COMPUSTAT.
• Price momentum. The stock price momentum (MOM) is the accumulated past 12-
month stock returns using daily stock returns. In constructing the price momentum
signal we skip the most recent month to avoid short-term reversal.
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A Graphical Illustration of Hypothesis 3A
As shown in Figure A1, suppose that the total net supply of stocks (assumed to be perfectly inelastic) at day
t is affected by credit news on day t-1 by 10 units during market hours. The illiquid stock (with steeper slope
in the demand curve) should see a greater price drop than the liquid stock with a more gentle slope. Given the
10 units excess supply due to the adverse news, price impact on the illiquid stock is |P(t-1)-P1(t)| and for the
liquid stock it is |P(t-1)-P2(t)| where |P(t-1)-P1(t)| > |P(t-1)-P2(t)|. If net excess supply should revert from
10 to only 5 units, after market hours, then the illiquid stock price would reverse more than the liquid stock
price.
Figure A1 provides a graphical illustration of larger impact of CDS news on stock prices
of illiquid stocks as suggested in Hypothesis 3A.
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Table A1: Replication of Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson (2015) Panel VAR result: This table
presents our replication of Hilscher et al. (2015), and an extension of their findings from 2001 to 2013 based
on a Panel fixed-effect regression model. RStocki,t are the daily close-to-close stock returns and R
CDS
i,t are the
daily percentage changes of CDS spread or CDS returns, for firm i on day t. In t-k, k indicates the number
of lags. Following Hilscher et al. (2015), we apply 3 lags. Panel A reports the VAR results for firms with
rating of A or above. Panel B reports results for firms with rating of BBB. Panel C reports results for firms
with rating below or equal to BB. Hilscher et al. (2015)’s results are shown in column (1), 2001 to 2007,
for purpose of comparison. Our replication results based on our data are reported in column (2) based on
the same sample period of 2001-2007. Column (3) is the extension using data from 2001 to 2013. All
regressions include firm fixed-effects. t-statistics from heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by
dates are reported in parentheses. *, and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Equity return t CDS return t
Hilscher Replication Extended Hilscher Replication Extended
et al. (2015) 2001-2007 2001-2013 et al. (2015) 2001-2007 2001-2013
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Rating A & Above
Equity return, RStock t-1 -0.023 -0.022 -0.045** -0.158** -0.155** -0.170**
(-1.87) (-1.93) (-4.51) -(12.78) (-6.86) (-11.34)
t-2 -0.013 -0.012 -0.017 -0.105** -0.109** -0.063**
(-1.17) (-1.42) (-0.96) (-8.09) (-8.12) (-8.97)
t-3 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.077** -0.085** -0.030**
(-0.62) (-1.04) (-0.19) (-6.19) (-9.72) (-3.43)
CDS return, RCDS t-1 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.020** -0.026** 0.038
(0.20) (-0.55) (-0.60) -(3.00) (-3.42) (1.27)
t-2 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.019** 0.013** 0.049**
(0.20) (0.04) (0.70) (3.49) (2.97) (5.17)
t-3 0.002 0.002 0.010** 0.001 -0.007 0.012*
(0.88) (1.30) (3.43) (0.25) (-1.11) (2.07)
Number of observations 261750 239257 494519 261252 239257 494519
Panel B: Rating BBB
Equity return, RStock t-1 -0.010 -0.011 -0.027** -0.127** -0.139** -0.127**
(-1.07) (-1.48) (-3.50) (-15.64) (-10.09) (-19.44)
t-2 -0.013 -0.011 -0.014 -0.083** -0.091** -0.052**
(-1.32) (-1.41) (-1.32) (-10.24) (-9.16) (-8.46)
t-3 0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.068** -0.068** -0.028**
(0.20) (0.09) (-0.04) (-7.68) (-5.25) (-4.85)
CDS return, RCDS t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.011 0.015 0.079**
(-0.47) (-0.69) (-0.68) (1.53) (0.75) (3.12)
t-2 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.027** 0.024** 0.059**
(0.12) (-1.11) (-0.30) (5.44) (4.06) (8.82)
t-3 0.002 0.001 0.008* 0.016** 0.002 0.022**
(0.08) (1.44) (2.46) (2.94) (0.74) (5.22)
Number of observations 325722 359806 772066 325028 359806 772066
Panel C: Rating BB & Below
Equity return, RStock t-1 0.009 0.005 0.004 -0.109** -0.138** -0.111**
(1.04) (1.07) (1.33) (-14.66) (-10.33) (-22.16)
t-2 -0.008 -0.010 -0.008 -0.067** -0.089** -0.054**
(-0.91) (-1.46) (-1.50) (-10.44) (-8.44) (-9.94)
t-3 -0.004 -0.000 -0.002 -0.046** -0.063** -0.031**
(-0.48) (-0.06) (-0.29) (-6.33) (-6.65) (-5.45)
CDS return, RCDS t-1 -0.004 -0.001 -0.006* -0.056** -0.051* 0.045
(-1.16) (-1.03) (-2.35) (-6.46) (-2.10) (1.79)
t-2 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005* 0.006 -0.008 0.048**
(-1.72) (-1.33) (-1.98) (0.88) (-0.61) (6.26)
t-3 -0.002 -0.000 0.005 -0.003 0.002 0.020**
(-1.67) (-0.90) (1.64) (-0.44) (1.12) (5.10)
Number of observations 162911 466444 786064 162318 466444 786064
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Table A2: Stock Portfolios Sorted by CDS Returns Conditioned on 80/20 CDS Spread
Levels: This table reports H/L portfolio trading day returns under a double sorting strategy. At the start of
an investment period, whether daily, weekly, or monthly, we split all stocks into high CDS spread level and
low CDS spread level based on their cross-sectional top 80% and bottom 20% respectively as observed on that
day. Within each CDS spread group, we rank firms by quintiles based on their CDS returns or percent spread
change and form 5 portfolios. The portfolios are rebalanced every day, week, and month accordingly. H/L
is the raw return of a zero-cost portfolio of going short stocks of the highest quintile CDS return and going
long stocks of the lowest CDS return quintile. Equal-weighted returns are reported in Panel A, and value-
weighted returns are reported in Panel B for the different horizons of day, week, and month. These average
returns are expressed as %. Columns (1) & (2) report the H/L close-to-close stock return (RCTCt ) given High
and Low CDS spread respectively. Columns (3) & (4) report the H/L before market-open stock return (RBMt )
given High and Low CDS spread respectively. Columns (5) & (6) report the H/L during market hours stock
return (RMHt ) given High and Low CDS spread respectively. Columns (7) & (8) report the H/L after-market
hours stock return (RAMt ) given High and Low CDS spread respectively. The stock returns are constructed by
transaction prices from TAQ. The sample period covers January 2001 through December 2013. Newey and
West t-statistics adjusted for 12 lags are reported in the brackets. ***,**, and * denote significance at 1%,
5%, and 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High SCDSt−1 Low S
CDS
t−1 High S
CDS
t−1 Low S
CDS
t−1 High S
CDS
t−1 Low S
CDS
t−1 High S
CDS
t−1 Low S
CDS
t−1
RCTCt R
CTC
t R
BM
t R
BM
t R
MH
t R
MH
t R
AM
t R
AM
t
Panel A: Equal-weight
Daily
H/L RCDSt−1 0.124*** -0.013 0.055* 0.004 0.103*** 0.003 -0.024*** -0.002
(4.7) (-0.9) (1.8) (0.4) (5.4) (0.5) (-3.1) (-0.7)
Weekly
H/L RCDSt−1 0.210*** -0.086 -0.055 0.011 0.251** -0.007 -0.088** -0.013
(1.6) (-1.0) (-1.3) (0.6) (2.0) (-0.2) (-2.5) (-0.8)
Monthly
H/L RCDSt−1 0.996 -0.346 -0.245 0.001 1.664*** -0.236 -0.417** -0.125
(1.0) (-1.3) (-1.3) (0.0) (2.6) (-1.0) (-2.5) (-1.6)
Panel B: Value-weight
Daily
H/L RCDSt−1 0.147*** -0.012 0.071** 0.004 0.085*** 0.003 -0.009* -0.002
(4.3) (-0.8) (2.0) (0.3) (3.5) (0.5) (-1.9) (-0.7)
Weekly
H/L RCDSt−1 0.003 -0.098 -0.090 0.006 0.267** -0.012 -0.136** -0.016
(0.0) (-1.1) (-1.1) (0.4) (2.5) (-0.3) (-2.1) (-1.0)
Monthly
H/L RCDSt−1 0.791 -0.214 -0.747** -0.014 2.752*** -0.168 -0.983*** -0.137*
(0.9) (-0.8) (-2.2) (-0.2) (2.7) (-0.7) (-3.6) (-1.8)
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Table A3: Stock Portfolios sorted by CDS Returns Condition on High/Low CDS Level
using CRSP: This table reports trading day H/L portfolio returns under a double sorting strategy. A double
sort is conducted such that at the start of every trading day or week or month, all stocks are split into high CDS
levels and low CDS levels based on their cross-sectional top 20 percentile and bottom 20 percentile observed
on the previous day or week or month. Within each CDS level group, we further rank firms by quintile
based on their CDS returns from t-2 to t-1 and form 5 portfolios. The portfolios are rebalanced every day,
week, and month accordingly. Equal-weighted returns are reported in Panel A, and value-weighted returns
are reported in Panel B. We focus on the H/L portfolio at different investment horizons. The average daily
returns are expressed as %. Columns (1) & (2) report the H/L strategy of close-to-open stock returns (RCTOt )
given high/low CDS spreads. Columns (3) & (4) report the H/L strategy of open-to-close returns (ROTCt )
given high/low CDS spreads. The stock returns are constructed by price data from CRSP. The sample period
covers January 2001 through December 2013. Newey and West t-statistics adjusted for 12 lags are reported
in the brackets. ***,**, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High SCDSt−1 Low S
CDS
t−1 High S
CDS
t−1 Low S
CDS
t−1
RCTOt R
CTO
t R
OTC
t R
OTC
t
Panel A: Equal-weight
Daily
H/L RCDSt−1 0.006 -0.009* 0.057*** 0.006
(0.8) (-1.7) (5.4) (1.0)
Weekly
H/L RCDSt−1 -0.074* -0.029 0.173*** -0.027
(-1.8) (-1.0) (2.5) (-0.9)
Monthly
H/L RCDSt−1 -0.418* -0.211 0.832*** -0.080
(-1.7) (-1.4) (3.1) (-0.5)
Panel B: Value-weight
Daily
H/L RCDSt−1 0.024 -0.006 0.042*** 0.004
(1.1) (-1.1) (3.0) (0.7)
Weekly
H/L RCDSt−1 -0.040 -0.015 0.245* -0.034
(-1.0) (-0.5) (1.9) (-1.0)
Monthly
H/L RCDSt−1 -0.582* -0.237* 2.148*** 0.004
(-1.8) (-1.7) (2.7) (0.0)
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CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECT OF CDS ON EARNINGS QUALITY: THE ROLE OF CDS
INFORMATION
3.1 Introduction
Credit default swaps (CDS)1 is amongst the most influential and controversial financial
innovations in the recent decades. On the one hand, CDS can reduce debt investors’ monitor
incentive and may lead to inefficient bankruptcy or liquidation. Specifically, debt holders
can buy CDS protection to hedge the credit risk in the future cash flows of their debt
exposures but retain their control rights2 (Hu and Black, 2008; Yavorsky, 2009). Those
debt holders may no longer have incentive to continuous monitor borrowers who experience
credit events even when it is efficient to do so, but somewhat redundant to make concessions
on their part in debt renegotiations process thereby may lead to inefficient bankruptcy or
liquidation (Lubben, 2007; Hu and Black, 2008; Bolton and Oehmke, 2011; Stulz, 2010;
Subrahmanyam et al., 2014; Narayanan and Uzmanoglu, 2014; Chakraborty et al., 2015,
and Colonnello et al., 2016). Those which indicate that borrowers may attempt to avoid
such renegotiations via changes of corporate financial policies (Subrahmanyam, Tang, and
Wang, 2017) and accounting practices (Martin and Roychowdhury, 2014). On the other
hand, the trading of CDS on a reference entity can reduce information risk through the
information conveyed in CDS spreads. For instance, Li and Tang (2016) found that the
1The Credit Default Swaps (CDS) market is a derivatives market, which facilitates the management of
credit risk. The protection buyer or credit risk seller pays a periodic fee to the protection seller or credit risk
buyer for a contingent payment associated with a reference entity’s credit events.
2As discuss by Hu and Black (2008), contractual control rights allow for the debt holders to enforce,
waive, or modify the terms of the debt contract. Ownership of debt customarily conveys a package of eco-
nomic rights (e.g., to receive payment of principal and interest), contractual control rights (e.g., to enforce,
waive, or modify the terms of the debt contract), and other legal rights (e.g., including rights to participate
in bankruptcy proceedings and to sue company directors and officers under securities and other laws). CDS
provides debt holder an opportunity to hedge the risk of economic rights but other rights such as contractual
control rights, other legal rights remain.
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supplier firms with trades and commercial exposures to a reference entity learn from CDS
markets about the distress information of the reference entity and react accordingly by
reducing their leverage ratios. Kim et at.(2015) found that actively traded CDS can increase
managers’ voluntary disclosures. Betta et at.(2016) found that uncertainties of dispersion
and earnings forecast error decrease in the post-CDS trading period. Thus, the contribution
of the CDS market to the economic system remains debatable. This article contributes to
the debate by suggesting that the external monitoring role provided by CDS markets can
reduce earnings management activities and thus information asymmetry between corporate
insiders and outsiders.
We investigate the influence of post-CDS trade initiation on earnings management deci-
sions. Earnings management can be misused when managers use their discretion to mislead
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the firms (Healy and Wahlen,
1998). For instance, firms can delay to report financial losses. However, it comes with a
cost (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1996) when investors understand that corporate man-
agers are manipulating the underlying economic performance of the company. Although
the onset of CDS trading reduces CDS-insured lenders’ monitor incentive in the presence
of empty creditor problem, it may increase other stakeholders’ (e.g., shareholders, product
suppliers, etc.) monitor incentive given higher a distress risk. To reduce the distress risk,
other stakeholders who learn from CDS prices should push the borrowing firms to enhance
its transparency and force them to reduce its earnings management activities. Thus we posit
that post-CDS trade initiation can reduce intentional earnings manipulation of underlying
borrowing firms as CDS provides additional distress information.
We examine the impact of post-CDS trade initiation on intentional earnings manage-
ment activities for a U.S. sample from 1973 Q1 to 2016 Q4. The intentional earnings
manipulation metrics we focus on are absolute or unsigned discretionary accruals errors
suggested by Jones (1991) and modified Jones’s accruals expectation model in Dechow
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et at.(1995)3. The post-CDS trade initiation is measured as CDS trading dummy used in
Saretto and Tookes (2013), Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), and Li and Tang (2016). Consis-
tent with our hypothesis, we find that post-CDS trade initiation improves earnings quality
by significantly reducing the absolute discretionary accruals after controlling for the eco-
nomic determinants of earnings quality. Furthermore, we conduct three additional endo-
geneity tests: (1) propensity score matching, (2) 2SLS, and (3) event study to rule out the
possibility that firms with lower information risk adversely select a CDS trade initiation.
How does post-CDS trade initiation reduce absolute discretionary accruals? Firstly, we
find that the reduction is channeling through contracts suppliers’ trade credit exposure. To
be more precise, contracts suppliers who supply trade credit to customers may stop provide
intermediate goods when their customers are financially distressed (Cunat, 2006). If CDS
markets can offer credit risk status of customers to contracts suppliers, it becomes a mon-
itoring tool used by contract suppliers. Consistently, we find that absolute discretionary
accruals weaken the ability of CDS customers to raise additional trade credit. Additionally,
we conduct further analysis to see which types of firms are more sensitive to the contracts
suppliers’ trade credit channel. We find that the CDS trading-contracts suppliers’ trade
credit exposure is stronger for median credit rated firms4. This is because median credit
rated firms are more sensitive to CDS information. Specifically, it is easier for median
credit rated firms to change their corporate fundamental by improving operational effi-
ciency compared with (1) low rated firms who are deeply under financial distress, and (2)
high rated firms who are far away from financial distress.
Secondly, we find that the post-CDS trading initiation should have stronger impacts on
3The terms “absolute” or “unsigned“ refer to the accrual models do not differentiate income increasing
from income-decreasing earnings management. We use absolute discretionary accruals model to measure
earnings management. Recent accounting literature extensively use absolute accruals model to measure earn-
ings quality (e.g., Warfield, Wild, and Wild, 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson,
2002; Klein, 2002; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Myers, Myers, and Omer, 2003; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki,
2003; Aboody, Hughes, and Liu, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006).
4We classify firms into high, median, and low rating groups by classifying: (i) A group or high credit
rating: AAA, AA+, AA, AA-; (ii) B group or median credit rating, BBB+,BBB,BBB-,BB+,BB,BB-,B,B-
,B+; and (iii) C or low credit rating: CCC+, CCC, CCC-, CC, D, SD.
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low cash holding firms. Borrowers attempt to adopt conservative liquidity management
corporate practice by holding more cash (Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, 2017) in or-
der to gain more bargaining power over the tougher creditors who use CDS (Bolton and
Oehmke, 2011). However, the conservative liquidity management practice will anesthetize
the stakeholders’ monitor incentive. As a result, we expect the external monitoring power
induced by CDS trading should be less effective for the high cash holding firms. Empiri-
cally, we partition our sample by cash holding and find stronger effects of CDS on absolute
discretionary accruals when borrowers hold less cash. We find that the effect becomes
much weaker (not statistically significant) in higher cash holding sample.
Thirdly, we examine how do firms with high earning management activities response
to high default probability. Theoretically, it is optimal for firms to adopt risk-management
activities to reduce financial distress risk (Purnanandam, 2007). To test this, we focus on
the firms with CDS prices and bootstrap the default probability from the entire CDS curve
at a quarterly frequency based on the Hull and White (2000)s’ reduced-form CDS pric-
ing framework. We examine whether the higher default probability of firms with greater
earnings management activities predicts (1) more conservative future liquidity manage-
ment activities and (2) better future operational efficiency. Consistently, we find that firms
with high default probability this quarter will accumulate more cash, increase operating
cash flow, and increase net working capital in next quarter. This enhancement is more
pronounced for firms with high absolute discretionary accruals. Thus, our evidence sug-
gests that strategically reporting high earnings may not get around with the CDS prices and
consistent with the optimal actions to reduce financial distress risk are to enhance firms’
financial health and fundamental strength (Warner, 1977; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Opler
and Titman, 1994; Andrade and Kaplan, 1998; among many studies).
Lastly, we investigate the value implication of post-CDS trade initiation. Dye (1985)
showed that high valuation uncertainty predicts the low value of the firm. Built upon this
insight, we study whether firms with CDS trading will have high valuation than firms with-
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out CDS trading when high absolute discretionary accruals are high. Using 1-quarter ahead
EPS growth as the proxy for valuation growth, we find that the average annual earning
growth of CDS trading firms are on average 10% higher than firms without CDS trading
when absolute discretionary accruals is higher than the cross-sectional median. It suggests
that CDS markets serve as the external information channel that reduces the valuation un-
certainty.
The remainder of the paper organizes as follows. Section 2 develops testable hypothe-
ses. Section 3 describes the data sample and variable measurement. Section 4 presents the
empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
3.2 Hypothesis Development
Earnings management is a key accounting practice to smooth earnings. It is used for main-
taining the short-run operating efficiency of a firm. In particular, managers exercise differ-
ent discretion to effectively manage working capital such as inventory cost method, revenue
and expense recognition, changes of accounting methods and so on. These are critical in-
gredients in firms’ operation management process (see Healy and Wahlen 1998). Earnings
management occurs because insiders have better access to private information that is not
available to outsiders. It may impose the non-diversifiable information risk to investors
(see O’Hara, 2003; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2004), and may harm
firm value. Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman (2013) found that poor earnings quality
relates to high information risk, which is proxied by idiosyncratic volatility5. Specifically,
one example of possible reduction in firm value is the case when insiders use their discre-
tions to mislead stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of firms such as
inflating the current earnings or delating credit payment to hide losses. Dechow, Sloan,
and Sweeney (1996) found that these bad earnings management practices come with the
cost when the manipulations are made public. The firm will consequently face a high cost
5As suggests by Jiang, Xu, and Yao (2009), idiosyncratic volatility captures to corporate transparency.
Thus high idiosyncratic volatility associates with greater information risk.
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of capital (Brealey, Leland, and Pyle, 1977; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008; Tang, 2009). If
outsiders can be informed about the potential credit risk exposures via CDS markets, it
would be optimal for insiders to reduce earnings management or manipulation activities
as insiders understand the cost when the bad information becomes public. The costs for
insiders could be paying penalties for fraud or reductions on their compensation packages.
We employ abnormal absolute discretionary accruals as a proxy for intentional earnings
management activities following existing studies. The general idea of abnormal absolute
discretionary accruals is that if the “normal” component (such as revenues that cannot be
manipulated by insiders) of total accruals is modeled properly, the abnormal component
indicates a distortion that is of lower the earnings quality. Therefore, we predict
Hypothesis 1. Ceteris paribus, post-CDS trade initiation can reduce absolute dis-
cretionary accruals.
We investigate how post-CDS trade initiation reduces absolute discretionary accruals.
Firstly, we focus on the role of trade credit, which serves as the crucial source of short-
term external finance channel. The trade credit is sizable for U.S. markets. For example,
using a sample of non-financial U.S. firms from 1973 to 2016, we show that aggregate the
accounts payable add up to 18.2% of the total assets, whereas the debt in current liability
only accounts for 10.6% of total assets. Supplier firms monitor the customers’ corporate
actions by threatening to cut off future supplies in the event of customer firms showing fi-
nancially distress. Cunat (2006) showed that contracts suppliers who supply trade credit to
customers stop providing intermediate goods when their customers are under financial dis-
tress. The CDS market prices give the suppliers public information of the customer firms’
current credit status. Higher CDS prices may signal the customer firms’ inability to make
repayments. Hence, this will alert to a deterioration in customer firms’ creditworthiness. It
makes suppliers better monitor and control for the customer firms. Further, the influence of
credit lenders on median credit rating group should be larger than higher rating groups and
low rating group because it is easier for median credit rated firms to change their corporate
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fundamental by improving operational efficiency compared with (1) low rated firms who
are deeply under financial distress, and (2) high rated firms who are far away from financial
distress. We predict
Hypothesis 2. Ceteris paribus, post-CDS trade initiation reduces absolute accruals
estimation errors channeled through account payable. The impact is more pronounce
for median credit rating borrowers.
Corporate borrowers attempt to adopt conservative liquidity management practice by
holding more cash (Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, 2017) in order to gain more bargain-
ing power over the tougher creditors who use CDS (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011). Although
CDS markets reduce debt holders’ incentive to continuously monitor the borrowers who
face high distress risks by providing them full insurance (Bolton and Oehmke, 2010), CDS
may increase the external monitoring incentive for other stakeholders such as equity hold-
ers and product suppliers because they find it costly to use CDS and are more vulnerable to
bankruptcy risks. It will force firms to adopt risk-management activities to reduce distress
risk (Purnanandam, 2007). At the same time, the consequence of conservative liquidity
management practice would reduce the effectiveness of the stakeholders’ monitor incen-
tive, since the financial distress risk are decreasing as the cash holding increases. Hence,
the intentional earnings management activities of firms with low cash holdings are sup-
posed to more sensitive to the external monitoring activities by outsiders or stakeholders,
while the outsiders have less incentive to monitor when firms have accumulated enough
cash.
Hypothesis 3a. Ceteris paribus, post-CDS trade initiation reduces absolute discre-
tionary accruals more significantly in borrowers with low cash holding.
Hypothesis 3b. Higher default risk at quarter t may predict more conservative
corporate actions and better operational efficiency in the future. The predictive power
is more pronounced for firms with high earnings management activities
CDS markets can signal the distress risk through observed CDS prices. Outsiders can
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perhaps be informed by looking at those prices rather than spending efforts on analyzing
the relatively complex financial disclosures. Additionally, CDS markets convey the distress
information on a daily basis and thus produce more timely and accurately distress news
compared with quarterly financial reporting. In the theory side, Dye (1985) developed a
partial voluntary disclosure model showing that firm value should reduce if the firm faces
high asset value measurement uncertainty. If CDS information can reduce the measurement
uncertainty, it should increase the firm value. Thus, we predict
Hypothesis 4. Ceteris paribus, the value of firms with CDS trading should be
higher than firms without CDS trading.
3.3 Sample, Variables, and Summary Statistics
3.3.1 Sample
We obtain CDS information of U.S. listed firms from Markit, the leading industry source for
credit pricing data. Markit Group collects CDS quotes from a large number of contributing
banks and then cleans them to remove outliers and stale prices. We identify CDS trad-
ing firms using Markit RED file that provides the detail contract-level information about
the length of contract phase. We collect firm-level/quarter financial data from COMPU-
STAT North America with necessary data for the empirical analyses. We first combine
COMPUSTAT and CDS information from Markit primarily using first six digit CUSIP
and then, for the rest of firms cannot be matched using CUSIP, we manually match firms
across two databases by using long-legal names. Also, we obtain bond trading volume data
from TRACE to compute peer firms’ trading volumes following Oehmke and Zawadowski
(2013) and Boehmer et al. (2015). We obtain the Fama-French 48 industry classification
from Professor Ken French’s website. The overall sample of firms ranges from 1973Q1
to 2016Q4. This is important to incorporate periods before 1994 Q1 to see the time-series
difference for with/without CDS trading over a same firm.
Table 1A reports the sample distribution of CDS firms versus non-CDS firms from 1994
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to 2016. In panel A of Table 1A, the CDS market starts since 1994Q1 with 21 reference
entities with CDS contracts6. This number rises to 621 in 2007 but reduces to 401 in 2015.
Panel B of Table 1A reports there is 849 unique reference entity with traded CDS contracts
among 14771 total unique firms.
[Table 1A about here]
3.3.2 Variable Construction
CDS trading/traded dummies
The key variable of interest is a CDS trading dummy. We construct the CDS trading dummy
following Saretto and Tookes (2013). In particular, we define that CDSTrading equal to one
if there are CDS written on the reference entity and equal to zero otherwise. We identify
the CDS trading dummy using the RED file provided by Markit. The RED file provides
the detail contract-level information about which date the CDS contract starts and which
date it expires. We identify whether there is a CDS contract written on the reference entity
by counting the date covered by a CDS contract period. Moreover, we define CDS traded
dummies following Saretto and Tookes (2013) as CDSTraded equals to one if there is a
CDS for the firm’s debt at any time during our sample period, zero otherwise in order to
control for time-invariant unobservable differences between CDS and non-CDS firms.
Measure discretionary earnings accruals
We consider two different measures of earnings manipulation. They are total (absolute)
abnormal accruals and current (absolute) abnormal accruals.
Jones (1991) accruals model: |EQ1| To measure the total abnormal accruals for each
firm j in quarter t, we first perform the cross-sectional regression for each Fama and French
6Note that the CDS prices provided by Markit are available only after 2001 from their daily CDS data
tape, but the number of firms can be traced back to 1994 using Markit RED file.
127
48 industry classifications. We require that cross-sectional dataset contains at least 20
firms in each quarter each industry. Specifically, for each quarter t and each industry k
(k=1,2,...,48), we run
TAj,k,t
Assetj,k,t−1
= γ1,k,t
1
Assetj,k,t−1
+ γ2,k,t
∆REVj,k,t
Assetj,k,t−1
+ γ3,k,t
PPEj,k,t
Assetj,k,t−1
+ j,k,t
where TAj,k,t is total accruals, Assetj,k,t−1 is total asset at quarter t-1. ∆REVj,k,t is firm
j’s quarterly change in revenues. PPEj,k,t is firm j’s gross value of property, plant, and
equipment in quarter t.
We collect the industry-quarter parameters to obtain the firm-specific fitted total accru-
als (NAj,k,t) for firm j in quarter t as
NAj,k,t = γˆ1,k,t
1
Assetj,k,t
+ γˆ2,k,t
∆REVj,k,t −∆ARj,k,t
Assetj,k,t
+ γˆ3,k,t
PPEj,k,t
Assetj,k,t
where ∆ARj,k,t is firm j’s change in account receivable in quart t.
The absolute or unsigned abnormal accruals or |EQ1| is defined as
|EQ1| = | TAj,k,t
Assetj,k,t−1
− NAj,k,t|
Modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995): |EQ2| To measure the current abnor-
mal accruals for each firm j in quarter t, we first perform the cross-sectional regression for
each industry,
TCAj,k,t
Assetj,k,t−1
= γ1,k,t
1
Assetj,k,t−1
+ γ2,k,t
∆REVj,k,t
Assetj,k,t−1
+ j,k,t
TCAj,k,t is current accruals, Assetj,k,t−1 is total asset at quarter t-1. ∆REVj,k,t is firm
j’s quarterly change in revenues. PPEj,k,t is firm j’s gross value of property, plant, and
equipment in quarter t.
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For each firm j in quarter t, we obtain the fitted current accruals as
NCAj,k,t = γˆ1,k,t
1
Assetj,k,t−1
+ γˆ2,k,t
∆REVj,k,t −∆ARj,k,t
Assetj,k,t−1
+ j,k,t
|EQ2| is defined as
|EQ2| = | TCAj,k,t
Assetj,k,t−1
− NCAj,k,t|
Construct TA, TCA, and CFO We construct total accruals TAj,k,t, current accruals
TCAj,k,t, and cash flow from operations CFOj,k,t by,
TAj,k,t = ∆CAj,k,t −∆CLj,k,t −∆CASHj,k,t + ∆STDEBTj,k,t − DEPNj,k,t
TCAj,k,t = ∆CAj,k,t −∆CLj,k,t −∆CASHj,k,t + ∆STDEBTj,k,t
CFOj,k,t = NIBEj,k,t − TAj,k,t
where ∆CAj,k,t is firm j’s change in current assets in quarter t; ∆CLj,k,t is firm j’s change in
current liabilities in quarter t; ∆CASHj,k,t is firm j’s change in cash in quarter t; ∆STDEBTj,k,t
is firm j’s change in short-term debt in quarter t; DEPNj,k,t is firm j’s depreciation and amor-
tization expense in quarter t; and NIBEj,k,t is firm j’s net income before extraordinary items
in quarter t. We consider EQ1 and EQ2 as proxy for firm’s earnings quality.
Default probability curve
We start by estimating the term structure of default probabilities, which are risk-neutral
default probabilities for a given name. In general, such probabilities react the fundamental
performance of a firm (Bai and Wu, 2016). We use the closed-form solution for bootstrap-
ping the entire default probability curve from the single-name CDS spread based on Hull
and White (2000). Given the finite time stamp t0 < t1 < t2 < t3 < ... < ti, the default
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curve is based on the survival function Q(ti) is given by
Q(ti) = exp[−
ti∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t]
The closed-form solution for the default hazard rate based on reduced-form pricing formula
of credit default swap is given by
h(ti) = − 1
∆t
{ln{exp[−
ti−1∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t] +
β0
β1
}+
ti−1∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t} (3.1)
where
δ1 = {B(0, ti)∆ti [stie(ti)− [1− Rˆ− A(ti)Rˆ]}
δ0 = sti{[1−
t=ti−1∑
t=t1
q(t)∆t]B(0, ti) +
t=ti−1∑
t=t1
[q(t)B(0, t)(1 + e(t))∆t]}
We use δ0 and δ1 to simplify the notations in Eq.(3.1). The values of δ0 and δ1 are known
recursively through the bootstrapping process (see Appendix A2 for a mathematical detail).
s is the credit default swap spread when the present value of the premium leg is equal to the
default leg. This is total payments per year made by protection buyer or credit risk seller.
B(0,t) is The risk-free discount factor. tT is the length of the credit default swap. Rˆ is
Expected recovery rate on the reference obligation provided by Markit. q(t) is Risk-neutral
default probability density at time t. u(t) is payments at the rate of $1 per year on payment
dates between time zero and time t. e(t) is an accrual payment at time t equal to t-t∗ where
t∗ is the payment date immediately preceding time t. v(t) is $ 1 received at time t. A(t)
is Accrued interest on the reference obligation at time t as a percent of face value. Thus
the default probability curve is computed as substituting the h(ti) into survival function.
Specifically, the default probability curve PD(ti) and survival function Q(ti) are given by
the following relationship
PD(ti) = P [t <= ti] = 1−Q(ti)
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The survival function Q(ti) is given by
Q(ti) = exp[−
ti∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t]
The risk-free discount factor is from ICAP. Since the risk-free discount factor is under
the local currency, we restrict the CDS into local currency to ensure consistency. We ag-
gregate daily default curve into the quarterly frequency in order to match the frequency of
accounting disclosure. We use a five-year default probability in our latter analysis.
Control variables
We list all control variables used in this study and the prediction respect to absolute dis-
cretionary accruals following the existing studies. The construction detail of all the control
variables can be found in Appendix Table A. Control variables include
• Total asset: As discuss in Dechow and Dichev (2002), |EQ| is expected to decrease
in firm size because large firms tend to have more stable and predictable operations,
therefore fewer estimation errors.
• SalesVolatility&Cashflow volatility: As discuss in Dechow and Dichev (2002), |EQ|
is expected to increase in cash flow volatility and sales volatility because the high
volatility of both measures indicates high uncertainty in the operating environment or
poor cash management practices, and therefore corresponding large errors of accruals
quality.
• Incidence of negative earnings realizations or Loss: As discuss in Dechow and Dichev
(2002), |EQ| is expected to increase with negative earnings because of firms with the
poor post profitability tracking record tend to have the noisy operational environment,
therefore large estimation errors.
• Operation cycle: As discuss in Dechow and Dichev (2002), |EQ| is expected to in-
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crease in the length of operating cycle because loner operating cycles indicate more
uncertainty, more estimation, and errors, and thus lower quality of accruals.
• M/B ratio: As discussed by Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), |EQ| is expected
to increase in market-to-book because high market-to-book indicates more growth
option, which is associated with volatile operating environments of firms that use
much stock-based compensation.
• Sales Growth: We follow Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and McVay (2013) to control for
the change in sales growth in order to make sure that the result is not affected by
growth to performance.
• Book Leverage: |EQ| is expected to decrease in book leverage because leverage can
induce additional monitor to the management team to limit the earnings management
activities.
3.3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the main variables used in the analysis.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1A reports the sample distribution of CDS firms versus non-CDS firms from
1994 to 2016. In panel A of Table 1A, the CDS market has started since 1994Q1 with 21
reference entities with CDS contracts. This number rose to 621 in 2007 but reduced to 401
in 2015. Panel B of Table 1A reports there is 849 unique reference entity with traded CDS
contracts among 14771 total unique firms.
Table 1B reports the descriptive statistics of the variables for CDS sample and non-CDS
sample respectively. At first glance, the sample mean and standard deviation of abnormal
earnings accruals measures |EQ| are lower than the non-CDS sample. Additionally, we find
that CDS traded firms are large size stocks with lower cash flow volatility, sales volatility,
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less market-to-book ratio, shorter operation cycle, less loss tracking record, and a higher
book leverage ratio that is the initial evidence that CDS trading firms have more efficient
operational environments than non-CDS trading firms.
Table 1C reports time-series correlations for the variables. |EQ1| and |EQ2| are highly
correlated with each other. It is notable that earnings quality measures are negatively re-
lated to CDS trading, which indicates that CDS trading correlates with better earnings
quality. In addition, the control variables are not highly correlated thus it is less likely that
multicollinearity issue will affect our regression results.
Table 1D reports the summary statistics of the bootstrapped default probability curve
and CDS spread. The default probability curve is developed following section 3.3.2. We
consider five tenors including six months, one year, five years, ten years, and 30 years. The
sample means of both default probability curve and CDS spread are upward sloping. The
default probability curve has an advantage over CDS spreads by reducing noises embed-
ded in CDS spreads. Specifically, the standard deviation of the default curve is smaller
than that of CDS spreads. Defining the difference between the standard deviation of CDS
spread and standard deviation of default slope as standard deviation gap, we find that the
standard deviation gaps between default probability curve and CDS spread are increasing
with tenors.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Do CDS Trading Reduce Intentional Earnings Management Activities?
To test the Hypothesis 1 whether post-CDS trade initiation can reduce intentional earnings
manipulation of underlying borrowing firms, we use the following empirical design
|EQt| =α + β1 ∗ CDSTradingi,t ∗ I[EQt < 0] + β2 ∗ CDSTradingi,t ∗ I[EQt > 0]
+ β3 ∗ CDSTradedi,t + Xt ∗ θ + Industry FE + Quarter FE + i,t
(3.2)
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• Dependant Variable: |EQt| represents absolute discretionary accruals. In particu-
lar, we use two different measures of |EQt|. As discussed in Section 3.3.2, |EQ1t|
is absolute accruals errors based on Jone’s discretionary accruals model and |EQ2t|
is absolute accruals errors based on modified Jone’s discretionary accruals model.
I[EQt < 0] indicates either I[EQ1t < 0] if the dependent variable is |EQ1t| or
I[EQ2t < 0] if the dependent variable is |EQ2t|. Similarly, I[EQt > 0] indicates ei-
ther I[EQ1t > 0] if the dependent variable is |EQ1t| or I[EQ2t > 0] if the dependent
variable is |EQ2t|.
• CDS Trading: CDSTrading is a CDS trading dummy that equals to one if there is a
CDS written on a reference entity and equals to zero otherwise.
• CDS Traded: In order to control for time-invariant unobservable differences be-
tween CDS and non-CDS firms, we include CDSTraded, an indicator equal to one
if there is a CDS for the firm’s debt at any time during our sample period follow-
ing Saretto and Tookes (2013) and many other studies. In Table 1C, the time-series
correlation between CDSTraded and CDSTrading is 0.22.
• I[EQ]: We split a effect of a CDS trading on |EQt| into two parts: (CDSTradingi,t ∗
I[EQt < 0]), (CDSTradingi,t∗I[EQt > 0]) to rigorously examine whether the impact
of the post-CDS trade initiation on earnings management is more pronounced for
upward earnings manipulation EQt > 0 or downward earnings manipulation EQt <
0, or for both.
• I[Controls]: X is a N by eight control variables including total asset, sales volatility,
cash flow volatility, loss, operation cycle, changes in sales growth, book leverage,
and MB ratio. θ is eight by one slope coefficients. The economic prediction of
control variables are discussed in section 3.3.2. For the detail information for control
variables please refer to Appendix A1.
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• Other Panel Specifications: We include industry fixed effect and quarter fixed ef-
fect. The industry classification we use is Fama-French 48 industry classification.
The standard errors are clustered into industry and quarter.
The null hypothesis, CDS trading does not reduce absolute discretionary accruals, is given
by β1 ≥ 0 and β2 ≥ 0. The alternative hypothesis, CDS trading reduces absolute discre-
tionary accruals, is given by β1 < 0 and β2 < 0.
[Table 2 about here]
Table 2 presents the result of Eq.(3.2). In the first column, we conduct a univariate model by
regressing absolute discretionary total accruals |EQ1| on CDS dummies only. The estimat-
ing result indicates that CDS trade initiation significantly reduces earning manipulation.
β1 and β2 are both significantly negative respect to zero: β1=-0.0123 (t-stat=-5.61) and
β2=-0.0072. This result is consistent with the prediction of H1. Moreover, the estimation
result in Column (1) is economically significant. Considering that the sample mean of
|EQ1| is 0.05, the coefficient of β1+β2=-0.195 translates into a 39% (-0.095/0.05) decrease
in the |EQ1|. In the second column, we control for the economic determinants of absolute
discretionary accruals suggested by existing literature. As we can see, β1 and β2 are still
statistically significant. After control for the potential covariates in |EQ1|, the economics
significance reduces from 39% to 24.2% (-(0.0089+0.0032)/0.05). Additionally, signs of
control variables are consistent with the prediction concluded by existing studies. The cor-
rect predictions contain next to the variable name. In addition, we find that |β1| > |β2|.
This shows that CDS trade initiation has relatively strong impact on |EQ1| when EQ1 < 0.
If the accruals model we use is correct7, it indicates that the explanatory variables in the
accrual model are not manipulatable. Negative EQ implies the accruals is lower than that
7It means, the RHS variable of the accruals model is exogenous. As discussed by Dechow, Sloan, and
Sweeney (1995), the Jones model implicitly assumes that discretion is not exercised over revenues in either
estimation periods or event periods. The modified version of the Jones Model implicitly assumes that all
changes in credit sales in event periods result from earnings management based on the reasoning that the
dependent variables in accruals models discussed in section 3.3.2 are hard to manipulate than independent
variables. This is the implicit assumption behind those accruals model used in this study.
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of a model implied. This suggests the current liability (adjust for short-term debt) is rela-
tively greater than the current asset (adjust for cash and PPE). Since current liability (adjust
for short-term debt) contains the credit lenders’ risk exposure, ceteris paribus, the greater
current liability implies the higher credit risk exposure of credit lenders. β2 < 0 suggests
that the onset of CDS improves earnings quality through reducing the credit lenders’ credit
risk exposure. In the third and fourth columns, we use alternative earnings management
measure |EQ2|, which is from modified Jone’s model. We find similar results compared
with Column (1) and (2). In particular, β1 and β2 are statistically and economically sig-
nificant. Overall, our empirical results suggest that CDS trade initiation reduces earnings
manipulation.
3.4.2 Address Potential Endogeneity
In following subsections, we consider three strategies to resolve the endogeneity. Firstly,
we conduct an event study by identifying the difference of earnings accruals before and af-
ter the quarter when there is a CDS written on the firm. Secondly, we use a propensity score
matching approach to examine the marginal effects of CDS trading on earnings accruals to
mitigate the concern that the CDS trading group is not randomly assigned. Thirdly, we
adopt a two-stage least square (2SLS) approach.
Changes in earnings quality around the CDS trade initiation We focus on changes in
|EQ| three quarter before a CDS trade initiation to three quarters following the initiation.
We compute sample average of change of |EQ| for CDS trading firms six quarters around
the CDS trade initiation event. The inference is drawn by using a T-statistics of sample
mean of change of |EQ| for each quarter. Table 3 reports the results.
[Table 3 about here]
In Table 3, we see a significant drop in earnings quality of firms with CDS trading.
There is a 24% reduction in |EQ1| from t=0 to t=1 where t=0 indicates the quarter with
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CDS trade initiation and t=1 indicates one quarter after CDS introduction. The effect is
statistically significant within 1% significant level and there is no significant change for the
rest of quarters. Similarly, we see a 34.5% decrease in |EQ1| from t=0 to t=1. We do not
see a significant time-trend before or after the first quarter event window, suggesting that
onset of CDS trading serves as a structural break for the firms’ earnings quality, which is
not adversely select by the strategic movement of earnings quality.
Propensity Score Matching We employ a propensity score matching approach to iden-
tify a control group of non-CDS traded firms with similar characteristics compared with
the group of CDS trading firms in order to address the potential selection bias that the CDS
trading firms is not randomly assigned. Propensity score matching is a matching tech-
nique facilitating causal inference in non-experimental settings by constructing a control
group that is similar to a treatment group (Rosenbaum and Rubin,1983). There are two
steps. Firstly, we estimate the propensity of CDS trading initiation using following a Probit
model:
Pr(CDSTradingi,t) = α + β1TotalAsseti,t + β2SalesVolatilityi,t + β3CashFlowVolatilityi,t
+ β4Lossi,t + β5OperationCyclei,t + β6∆SalesGrowthi,t + β7∆Book Leveragei,t + β8∆MB ratioi,t
+ Industry + Time + ei,t
Secondly, we pair CDS firms with a control group using the probability score derived
from the Probit model in the first step and run a panel model Eq.(3.2) to examine the CDS
trading effects on earnings quality. We attempt to see whether point estimates of β1 and
β2 are still significantly negative after pairing each treatment firm (firm with CDS trading)
with a matching firm (firm without CDS trading). Table 4 reports the results.
[Table 4 about here]
Panel A of Table 4 reports the average of difference in firm characteristics between
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treatment firms (CDS trading) and control firms (without CDS trading). In Column (1), we
see that total assets, change of sales growth, book leverage, and market-to-book ratio of
CDS trading firms are significantly higher than the firms without CDS trading. In addition,
the sales volatility, cash flow volatility, incidence of negative earnings realization, and op-
eration cycle are lower. This indicates the economic fundamental of CDS trading firms is
stronger. In column (2), we find that the mean difference between the matched sample and
treated sample (CDS trading) reduces dramatically and becomes statistically insignificant
after we pair the control firms with similar characteristics. It suggests that the matched or
control firms have almost the same firm characteristics with the treatment or CDS trading
firms.
Having established a matched and a control sample, we next revisit the CDS effect
using the panel model in Eq.(3.2). Panel B of Table 4 reports the regression result. Both
the point estimates of slope coefficient and the T-statistics are similar after we rerun the
Eq.(3.2) using the matched and the treatment sample only. This suggests that the observed
CDS trading effect on earnings accruals is less likely to be driven by characteristics that
select the firm into the treatment group.
2SLS approach We estimate a 2SLS model to mitigate the concern of reverse causality.
The instrumental variable we are using is change in industry peers’ bond trading volume
(IBTVt), which captures bond investors’ hedging and speculative demand in the CDS mar-
ket but is not expected to be directly related to discretionary earnings accruals following
Oehmke and Zawadowski (2013), Boehmer et al. (2015), and Kim et al. (2015).
IBTV is expected to be a suitable instrument because (1) the correlation between IBTV
and CDS trading is positive at 0.26 as shown in Table 1C; (2) there is almost zero correlation
respect to the earnings quality measure |EQ1| and |EQ2|. It is consistent with the view
that change in industry peers’ bond trading volume is positively related to CDS trading
effect through affecting bond investors’ hedging demand in the CDS market but not directly
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related to earnings quality.
In first stage regression, we employ the Probit model of CDS trading (CDSTradingi,t))
on IBTVt together with other covariates,
Prob(CDSTradingi,t) = α + γIBTVi,t + Controlsi,t ∗ λ+ ei,t (3.3)
The choice to use Probit model is because our CDSTradingi,t is a binary variable. Next, we
obtain the fitted CDS trading dummy, ˆCDSTradingi,t using Eq.(3.3). In second stage, we
run Eq.(3.2) by replacing CDSTradingi,t into ˆCDSTradingi,t:
|EQt| =α + β1 ∗ ˆCDSTradingi,t ∗ I[EQt < 0] + β2 ∗ ˆCDSTradingi,t ∗ I[EQt > 0]
+ β3 ∗ CDSTradedi,t + Controlsi,t + Industry FE + Quarter FE + i,t
(3.4)
where β1 and β2 are expected to be significantly negative. Table 5 reports the results.
[Table 5 about here]
Column (1) shows the estimation results of the Probit model of Eq.(3.3). The point
estimate γ of Eq.(3.3) is 0.6537, which is statistically significant within 1% level, suggest-
ing that the increase of hedge demand of credit risk (proxy by peer’s bond trading volume)
raises likelihood of CDS trading. In column (2) and (3), we regress |EQ1| or |EQ2| on
fitted CDS trading dummy obtaining from column (1) of Eq.(3.4). We find that β1 and
β2 are negative and statistically significant for the both columns. β1=-0.0141 with t-stat=-
4.42, β2=-0.0058 with t-stat=-2.90 for column (2) with dependent variable of |EQ1| and
β1=-0.0215 with t-stat=-4.40, β2=-0.0096 with t-stat=-3.70 for column (3) with dependent
variable of |EQ2|. Overall, the instrumented CDS trading has negative and significant im-
pact on absolute discretionary accruals |EQ|.
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3.4.3 The Role of Trade Credit
In order to examine Hypothesis 2, we use the following specification
|EQi,t| =α+ β1 ∗ CDSTradingi,t ∗ I[EQt < 0] + β2 ∗ CDSTradingi,t ∗ I[EQt > 0]
+ β3 ∗∆AP ∗ CDSTradingi,t ∗ I[EQi,t < 0] + β4 ∗∆APi,t ∗ CDSTradingi,t ∗ I[EQi,t > 0]
+ β5 ∗∆Reci,t ∗ CDSTradingi,t ∗ I[EQi,t < 0] + β6 ∗∆Reci,t ∗ CDSTradingi,t ∗ I[EQi,t > 0]
+ β7 ∗ CDSTradedi,t + β8 ∗∆APi,t + β9 ∗∆Reci,t + Controlsi,t + Industry FE + Quarter FE + i,t
(3.5)
• Eq.(3.5) is built upon our baseline regression Eq.(3.2) with addition two variables:
(1) ∆APt is quarterly change in account payable, and (2) ∆Rect is quarterly change
in account receivable. Account payable is a trade credit account considering that a
supplier allows a customer to delay payment for goods already delivered.
• We focus on the point estimate of β3 on (∆AP∗CDSTradingi,t∗I[EQi,t < 0]). A neg-
ative EQ suggests the current liability (adjust for short-term debt) is relatively greater
than the current asset (adjust for cash and PPE). We expect that ∆AP∗CDSTradingi,t
is more sensitive to |EQi,t| given a negative EQ because of an influence of trade credit
suppliers. The rationale is that if there exists information asymmetry between firms
and their credit lenders, and if the short-term debt holder and credit lender expose to
similar short-term distress risk, the CDS trading should reduce the absolute accruals
estimation errors because the CDS provides information about credit lenders’ risk
exposure.
[Table 6 about here]
Table 6 reports the empirical results of Eq.(3.5). In Column (1) of considering |EQ1|
as a dependent variable, we see that a point estimate of β3 is significantly negative at -
0.0071 with a t-stat of -1.99 (statistically significant at 5% significant level). While point
estimates of β4, β5, and β6 are all statistically insignificant from zero. It shows a conditional
140
impact of change of trade credit or credit suppliers’ trade exposure that can reduce earnings
management activities when a firm faces a greater credit exposure. In Column (2), we
estimate Eq.(3.5) by considering |EQ2| as a dependent variable, and find a similar and
consistent results respect to Column (1).
H2 also posits that credit lenders’ trade credit effect should be more significant for me-
dian credit rating group rather than either high rating group or poor rating group because it
is easier for median credit rated firms to change their corporate fundamental by improving
operational efficiency compared with (1) low rated firms who are deeply under financial
distress, and (2) high rated firms who are far away from financial distress. To test this,
we split our sample into high, median, and low rating group using the rating data obtained
from COMPUSTAT’s S&P domestic long term issuer credit rating. In particular, COMPU-
STAT S&P domestic long term issuer credit rating covers AAA, AA+, AA, AA-,A+,A,A-
,BBB+,BBB,BBB-,BB+,BB,BB-,B+,B,B-,CCC+,CCC,CCC-,CC, D, SD. We then group
firms into high, median, and low rating groups by classifying:
• High rating group: AAA, AA+, AA, AA-
• Middle rating group, BBB+,BBB,BBB-,BB+,BB,BB-,B,B-,B+
• Low rating group: CCC+, CCC, CCC-, CC, D, SD
[Table 7 about here]
Table 7 consists the results. In Table 7, we see that the point estimates of β3s are
only statistically significant for the median rating group (for Column (2) and Column (5)).
However, the point estimates of β3s are statistically insignificant for other rating group (see
Column (1), (3), (4), and (6)). These evidence suggests that the middle credit firms are
more able to improve their economic fundamental in order to prevent from economic loss
from their trade partners. Overall, the empirical results support the hypothesis 2.
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3.4.4 Conservative Liquidity Management
Table 8 reports the result of H3a. In order to test the H3a, we partition the full sample into
high and low cash holdings sample based on the cross-sectional median of cash holdings.
Consistent with H3a, we find that the CDS trading effect on absolute accruals estimation
error is more pronounce when a cash holding of a firm is above a cross-sectional median.
In column (1) of Table 8, a point estimate of β1 of -0.0038 with a t-stat of -3.22 and a
point estimate of β2 of -0.0031 with a t-stat of -3.76 are both statistically significant at 1%
significance level for low cash holding sample. However, point estimates for both β1 and
β2 are statistically insignificant for high cash holding sample in column (2). Similar results
are in Column (3) and (4). In the high cash holding sample, the CDS information effect is
weaken because of a reduction of credit lenders’ monitor incentive given a better corporate
liquidity.
[Table 8 about here]
How do firms with high earnings management activities response to high probability
of default? H3b suggests that firms with high earnings management activities should take
conservative corporate actions given high financial distressed risk. To see this, we exam-
ine whether a higher default risk at quarter t predicts the more active corporate liquidity
management policy in the future. We conduct the following regression:
∆CPi,t+1→t+4 = α + β1 ∗Di,t + Industry FE + i,t+1→t+4 (3.6)
where ∆CPi,t+1 is the one-year ahead change of corporate liquidity management. We
consider three dimensions of corporate liquidity practices:
• Change of future cash holding
• Change of operational cash flow
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• Change of net working capital
We gauge a degree of distress risk from CDS markets using five year default probabilities
developed based on the entire CDS curve following Hull and White (2000)s’ reduced-
form CDS pricing framework8. To do this, we restrict to firms with CDS prices only. In
particular, at each quarter, we split the CDS trading sample by half using |EQ| based on its
the cross-sectional median9. And then we run the predictive regression Eq.(3.6) for both
high/low discretionary accruals sample and expect to see a stronger predictive power of EQ
on a more conservative future corporate liquidity practices for low earnings quality (high
|EQ|) group.
[Table 9 about here]
Table 9 reports the empirical results. Panel A of Table 9 is the results that we partition
our sample using the |EQ1| and panel B is the results that we partition our sample using the
|EQ2|. In Panel A, we see that the 5-year default probability predicts more conservative
liquidity management actions in future. In Column (2) of Panel A, we see that 1 percent
increase in default probability will induce firms to hold 5.4% more cash in future when
|EQ1| is high, whereas the impact is only 2.0% for the low |EQ1| group. Besides, the
higher the 5-year default probability also predicts a 1.4% (Column (4) of Panel A) higher
future operating cash flow for high |EQ1| group compared with 0.1% (Column (3) of Panel
A) for the low |EQ1| group. Moreover, the high |EQ1| group experiences 4.6% (Column
(6) of Panel A) higher net working capital growth has given a higher default probability
that is about two times higher than low |EQ1| group (2.8% in Column (5) of Panel A).
The empirical results reported in the Panel B for high/low EQ2 sample are consistent with
those reported in Panel A. Overall, the results indicate that when default risk is high, firms
tend to manage their earnings less and adopt the more conservative liquidity management
8The detail of the derivation is in appendix 3.5.
9We consider two versions of EQ: (1) |EQ1t| is Jone’s discretionary accruals model and (2) |EQ2t| is
modified Jone’s discretionary accruals model. We also control for the industry fixed effect.
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policy in the future. The enhancement of operational efficiencies includes improving the
future operating cash flows and working capitals. The evidence suggests that conservative
corporate liquidity management practice coincides with high default risk and less earnings
management activities.
3.4.5 Value Implication
We use the following regression to test H4:
∆Vi,t+1 =α + β1 ∗ CDSTradingi,t × High| EQi,t|+ β2 ∗ CDSTradingi,t
+ β3 ∗ High| EQi,t|+ Controlsi,t + Industry FE + i,t+1
(3.7)
where ∆Vi,t+1 is the one-quarter ahead change of value of firm proxied by using change of
EPS (exclude special items) from quarter t to quarter t+1. High |EQ| is a dummy variable
equaling to one if, for each t, the value of |EQi,t| is greater than the cross-sectional median.
Similar, we consider two EQ: (1) |EQ1t| is Jone’s discretionary accruals model and (2)
|EQ2t| is modified Jone’s discretionary accruals model. The control variables are discussed
in section 3.3.2 and detail information for the construction can be referred to Table A of
Appendix.
According to Dye (1985)s’ insight, the high discretionary accruals should come with
the negative firm value changes, suggesting that β3 < 0. Since we expect CDS markets
provide information thus reduce the measurement uncertainty, the magnitude of β1 should
be smaller (at least less negative) compared with β3.
[Table 10 about here]
Table 10 reports the impacts of intentional earnings management on future EPS changes.
Panel A considers the case of EQ1 and panel B considers the case of EQ2. Column (1) re-
ports the full-sample estimation results of Equation (3.7) without including the CDS trading
dummy and the interaction terms between CDS trading dummy and high accruals estima-
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tion errors. Column (2) reports the sub-sample estimation results of Equation (3.7) by con-
sidering firms without CDS trading. Column (3) reports the sub-sample estimation results
of Equation (3.7) by solely considering firms with CDS trading. Column (4) reports the
full-sample estimation results of Equation (3.7) by considering CDS trading dummy and
the interaction terms between CDS trading dummy and high accruals estimation errors.
In Table 10, we find that the accruals estimation errors have negative impacts on future
earnings. In column (1) and (2) of Panel A, we find that the next quarter returns of firms
with high accruals estimation errors (measured at quarter t) are about 2.2% lower than other
firms. However, this is not significant in the sample of firms with CDS trading as shown
in Column (3). By combining CDS trading sample and non-CDS trading sample in Col-
umn (4), we find that the point estimation of “High |EQ1| × CDS Trading” is significant
and positive at 9%. By contrast, while firms with “High |EQ1|” is on average running at
a loss about -2.7% (a t-stat of -3.30). The results suggests that firms with CDS trading in
fact generate positive earnings next quarter in response to reduce the high earning manage-
ment activities. Panel B reports similar results for |EQ2|. Overall, the empirical evidence
supports H4.
3.5 Conclusion
The contribution of the CDS market to the entire economic system is debatable. We con-
tribute to the gap by showing that CDS markets convey distress risk information to creditors
thus reduce insiders’ incentives to do earnings manipulation. We conduct three specifica-
tion tests to establish a causal relationship to rule out the alternative possibility that firms
with good earnings quality attract CDS. We further investigate how CDS improves earn-
ings quality. In particular, we show that the reduction of earnings manipulation is channeled
through contracts suppliers trade credit exposure, corporate liquidity management policy,
and default probability slope. Overall, our finding suggests that CDS markets reduce infor-
mation risks of borrowing firms and improve their operating efficiency.
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Appendices
A1 Detail information of variable construction
[Table A about here]
A2 Technical detail for bootstrapping default probability curve from single-name CDS
spreads curve
We use the reduced-form pricing model to bootstrap the implied default probability curve from
credit default swap curve. Following the Hull and White (2000), we assume that default events,
interest rate process, and recovery rates are mutually independent. Then the reduced-form CDS
spread pricing equation given for a contract starting from time t010 to tT :
s =
∫ tT
t0
[1− Rˆ−A(t)Rˆ]q(t)B(0, t)dt∫ tT
t0
q(t)[B(0, t) + e(t)B(0, t)]dt+ [1− ∫ tTt0 q(t)dt]B(0, tT ) (3.8)
where
s: The credit default swap spread when the present value of the premium leg was equal to the default
leg at inception of CDS. This is total payments per year made by protection buyer or credit risk seller
B(0,t): The risk-free discount factor
tT : Life of the credit default swap
Rˆ: Expected recovery rate on the reference obligation
q(t): Risk-neutral default probability density at time t
u(t): payments at the rate of $1 per year on payment dates between time zero and time t
e(t): an interest accrual payment at time t equal to t-t∗ where t∗ is the payment date immediately
preceding time t
v(t): $ 1 received at time t
A(t): Accrued interest on the reference obligation at time t as a percent of face value
The numerator of Eqs (3.8),
∫ tT
t0
[1 − Rˆ − A(t)Rˆ]q(t)B(0, t)dt is defined as default leg. This
10To be precise, the contract is not activating at t0. The contract starts from t0 +  given  > 0, which
is approaching to zero. Throughout the report, we interchange the notation of t0 and 0 in the zero discount
function B(0,t).
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is the present value of payments conditional on a default event. This captures the lump-sum pay-
ment or the loss given default that protection seller must pay to the protection buyer. The de-
nominator, s ∗ {∫ tTt0 q(t)[B(0, t) + e(t)B(0, t)]dt + [1 − ∫ tTt0 q(t)dt]B(0, tT )} indicates the pre-
mium leg, which captures the protection buyer’s cash outflows per unit of spread. In particu-
lar, the first term s ∗ ∫ tTt0 q(t)[B(0, t) + e(t)B(0, t)]dt indicates the present value of the pay-
ment when default occurs at time t. The second term s ∗ [1 − ∫ tTt0 q(t)dt]B(0, tT ) indicates the
present value if there is no default happens prior to time tT . Taking the difference between present
value of premium leg and the present value of the default leg, we obtain s ∗ {∫ tTt0 q(t)[B(0, t) +
e(t)B(0, t)]dt+ [1− ∫ tTt0 q(t)dt]B(0, tT )} − ∫ tTt0 [1− Rˆ−A(t)Rˆ]q(t)B(0, t)dt. In discrete form,
we have s ∗ {∑tTt0 q(t)[B(0, t) + e(t)B(0, t)]∆t + [1 −∑tTt0 q(t)∆t]B(0, tT )} −∑tTt0 [1 − Rˆ −
A(t)Rˆ]q(t)B(0, t)∆t
11.
Next, we define the net present value between default and premium leg as Λti up to time ti and
finitely partition the time stamp between t0 and tT such that t0 < t1 < t2 < t3 < ... < ti < ... <
tT .
Λti =
ti∑
t1
sti{q(ti)[B(0, ti) + e(ti)B(0, ti)]∆ti + [1−
t=ti∑
t=t1
q(t)∆t]B(0, ti)}
− [1− Rˆ−A(ti)Rˆ]q(ti)B(0, ti)∆ti = 0
(3.9)
We use standard exponential form of the survival probability function given no default happens from
time t0 to time ti following existing literature
Q(ti) = exp[−
∫ ti
t0
h(s)ds] (3.10)
Given the finite time stamp t0 < t1 < t2 < t3 < ... < ti, the probability of default happening at
time t is thus given by
q(ti) = Q(ti−1)−Q(ti) = exp[−
∫ ti−1
t0
h(s)ds]− exp[−
∫ ti
t0
h(s)ds] (3.11)
11One can immediately verify this by setting Eqs (3.8) into zero.
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The q(ti) can be expressed in terms of the discrete form
q(ti) = Q(ti−1)−Q(ti) = exp[−
ti−1∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t]− exp[−
ti∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t] (3.12)
where ∆ti is defined as ti− ti−1. We bootstrap the entire hazard rate curve given the historical CDS
spread {st1 , st2 , ..., stT } from the shortest tenor t1 to longest tenor tT to work out the hazard rate
based on Λti . the segments of the hazard rate function are chosen to match the maturity dates
12 of
the CDS spreads in the curve. Each segment can be fitted using successive of CDS spreads observed
from the market, with the hazard rate segment chosen to ensure that CDS has zero value. The hazard
rate h1 can be obtained from the construction of default density function q(t1) given by assumption
of survival function. At t2, we obtain h(t2) and q(t2) given st2 based on Λt2 , which requires value
of q(t1) obtained from the previews step. At ti, we obtain h(ti) and q(ti) given sti based on Λti ,
which requires a sequence of q(t1),...,q(ti−1). We recursively conduct this process up to time to
maturity, say, tT . Therefore we bootstrap the entire hazard rate curve {h(t1), h(t2), ..., h(tT )}.
Intuitively, at t1, we can obtain hazard rate h(t1) given historical CDS spread st1 based on
the first net present value Λt1 . The first payment is a special case because the q0 is zero (no default
happens before a contract is alive). This allows us to directly work out the q1 based on the expression
of Λt1 . Specifically, the default density q1 can be solved as qt1 = − st1[e(t1)st1−(1−Rˆ−A(t1)Rˆ)]∆t1 . The
derivation is following
Λt1 = st1 [q(t1)e(t1)B(0, t1)∆t1 +B(0, t1)]− [1− Rˆ−A(t1)Rˆ]q(t1)B(0, t1)∆t1
= [st1 ∗ q(t1)e(t1)B(0, t1)∆t1 + st1 ∗B(0, t1)]− [1− Rˆ−A(t1)Rˆ]q(t1)B(0, t1)∆t1
= q(t1)[st1e(t1)B(0, t1)∆t1 − [1− Rˆ−A(t1)Rˆ]B(0, t1)∆t1 ] + st1B(0, t1) = 0
Arrange terms, we have
qt1 = −
st1
[e(t1)st1 − (1− Rˆ−A(t1)Rˆ)]∆t1
Since qt1 = Q(t0) − Q(t1) = 1 − Q(t1) = 1 − exp[−h(t1) ∗∆t1 ], the first period hazard rate is
12For instance, the available maturities are 6 month, 1 year, 2 year, 3 year, 4 year, 5 year, 7 year, 10 year,
15 year, 20 year, 30 year.
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h(t1) = − ln(1−qt1 )∆t1 . Then we can specify Λti for i > 1 by the linear form: Λti = β1∗q(ti)+β0 = 0.
The β1 and β2 are known at ti. β1 and β2 are based on the following derivation
Λti = sti{
t=ti∑
t=t1
q(ti)[B(0, ti) + e(ti)B(0, ti)]∆ti + [1−
t=ti∑
t=t1
q(t)∆t]B(0, ti)} − [1− Rˆ−A(ti)Rˆ]
q(ti)B(0, ti)∆ti = q(ti){B(0, ti)∆ti [stie(ti)− [1− Rˆ−A(ti)Rˆ]}+ sti{[1−
t=ti−1∑
t=t1
q(t)∆t]B(0, ti)
+
t=ti−1∑
t=t1
[q(t)B(0, t)(1 + e(t))∆t]} = β1 ∗ q(ti) + β0 = 0
(3.13)
We define
β1 = {B(0, ti)∆ti [stie(ti)− [1− Rˆ−A(ti)Rˆ]
and
β0 = sti{[1−
t=ti−1∑
t=t1
q(t)∆t]B(0, ti) +
t=ti−1∑
t=t1
[q(t)B(0, t)(1 + e(t))∆t]}
. Since β0 and β1 are function of discount factor B(0, ti), recovery rate, CDS spread sti and past
probability density function {h(t1),h(t2),...,h(ti−1)} and their values are known at time ti, the
default density q(ti) at ti can express as q(ti) = −β0β1 given the values of RHS are known. Together
with the definition of default density function, the hazard rate h(ti) is solved in the following few
steps:
h(ti) = − 1
∆t
{ln{exp[−
ti−1∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t] +
β0
β1
}+
ti−1∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t}
Since the default density function q(ti) is defined as exp[−
∑ti−1
t=t0
h(t)∆t]− exp[−
∑ti
t=t0
h(t)∆t]
and q(ti) can also be expressed as linear form: Λti = β1 ∗ q(ti) + β0 = 0, where β0 = sti{[1 −∑t=ti−1
t=t1
q(t)∆t]B(0, ti)+
∑t=ti−1
t=t1
[q(t)B(0, t)(1+e(t))∆t]}, we substitute exp[−
∑ti−1
t=t0
h(t)∆t]−
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exp[−∑tit=t0 h(t)∆t] into q(ti) in order to find h(ti). Particularly, we have
−β0
β1
= exp[−
ti−1∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t]− exp[−
ti∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t]
= exp[−
ti−1∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t]− exp[−
ti−1∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t − h(ti)∆ti ]
This is same as
exp[−
ti−1∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t − h(ti)∆ti ] = exp[−
ti−1∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t] +
β0
β1
Take natural log on the both side of the equation, we obtain
−
ti−1∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t − h(ti)∆ti = ln{exp[−
ti−1∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t] +
β0
β1
}
Arrange terms, we obtain
h(ti) = − 1
∆t
{ln{exp[−
ti−1∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t] +
β0
β1
}+
ti−1∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t}
.
This is the closed form solution for h(ti). After obtaining the hazard rate for each tenor, we use
cubic spine to interpolate the hazard rate in order to obtain the continuous default probability curve.
Lastly, we compute the implied probability default from the bootstrapped hazard rate following the
definition of default probability. The default probability curve PD(ti) and survival function Q(ti)
are given by the following relationship
PD(ti) = P [t <= ti] = 1−Q(ti) (3.14)
The survival function Q(ti) is given by
Q(ti) = exp[−
ti∑
t=t0
h(t)∆t] (3.15)
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We compute the default probability term structure by substitute h(t).
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Table 1A. Firm distribution of CDS firms versus non-CDS firms: Panel A of Table 1A
reports the sample distribution of CDS firms versus non-CDS firms from 1994 to 2016.
Panel B of Table 1A reports the number of unique firms in our sample
Panel A:
Year CDS firms NonCDS firms
1994 21 4513
1995 45 4741
1996 66 4928
1997 95 5083
1998 166 5246
1999 231 5078
2000 288 4825
2001 406 4458
2002 473 4338
2003 563 3947
2004 630 3705
2005 642 3535
2006 624 3477
2007 621 3359
2008 575 3250
2009 545 3228
2010 528 3095
2011 511 2970
2012 487 2925
2013 469 2881
2014 449 2877
2015 428 2945
2016 401 2888
Panel B:
CDS Firms Total Firms
Firms 849 14771
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Table 1B. Summary statistics for main variables: This table provides summary statistics
for our sample of 530021 (492761 for non-CDS trading sample and 37260 for CDS trading
sample) firm-quarter observations from 1971Q1-2016Q4. The CDS trading starts 1994.
The summary statistics include sample average, sample standard deviation, 25 percentile,
median, and 75 percentile. Panel A is the descriptive statistics for the non-CDS sample,
while panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the CDS trading sample. Please refer to
Appendix 1 for detail disclosure of the variables definitions and constructions. We win-
sorize all continuous variables at 1% and 99% levels.
Panel A: The Non-CDS sample
Variable N Mean S.D. 0.25Q Mdn 0.75Q
|EQ1| 492761 0.06 0.24 0.01 0.03 0.06
|EQ2| 492761 0.05 0.25 0.01 0.02 0.05
BookLeverage 492761 0.24 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.37
OperCycle 492761 3.67 2.54 3.30 4.44 4.97
Loss 492761 0.39 0.33 0.08 0.25 0.58
M/B ratio 492761 2.56 3.90 0.98 1.66 2.95
TA(in Billions) 492761 1.34 4.88 0.04 0.18 0.80
CashFlowVolatility 492761 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.07
SalesVolatility 492761 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.07
Cash Holding 492761 0.07 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.05
SalesGrowth 492761 0.00 0.44 -0.15 0.00 0.15
rating 492761 14.25 4.31 11.00 15.00 16.00
∆AP 492761 0.02 0.37 -0.14 0.02 0.18
∆Rec 492761 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00
IBTV 492761 1.11 1.50 0.00 0.00 3.12
Panel B: The CDS sample
Variable N Mean S.D. 0.25Q Mdn 0.75Q
|EQ1| 37260 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.04
|EQ2| 37260 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.03
BookLeverage 37260 0.32 0.16 0.20 0.30 0.41
OperCycle 37260 3.28 3.30 3.47 4.32 4.77
Loss 37260 0.24 0.22 0.08 0.17 0.33
M/B ratio 37260 2.87 4.14 1.32 2.10 3.40
TA(in Billions) 37260 19.57 25.86 4.09 9.57 23.72
CashFlowVolatility 37260 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
SalesVolatility 37260 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04
Cash Holding 37260 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
SalesGrowth 37260 0.00 0.31 -0.10 0.00 0.11
rating 37260 11.13 3.34 9.00 11.00 13.00
∆AP 37260 0.01 0.34 -0.08 0.01 0.10
∆Rec 37260 0.04 0.49 -0.01 0.00 0.04
IBTV 37260 2.65 1.14 3.08 3.14 3.17
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Table 1D. Summary statistics for probability default curve versus CDS terms structure:
6 Month 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 30 Year
Mean.Default curve. 0.0185 0.0338 0.1224 0.1968 0.3651
Stdv.Default curve. (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Mean.CDS curve. 0.0116 0.0122 0.0182 0.0204 0.0267
Stdv.CDS curve. (0.05) (0.08) (0.18) (0.24) (0.31)
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Table 2. CDS trading and absolute discretionary accruals: baseline regression result: This
table presents the estimates of the effect of CDS trading on absolute or unsigned discre-
tionary accruals in a 530021 firm-quarter sample including both firms with CDS trading
and without CDS trading using an industry-quarter fixed effect panel regression model
with clustered for standard errors within industry and quarter. The sample period is from
1973Q1-2016Q4. The dependent variables are Jones’ 1991 discretionary accruals |EQ1|
or modified Jones’ 1991 accruals |EQ2| by Dechow et at. (1995) at quarter t. The con-
trol variables include cash flow volatility, sales volatility, change of sales growth(∆ sales
growth), operation cycle, an incidence of negative earnings realization (we denote as a loss
in the regression table), book leverage, total asset (in billions), market-to-book ratio. The
CDS trading dummy is the dummy variable equal to 1 to a firm in quarter t if there are CDS
contracts written on the reference entitys debt during the sample period, otherwise equals
to zero. We include an additional control variable CDSTraded (equals to one if there are
a CDS for the firm’s debt at any time during our sample period, zero otherwise) to control
for time-invariant unobservable differences between CDS and non-CDS firms suggested by
Saretto and Tookes (2013). See Appendix 1 for discussion of detail construction of control
variables. The coefficient of interest is β1 and β2, which capture the impact of the incep-
tion of CDS trading on discretionary accruals errors. We posit that β1 < 0 and β2 < 0.
***,**, and * denote significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The numbers in
the parentheses are T-statistics. We include the industry (we use Fama-French 48 industry
classification) and quarter fixed effect and adjustment for standard error by clustering into
an industry and quarter level. We winsorize all continuous variables at 1% and 99% levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
|EQ1| |EQ1| |EQ2| |EQ2|
CDSTrading× I[EQ < 0], β1 (-) -0.0123*** -0.0089*** -0.0172*** -0.0140***
(-5.61) (-4.82) (-4.86) (-4.51)
CDSTrading× I[EQ > 0], β2 (-) -0.0072*** -0.0032*** -0.0084*** -0.0048***
(-5.70) (-2.70) (-6.44) (-4.05)
CDS Traded, β3 -0.0127*** -0.0034*** -0.0123*** -0.0037***
(-32.60) (-9.09) (-27.65) (-9.49)
Total Asset(-) -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(-6.12) (-4.14)
Sales Volatility(+) 0.1139*** 0.1143***
(19.64) (15.92)
CashFlowVolatility(+) 0.1400*** 0.1355***
(14.13) (12.28)
Loss(+) 0.0339*** 0.0304***
(25.42) (15.37)
Operation Cycle(+) 0.0012*** 0.0011***
(3.94) (3.81)
∆ Sales Growth(+) 0.0051*** 0.0040***
(5.43) (4.61)
Book Leverage(-) -0.0041*** -0.0095***
(-2.82) (-5.03)
MB ratio(+) 0.0010*** 0.0010***
(7.48) (8.25)
Intercept 0.0570*** 0.0218*** 0.0499*** 0.0177***
(439.29) (11.12) (252.51) (9.53)
Industry&Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 530021 530021 530021 530021
R-sq 0.256 0.266 0.141 0.147
adj. R-sq 0.247 0.257 0.13 0.136
156
Table 3. Event study, CDS trading and change of discretionary accruals estimation error:
This table presents the changes in abnormal earnings accruals for firms with CDS from 3
quarters before the inception of CDS trading to zero, one, two, and three years after the
inception of CDS trading. t=-3 indicates three quarters before the inception, t=-2 indicates
two quarters before the inception the inception, so on so forth. The measurement of ac-
cruals estimation errors is either the |EQ1| or the |EQ2|. We compute the log-change of
|EQ1| (|EQ2|) to measure the inter-temporal change of |EQ1| (|EQ2|) that responses to the
onset of CDS. Standard T-statistics is reported in the bracket. The period of this analysis is
from 1994Q1 to 2016Q4. The first CDS trading starts at 1994 in our sample. ***,**, and
* denote significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
t=-3 t=-2 t=-1 t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3
|EQ1| 0.019 -0.102* -0.051 -0.082* -0.241*** -0.055 -0.055
T-statistics (0.401) (-1.971) (-1.040) (-1.823) (-4.529) (-1.091) (-1.148)
|EQ2| -0.057 -0.023 -0.070 0.045 -0.345**** -0.089* -0.089*
T-statistics (-1.209) (-0.460) (-1.436) (0.988) (-6.800) (-1.761) (-1.866)
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Table 4. Difference-in-difference design with propensity score matching technique: The
table reports the estimated result of the effect of post-CDS trade initiation on the accruals
estimation errors in a sample including CDS trading firms and non-CDS traded propensity-
score-matched firms. The sample is from 1973Q1 to 2016Q4. The empirical research
design of a difference-in-difference design is discussed in section . Our matching criteria is
one non-CDS firm nearest CDS firm’s and within a difference of 1 percent. The matching
covariates include variables Cash flow volatility, sales volatility, change of sales growth(∆
sales growth), operation cycle, incidence of negative earnings realization (we denote as
loss in the regression table), book leverage, total asset (in billions), market-to-book ratio,
which are the control variables we used in Table 2. The dependent variables are Jones’
1991 discretionary accruals |EQ1| or modified Jones’ 1991 accruals |EQ2| by Dechow et
at. (1995) at quarter t. Panel A reports the mean difference between the treatment group
and control group before and after propensity score matching analysis. Panel B reports the
industry&quarter panel regression results by only considering treatment group and control
groups. The coefficient of interest is β1 and β2, which capture the impact of the inception
of CDS trading on discretionary accruals errors. We posit that β1 < 0 and β2 < 0. ***,**,
and * denote significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The numbers in the
parentheses are T-statistics. We include the industry (we use Fama-French 48 industry
classification) and quarter fixed effect and adjustment for standard error by clustering into
an industry and quarter level. We winsorize all continuous variables at 1% and 99% levels.
(1) (2)
Panel A: Before &After match
Before Match After Match
TotalAsset 14.918*** 0.602
SalesVolatility -0.023*** 0.001
CashFlowVolatility -0.017*** 0.001
Loss -0.146*** 0.015
OperationCycle -0.291*** 0.067
∆Sales Growth 0.004** -0.001
Book Leverage 0.116*** -0.008
MB ratio 0.439*** -0.163
Panel B: Difference-in-difference design result
|EQ1| |EQ2|
CDSTrading× I[EQ < 0],β1 (-) -0.0078*** -0.0147***
(-2.64) (-3.97)
CDSTrading× I[EQ > 0],β2 (-) -0.0091*** -0.0038*
(-3.95) (-1.83)
Total Asset(-) -0.0001** -0.0001***
(-2.49) (-3.89)
Sales Volatility(+) 0.1271*** 0.1481***
(2.77) (2.80)
CashFlowVolatility(+) 0.4333*** 0.3730***
(4.47) (3.85)
Loss(+) 0.0309*** 0.0287**
(2.85) (2.32)
Operation Cycle(+) 0.0006* 0.0004**
(1.79) (2.10)
∆ Sales Growth(+) 0.0080** 0.0049**
(2.11) (2.00)
Book Leverage(-) 0.0017* -0.0013
(1.78) (-1.33)
MB ratio(+) 0.0019 0.0022
(0.87) (1.50)
Intercept 0.0182*** 0.0004
(2.89) (0.07)
Industry&Quarter FE YES YES
Cluster SE YES YES
N 52135 52135
R-sq 0.179 0.052
adj. R-sq 0.176 0.049
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Table 5. 2SLS results: Table 5 reports the 2SLS estimation results. In column (1), we report
the probit regression result. In particular, we run Prob(CDS Tradingt) = α+ γ∆IBTVt +
λControlsj,t + ej,t. The instrumental variable is IBTVt, which is industry peers’ trading
volume as instrumental variable following Oehmke and Zawadowski (2013) and Boehmer
et al. (2014), and Kim et al. (2015). This variable should only influence bond investors’
hedging/speculative demand but not affect the earnings quality. We construct this variable
by summing the individual bond into (Fama-French 48) industry level. We control for Cash
flow volatility, sales volatility, change of sales growth(∆ sales growth), operation cycle, an
incidence of negative earnings realization (we denote as a loss in the regression table), book
leverage, total asset (in billions), market-to-book ratio. In the second stage, we run |EQ| on
fitted CDS trading dummy derived from the first stage Probit model under Eqs.(3.4). The
CDS trading dummy is the dummy variable equal to 1 to a firm in quarter t if there are CDS
contracts written on the reference entitys debt during the sample period, otherwise equals
to zero. We include an additional control variable CDSTraded (equals to one if there are
a CDS for the firm’s debt at any time during our sample period, zero otherwise) to control
for time-invariant unobservable differences between CDS and non-CDS firms suggested by
Saretto and Tookes (2013). See Appendix 1 for discussion of detail construction of control
variables. The coefficient of interest is β1 and β2, which capture the impact of the inception
of CDS trading on discretionary accruals errors. We posit that β1 < 0 and β2 < 0. ***,**,
and * denote significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The numbers in the
parentheses are T-statistics. We include the industry (we use Fama-French 48 industry
classification) and quarter fixed effect and adjustment for standard error by clustering into
an industry and quarter level. We winsorize all continuous variables at 1% and 99% levels.
(1) (2) (3)
CDS Trading |EQ1| |EQ2|
1st Stage 2nd Stage
IBTV (+) 0.6537***
(160.99)
CDSTrading× I[EQ1 < 0],β1 (-) -0.0141***
(-4.42)
CDSTrading× I[EQ1 > 0],β2 (-) -0.0058***
(-2.90)
CDSTrading× I[EQ2 < 0],β1 (-) -0.0215***
(-4.40)
CDSTrading× I[EQ2 > 0],β2 (-) -0.0096***
(-3.70)
CDS Traded,β3 -0.0018*** -0.0012
(-3.06) (-1.46)
Total Asset(-) 0.0144*** -0.0001*** -0.0000**
(34.21) (-5.00) (-2.15)
Sales Volatility(+) -0.5773*** 0.1139*** 0.1144***
(-4.15) (19.68) (15.92)
CashFlowVolatility(+) 0.9544*** 0.1404*** 0.1360***
(8.23) (14.11) (12.26)
Loss(+) -0.0841*** 0.0339*** 0.0304***
(-2.86) (25.51) (15.35)
Operation Cycle(+) -0.0082*** 0.0012*** 0.0011***
(-3.19) (3.93) (3.78)
∆ Sales Growth(+) -0.0031 0.0051*** 0.0040***
(-0.17) (5.44) (4.61)
Book Leverage(-) 0.9157*** -0.0039*** -0.0091***
(22.71) (-2.73) (-5.03)
MB ratio(+) 0.0267*** 0.0010*** 0.0010***
(15.43) (7.50) (8.24)
Intercept -0.9617*** 0.0218*** 0.0176***
(-10.52) (11.05) (9.25)
Industry&Quarter FE NO YES YES
Cluster SE NO YES YES
N 530021 530021 530021
R-sq 0.266 0.147
adj. R-sq 0.256 0.136
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Table 6. CDS trading reduce absolute discretionary accruals by providing information to
suppliers about their account payable: The empirical design is based on Eq. (??). This table presents
the estimates result of Eq.(3.5) in a 530021 firm-quarter sample including both firms with CDS trading and
without CDS trading using an industry-quarter fixed effect panel regression model with clustered for standard
errors within industry and quarter. The sample period is from 1973Q1 to 2016Q4. The dependent variables
are Jones’ 1991 discretionary accruals |EQ1| or modified Jones’ 1991 accruals |EQ2| by Dechow et at. (1995)
at quarter t. ∆APt is quarterly change in account payable(trade account) in liability side of balance sheet.
∆Rect is quarterly change in account receivable(trade account) in asset side of balance sheet. The control
variables and their predictions are discussed in 3.3.2. The control variables include Cash flow volatility,
sales volatility, change of sales growth(∆ sales growth), operation cycle, an incidence of negative earnings
realization (we denote as a loss in the regression table), book leverage, total asset (in billions), market-to-
book ratio. The CDS trading dummy is the dummy variable equal to 1 to a firm in quarter t if there are
CDS contracts written on the reference entitys debt during the sample period, otherwise equals to zero. We
include an additional control variable CDSTraded (equals to one if there are a CDS for the firm’s debt at
any time during our sample period, zero otherwise) to control for time-invariant unobservable differences
between CDS and non-CDS firms suggested by Saretto and Tookes (2013). See Appendix 1 for discussion
of detail construction of control variables. The coefficient of interest is β1 and β2, which capture the impact
of the inception of CDS trading on discretionary accruals errors. We posit that β1 < 0 and β2 < 0. ***,**,
and * denote significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The numbers in the parentheses are
T-statistics. We include the industry (we use Fama-French 48 industry classification) and quarter fixed effect
and adjustment for standard error by clustering into an industry and quarter level. We winsorize all continuous
variables at 1% and 99% levels.
(1) (2)
|EQ1| |EQ2|
CDSTrading× I[EQ < 0], β1, (-) -0.0085*** -0.0142***
(-4.38) (-4.39)
CDSTrading× I[EQ > 0], β2, (-) -0.0031** -0.0047***
(-2.42) (-3.73)
CDSTrading ∗ I[EQ < 0] ∗∆AP, β3, (-) -0.0071** -0.0188**
(-1.99) (-2.37)
CDSTrading ∗ I[EQ < 0] ∗∆Rec, β4, (≈0) 0.0012 -0.0017
-(0.77) (-0.63)
CDSTrading ∗ I[EQ > 0] ∗∆AP, β3, (≈0) -0.0052 -0.0088
(-0.67) (-1.19)
CDSTrading ∗ I[EQ > 0] ∗∆Rec, β4, (≈0) 0.0031 0.0021
(1.40) (1.26)
CDS Traded -0.0034*** -0.0037***
(-8.84) (-8.82)
∆ Rec -0.0002 0.0009
(-0.12) (0.55)
∆ AP 0.0059*** 0.0049***
(3.41) (2.69)
Total Asset(-) -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(-6.06) (-3.85)
Sales Volatility(+) 0.1092*** 0.1105***
(17.95) (14.24)
CashFlowVolatility(+) 0.1596*** 0.1545***
(12.73) (11.37)
Loss(+) 0.0325*** 0.0296***
(21.31) (12.98)
Operation Cycle(+) 0.0011*** 0.0011***
(3.37) (3.54)
∆ Sales Growth(+) 0.0044*** 0.0035***
(4.24) (3.61)
Book Leverage(-) -0.0036** -0.0094***
(-2.28) (-4.45)
MB ratio(+) 0.0008*** 0.0010***
(6.63) (7.38)
Intercept 0.0214*** 0.0173***
(9.89) (8.63)
Industry&Quarter FE YES YES
Cluster SE YES YES
N 530021 530021
R-sq 0.253 0.145
adj. R-sq 0.242 0.133
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Table 7. Credit lenders’ trade credit exposure channel should come from median credit
rating group rather than either high rating group or poor rating group: H2a suggests that credit
lenders trade credit exposure channel should come from median credit rating group rather than either high rating group or poor rating
group. To test this, we split our sample into high, median, and low rating group. Compustat S&P domestic long-term issuer credit
rating covers AAA, AA+, AA, AA-,A+,A,A-,BBB+,BBB,BBB-,BB+,BB,BB-,B+,B,B-,CCC+,CCC,CCC-,CC, D, SD. We then group
firms into high, median, and low rating groups by classifying: (i) A group: AAA, AA+, AA, AA-; (ii) B group, BBB+,BBB,BBB-
,BB+,BB,BB-,B,B-,B+; and (iii) C or below group: CCC+, CCC, CCC-, CC, D, SD. We estimate Eq.(??) for each rating group. Column
(1)-(3) ((4)-(6)) of Table 6B reports the estimation result respect to dependent variable |EQ1| (|EQ2|). This table presents the estimates
result of Eq. (??) in a 530021 firm-quarter sample including both firms with CDS trading and without CDS trading using an industry-
quarter fixed effect panel regression model with clustered for standard errors within industry and quarter. The sample period is from
1973Q1-2016Q4. The dependent variables are Jones’ 1991 discretionary accruals |EQ1| or modified Jones’ 1991 accruals |EQ2| by
Dechow et at. (1995) at quarter t. ∆APt is quarterly change in account payable(trade account) in liability side of balance sheet. ∆Rect
is quarterly change in account receivable(trade account) in asset side of balance sheet. The control variables and their predictions are
discussed in 3.3.2. The control variables include Cash flow volatility, sales volatility, change of sales growth(∆ sales growth), operation
cycle, an incidence of negative earnings realization (we denote as a loss in the regression table), book leverage, total asset (in billions),
market-to-book ratio. The CDS trading dummy is the dummy variable equal to 1 to a firm in quarter t if there are CDS contracts written
on the reference entitys debt during the sample period, otherwise equals to zero. We include an additional control variable CDSTraded
(equals to one if there are a CDS for the firm’s debt at any time during our sample period, zero otherwise) to control for time-invariant
unobservable differences between CDS and non-CDS firms suggested by Saretto and Tookes (2013). See Appendix 1 for discussion of
detail construction of control variables. The coefficient of interest is β1 and β2, which capture the impact of the inception of CDS trading
on discretionary accruals errors. We posit that β1 < 0 and β2 < 0. ***,**, and * denote significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level
respectively. The numbers in the parentheses are T-statistics. We include the industry (we use Fama-French 48 industry classification)
and quarter fixed effect and adjustment for standard error by clustering into an industry and quarter level. We winsorize all continuous
variables at 1% and 99% levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A group B group C or below A group B group C or below
|EQ1| |EQ1| |EQ1| |EQ2| |EQ2| |EQ2|
CDSTrading× I[EQ < 0], β1, (-) -0.0140** -0.0092*** -0.0091** -0.0166** -0.0154*** -0.0101*
(-2.04) (-4.11) (-2.05) (-2.38) (-4.32) (-1.76)
CDSTrading× I[EQ > 0], β2, (-) -0.0063** -0.0027* -0.004 -0.0083* -0.0053*** 0.0021
(-2.11) (-1.75) (-0.88) (-1.68) (-2.98) (0.51)
CDSTrading ∗ I[EQ < 0] ∗∆AP, β3, (-) -0.0129 -0.0078* -0.007 -0.0243 -0.0179** -0.0122
(-0.96) (-1.66) (-0.41) (-1.21) (-2.20) (-0.82)
CDSTrading ∗ I[EQ < 0] ∗∆Rec, β4, (≈0) -0.0055 0.0004 0.0089 -0.0065 -0.0021 0.0074*
(-1.27) (0.18) (1.54) (-1.38) (-0.55) (1.72)
CDSTrading ∗ I[EQ > 0] ∗∆AP, β3, (≈0) 0.0005 -0.0091 -0.0074 -0.0056 -0.0116 -0.0079
(0.05) (-0.86) (-1.35) (-0.62) (-1.17) (-1.28)
CDSTrading ∗ I[EQ > 0] ∗∆Rec, β4, (≈0) -0.0066 0.0041 -0.0018 -0.0051 0.0029 -0.0004
(-1.52) (1.21) (-0.47) (-1.15) (1.21) (-0.13)
CDS Traded -0.0045*** -0.0020*** -0.0037*** -0.0044*** -0.0022*** -0.0051***
(-5.06) (-3.43) (-3.20) (-5.45) (-3.88) (-4.72)
∆ Rec 0.004 0.001 -0.0034 0.0059 0.001 -0.0019
(1.01) (0.57) (-1.38) (1.29) (0.49) (-0.79)
∆ AP 0.008 0.0068*** 0.0014 0.0084 0.0050*** 0.0014
(1.07) (4.76) (0.77) (1.01) (3.61) (0.79)
Total Asset(-) -0.0001* -0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0001* -0.0001*** -0.0001
(-1.77) (-7.02) (-2.10) (-1.67) (-4.13) (-0.76)
Sales Volatility(+) 0.1727*** 0.1028*** 0.0882*** 0.1686*** 0.1040*** 0.0923***
(8.58) (16.05) (5.62) (7.46) (13.14) (5.16)
CashFlowVolatility(+) 0.1108*** 0.1655*** 0.1644*** 0.1133*** 0.1586*** 0.1590***
(4.61) (12.50) (7.11) (4.47) (10.62) (6.76)
Loss(+) 0.0390*** 0.0326*** 0.0333*** 0.0375*** 0.0290*** 0.0285***
(7.76) (18.63) (11.25) (6.25) (11.85) (8.86)
Operation Cycle(+) 0.0004 0.0013*** 0.0011*** 0.0005 0.0012*** 0.0008***
(0.81) (3.56) (3.78) (0.91) (3.43) (2.88)
∆ Sales Growth(+) -0.002 0.0057*** 0.0033* -0.0034 0.0047*** 0.0015
(-0.34) (4.26) (1.89) (-0.53) (3.59) (0.93)
Book Leverage(-) -0.0066 -0.0027* -0.0046 -0.0092* -0.0087*** -0.0099**
(-1.54) (-1.69) (-0.98) (-1.86) (-4.20) (-2.14)
MB ratio(+) 0.0012** 0.0008*** 0.0008** 0.0014** 0.0009*** 0.0008**
(1.97) (5.92) (2.27) (2.26) (6.36) (2.31)
Intercept 0.0204*** 0.0216*** 0.0235*** 0.0145*** 0.0175*** 0.0203***
(11.23) (8.83) (10.81) (6.62) (7.51) (10.28)
Industry&Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 69496 361354 48127 69496 361354 48127
R-sq 0.327 0.264 0.47 0.219 0.143 0.37
adj. R-sq 0.259 0.25 0.396 0.141 0.127 0.282
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Table 8. High cash holding firms versus low cash holding firms: In this table, we par-
tition our sample into low cash holding and high cash holding based on cross-sectional
median of cash holding of the total sample. The sample period is from 1973Q1-2016Q4.
The dependent variables are Jones’ 1991 discretionary accruals |EQ1| or modified Jones’
1991 accruals |EQ2| by Dechow et at. (1995) at quarter t. The control variables and their
predictions are discussed in 3.3.2. The control variables include Cash flow volatility, sales
volatility, change of sales growth(∆ sales growth), operation cycle, an incidence of nega-
tive earnings realization (we denote as a loss in the regression table), book leverage, total
asset (in billions), market-to-book ratio. The CDS trading dummy is the dummy variable
equal to 1 to a firm in quarter t if there are CDS contracts written on the reference entitys
debt during the sample period, otherwise equals to zero. We include an additional control
variable CDSTraded (equals to one if there are a CDS for the firm’s debt at any time during
our sample period, zero otherwise) to control for time-invariant unobservable differences
between CDS and non-CDS firms suggested by Saretto and Tookes (2013). See Appendix
1 for discussion of detail construction of control variables. The coefficient of interest is β1
and β2, which capture the impact of the inception of CDS trading on discretionary accruals
errors. We posit that β1 < 0 and β2 < 0. ***,**, and * denote significant at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level respectively. The numbers in the parentheses are T-statistics. We include
the industry (we use Fama-French 48 industry classification) and quarter fixed effect and
adjustment for standard error by clustering into an industry and quarter level. We winsorize
all continuous variables at 1% and 99% levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
<meidan cash ≥median cash <meidan cash ≥median cash
|EQ1| |EQ1| |EQ2| |EQ2|
CDSTrading× I[EQ < 0], β1 (-) -0.0038*** -0.0049 -0.0080*** -0.0102
(-3.22) (-0.57) (-4.62) (-1.05)
CDSTrading× I[EQ > 0], β2 (-) -0.0031*** 0.0282 -0.0028*** 0.0258
(-3.76) (0.97) (-3.30) (0.98)
CDS Traded, β3 -0.0030*** 0.0022** -0.0036*** 0.0017
(-8.57) (2.33) (-10.69) (1.55)
Total Asset(-) -0.0001*** -0.0011*** -0.0001*** -0.0009**
(-6.46) (-2.91) (-4.99) (-2.56)
Sales Volatility(+) 0.1139*** 0.1097*** 0.1186*** 0.1083***
(11.84) (14.61) (11.02) (12.27)
CashFlowVolatility(+) 0.1400*** 0.1331*** 0.1336*** 0.1285***
(12.13) (12.37) (11.04) (11.16)
Loss(+) 0.0284*** 0.0326*** 0.0248*** 0.0281***
(18.32) (20.94) (12.41) (16.17)
Operation Cycle(+) 0.0008*** 0.0015*** 0.0008*** 0.0014***
(4.00) (3.75) (4.30) (3.44)
∆ Sales Growth(+) 0.0038*** 0.0060*** 0.0022*** 0.0051***
(4.32) (4.80) (2.83) (4.11)
Book Leverage(-) -0.002 0.0012 -0.0079*** -0.0032*
(-1.01) (0.63) (-3.22) (-1.70)
MB ratio(+) 0.0006*** 0.0012*** 0.0008*** 0.0012***
(5.35) (5.88) (5.71) (6.20)
Intercept 0.0202*** 0.0241*** 0.0155*** 0.0210***
(13.34) (9.75) (12.15) (8.44)
Industry&Quarter FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES
N 263190 266831 263190 266831
R-sq 0.296 0.281 0.123 0.196
adj. R-sq 0.277 0.262 0.1 0.176
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Table 9. Higher default risk at quarter t predicts the more active corporate liquidity manage-
ment policy in the future: We use regression:∆CPi,t+1→t+4 = α+β1∗Di,t+Industry FE+
i,t+1→t+4 where ∆CPi,t+1 is the one-year ahead change of corporate actions. We proxy
corporate liquidity practices using (1) cash holding; (2) Operational cash flow; and (3) Net
working capital. In this specification, we only focus on firms with CDS trading activities.
We gauge the degree of distress risk from CDS markets using 5-year default probabili-
ties, which are bootstrapped via the entire CDS curve following Hull and White (2000)s’
reduced-form CDS pricing framework. At each quarter, we split the sample into half using
|EQ| based on its the cross-sectional median. We consider two EQ: (1) |EQ1t| is Jone’s dis-
cretionary accruals model and (2) |EQ2t| is modified Jone’s discretionary accruals model.
We include the industry fixed effect. We run the above empirical specification for both high
and low discretionary accruals sample. ***,**, and * denote significant at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level respectively. The numbers in the parentheses are T-statistics. We include the
industry (we use Fama-French 48 industry classification) and quarter fixed effect and ad-
justment for standard error by clustering into an industry and quarter level. We winsorize
all continuous variables at 1% and 99% levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Low |EQ1| High |EQ1| Low |EQ1| High |EQ1| Low |EQ1| High |EQ1|
Dep variable Cash Holding Cash Holding Cash flow Cash flow Working Capital Working Capital
Default 5Y 0.020** 0.054*** 0.001 0.014* 0.028*** 0.046***
(2.45) (6.34) (0.11) (1.98) (2.68) (4.77)
Intercept -0.000 -0.010*** 0.001 -0.003* -0.003 -0.008***
(-0.17) (-5.49) (0.63) (-1.91) (-1.17) (-3.40)
N 6046 6054 6046 6054 6046 6054
R-sq 0.245 0.221 0.171 0.139 0.246 0.211
adj. R-sq 0.172 0.143 0.089 0.053 0.172 0.132
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster for SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Low |EQ2| High |EQ2| Low |EQ2| High |EQ2| Low |EQ2| High |EQ2|
Dep variable Cash Holding Cash Holding Cash flow Cash flow Working Capital Working Capital
Default 5Y 0.012 0.051*** 0.002 0.012* 0.018 0.047***
(1.36) (6.16) (0.31) (1.91) (1.60) (5.59)
Intercept 0.002 -0.009*** 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.008***
(0.93) (-5.54) (0.44) (-1.55) (0.05) (-4.26)
N 6046 6054 6046 6054 6046 6054
R-sq 0.259 0.220 0.214 0.124 0.257 0.209
adj. R-sq 0.171 0.154 0.120 0.050 0.168 0.143
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster for SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 10. The value implication: The dependent variables are EPS growth from quarter
t to quarter t+1; High |EQ| is a dummy variable equaling to 1 if, for each t, the value of
|EQi,t| is greater than the cross-sectional median. Similar, we consider two EQ: (1) |EQ1t|
is Jone’s discretionary accruals model and (2) |EQ2t| is modified Jone’s discretionary ac-
cruals model. We only include industry fixed effect to study the intertemporal effect. The
numbers in the parentheses are T-statistics. We include the industry (we use Fama-French
48 industry classification) and quarter fixed effect and adjustment for standard error by
clustering into an industry and quarter level. We winsorize all continuous variables at 1%
and 99% levels.
Panel A: (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆EPSt+1 ∆EPSt+1 ∆EPSt+1 ∆EPSt+1
High |EQ1| × CDS Trading 0.090**
(2.17)
CDS Trading 0.011
(0.69)
High |EQ1| -0.022*** -0.022*** 0.006 -0.027***
(-2.71) (-2.72) (0.14) (-3.30)
N 168727 154165 14562 168727
R-sq 0.074 0.077 0.214 0.074
adj. R-sq 0.073 0.076 0.206 0.073
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster for SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆EPSt+1 ∆EPSt+1 ∆EPSt+1 ∆EPSt+1
High |EQ2| × CDS Trading 0.070***
(2.79)
CDS Trading 0.006
(0.06)
High |EQ2| -0.024*** -0.020** -0.050 -0.026***
(-2.96) (-2.54) (-1.06) (-3.18)
N 168727 154165 14562 168727
R-sq 0.180 0.180 0.240 0.180
adj. R-sq 0.179 0.179 0.233 0.179
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster for SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A: Definition of variables used in this study:
Variable Description Definition
EarningsQuality
|EQ1| Jone’s 1991 model We use Jone’s 1991 model to compute the unsiged accruals error.
The detail methodology please refer to Section 3.3.2. Source :
Compustat and Professor Ken French’s Website for Fama-French 48 industries.
|EQ2| Modified version of For the detail methodology please refer to Section 3.3.2
Jone’s 1991 model Source Compustat and Professor Ken French’s Website.
CDS Variable
CDS Trading CDS trading dummy Allocating an indicator equaling to one to a firm in quarter t if
there is CDS contracts written on the reference entitys debt
obligation during the sample period. Otherwise we put them
as zero. Similar setting is used by Sareto and Tookes (2013),
Subrahmanyam,Tang, and Wang (2017) and Li and Tang
(2016). Source: Combined RED obligation file and RED entity
from Markit
CDS Traded CDS Traded dummy Allocating an indicator equaling to one to a firm in quarter t if
there is a CDS for the firm’s debt at any time during the sample
period, zero otherwise. Source: Source: Combined RED obligation file
and RED entity file from Markit.
Controls
TA(Millions) Total Assets The book value of total assets (ATQ) of firm j in year-quarter t
following Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman (2013) .
Source: Compustat.
CashFlowVolatility Cash flow volatility The standard deviation of cash from operations over last three years
following Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and McVay (2013). The operating
cash flow is computed using net income minus total accruals.
Source: Compustat.
SalesVolatility Sales volatility The standard deviation of sales [(REVTQ)/ (ATQ)] over
the past three years
following Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and McVay (2013).
Source: Compustat.
MB Market-to-book decile The firm’s market-to-book ((PRCCQ*CSHOQ)/(ATQ-LTQ))
decile in quarter t,
following Hribar and Nichols (2007). Source: Compustat.
Lev Book leverage ratio The firm’s book leverage ratio is by total debt over total asset
((DLCQ+DLTTQ)/ATQ). Source: Computstat.
∆SalesGrowth Change of sales growth The quarterly change in sales growth defined as current
quarter’s sales growth (ln(REVTQ(t)/REVTQ(t-1)) less prior
quarter’s sales growth (ln(REVTQ(t-1)/REVTQ(t-2))following
Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and McVay (2013).Source: Compustat.
OperCycle Operation cycle The length of the firms operating cycle, defined as sales turnover
plus days in inventory [(REVTQ/360)/(average RECTQ) +
(COGSQ/360)/(averageINVTQ)] and is average over the past
3 years following Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and McVay (2013).
Source: Compustat.
Loss Past loss The percentage of years reporting losses in net income (NIQ)
over the last three years. Source: Compustat.
∆ AP Change of Account The quarterly change of Account payable (Trade account). This item
payble represents only trade obligations due within one year or the normal
operating cycle of the company. The item recorded as APQ.
Source: Compustat.
∆ Rec Change of Account The quarterly change of Account receivable (Trade account). This item
Receivable represents amounts on open account, net of applicable reserves, owed
by customers for goods and services sold in the ordinary course
of business. This item is recorded as RECTRQ. Source: Compustat.
Instrumental Variables
IBTV Industry Peers’ Industry peers’ trading volume as instrumental variable
Bond Trading Volume following Oehmke and Zawadowski (2013) and
Boehmer et al. (2014), and Kim et al. (2015). This supposes to
only influence bond investors’ hedging/speculative demand
but not affect the earnings quality. We construct this variable by
summing the individual bond into (Fama-French 48) industry level.
Then in order to assign the value for firm j in industry k in quarter t,
we match industry k’s total bond trading volume to firm j by removing
firm j’s own trading volume. Source: TRACE and Professor
Ken French’s website.
Default Probability Slope
Slope Default slope The default slope is bootstrapped from CDS spread curve. The detail
methodology of the bootstrapping process is documented in Appendix 3.5.
Source: Markit for CDS price information and ICAP for zero discount curve.
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